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A B S T R A C T
This study employed a micro-approach methodology to examine the social and 
demographic implications of marriage practices and marriage change in a rural north In­
dian area. Female age at marriage rose from 13.2 in 1930-39 to 14.6 in 1980-83. This 
change was entirely due to a reduction in the time lag between the marriage and con­
summation (gauna ) ceremonies, and there had been no increase in age at effective m ar­
riage in the study area from 1930 to 1983. This Finding calls into question previous 
analyses of the relationship between age at marriage and fertility in the region based on 
census da ta  documenting the age at ceremonial rather than effective marriage. Factors 
influencing age at marriage and cohabitation are discussed.
Marriages in the study area were overwhelmingly parentally arranged. The criteria 
for selecting a marriage partner were primarily based upon considerations important to 
the extended family, rather than upon individual characteristics which would lead to the 
formation of a strong conjugal bond. The field of marriage selection was circumscribed 
by strict rules of caste, kinship, and village exogamy, which greatly narrowed the 
universe of potential partners, thus creating a highly hierarchical and regulated system 
of marital alliances.
Although a minority of marriages of the intermediate and scheduled castes in­
volved the payment of a brideprice, the vast majority of weddings were of a groomprice 
type. In groomprice weddings, although the families of both bride and groom spent large 
amounts of money on wedding expenses, in fact, the majority of clothing and ornaments 
given by the groom’s family returned with the bride to the husband’s house upon con­
summation of the marriage, while the cash and goods given by the bride's family were 
permanently lost to them. Once resident in the husband’s family, the young bride relin­
quished control over the items of her dowry to the family patriarch and his wife - thus 
the payment was effectively a “groomprice,” rather than a dowry payment.
These and other practices were evaluated in terms of the prevailing systems of so­
cial stratification, by age, sex, and caste, found in the society. Some policy suggestions 
were offered.
C O N T E N T S
ACKNOW LEDGEM ENTS.......................................................................................
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................
LIST OF T A B L E S .....................................................................................................
CHAPTER 1: A MICRO-APPROACH STUDY OF MARRIAGE IN A RURAL 
NORTH INDIAN AREA: PURPOSE AND METHODS . . . .
On the Importance of Studies of Marriage to Demography, and the
Relationship between Age at Marriage and Fertility in India . . .
Purpose of the Study .......................................................................................
The Choice of a Methodology ........................................................................
Rationale for Local Area and Village S e le c t io n ...........................................
Research Design and M ethodology.................................................................
Initial E n co u n te rs ...................................................................................
Village Census .......................................................................................
Interviews In -D e p th ...............................................................................
Attendance at Ceremonial F u n c tio n s ..................................................
Structure of the Thesis ...................................................................................
CHAPTER 2: ENTRY INTO THE VILLAGE ..................................................
The Village Environment and the Daily Activity C y c l e .............................
The Home Environment. Socialization of the Young, and Expected Roles 
and B e h a v io r ..........................................................................................
Caste, Power, Politics and F ac tio n a lism ......................................................
CHAPTER 3: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION . . .
Caste, Household Size, and Economic S t a t u s ...............................................
Occupation and Land Tenancy ....................................................................
iii
iv
viii
1
6
11
12
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
24
26
35
42
50
50
52
Education 59
VI
Family S t r u c t u r e ...................................................................................................................... 64
Fertility ...................................................................................................................................... 65
M o r t a l i t y ...................................................................................................................................... 69
Population G r o w t h .................................................................................................................. 73
C H A PT E R  4: AGE AT M A R R I A G E .......................................................................................... 76
The National and Regional C o n t e x t .................................................................................. 76
Age at Marriage and Effective Marriage and Changes Over Time for
Three U tta r  Pradesh Villages .................................................................................. 82
Social and Economic Charactaristics Influencing the Age at M a r r i a g e ...............91
Individual Level Factors Influencing the Age at Marriage . .  ........................ 101
C H A PT E R  5: A R RA N G EM EN T OF M A R R I A G E ............................................................ 104
Field of Selection .................................................................................................................... 105
Criteria of S e l e c t io n ................................................................................................................ 109
Party  to S e l e c t io n .................................................................................................................... 115
Marriage Arrangements for a Village Bride ................................................................ 123
Marriage Ceremonies in the Village ................................................................................ 126
Marital Dissolution, Remarriage, and Multiple M a r r i a g e s ........................................ 132
C H A PT E R  6: M ARRIAG E EXPENSES ................................................................................ 136
Marriage Expenses in Socio-Economic and Cultural Perspective ........................ 140
Variations in Marriage Expenses by C a s t e ........................................................ 142
Variations in Marriage Expenses by Economic Status and Occupation . 150
Variations in Marriage Expenses by E d u c a t i o n ................................................ 151
Changes over Time .................................................................................................... 152
Conflicts over Marriage P a y m e n t s .................................................................................... 154
C H A PT E R  7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ............................................................ 159
Summary and Discussion .................................................................................................... 159
Demographic Implications of the Study ........................................................................ 166
Policy Implications and Future  Prospects .................................................................... 168
Vl l
R EF E R EN C ES ........................................................................................................................173
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................... 183
APPENDIX A: VILLAGE CENSUS AND CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC
INDEX ..................................................................................................... 185
V 111
LIST OF T A B L E S
T a b l e P a g e
1.1 M e a n  A ge  a t  M a r r i a g e  for I n d ia  a n d  U t t a r  P r a d e s h .  1891-1981  . . . .
1.2 T i m e  E la p s e d  f r o m  C o n s u m m a t i o n  o f  M a r r i a g e  u n t i l  F i r s t  D e l iv e ry
bv  A g e  o f  W o m a n ........................................................................................................ . . 9
3.1 P o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  S t u d y  A r e a  bv  C a s t e  a n d  R e l i g i o n ...................................... . . 51
3.2 O c c u p a t i o n  o f  M a le  W o r k e r s  by  C a s t e ....................................................................... . . 53
3.3 O c c u p a t i o n  o f  M a le  W o r k e r s  bv  M a j o r  C a s t e  G r o u p  ...................................... . . 55
3 .4 P a t t e r n s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  L a n d  T e n a n c y  in t h e  S t u d y  V i l l a g e s ...................
3 .5 P e r c e n t a g e  o f  S c h o o l  A ge  C h i ld r e n  C u r r e n t l y  A t t e n d i n g  S choo l  by
M a j o r  C a s t e  G r o u p ................................................................................................... . . 60
3 .6 A v e r a g e  E d u c a t i o n a l  A t t a i n m e n t  o f  A d u l t  V i l l a g e r s  by M a jo r
C a s t e  G r o u p  .................................................................................................................. . . 63
3 .7 P o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  S t u d v  A r e a  bv  F a m i ly  T v p e .................................................... . . 64
3 .8 A v e r a g e  N u m b e r  o f  C h i ld r e n  E v e r  B o r n  a n d  S u r v iv in g  in t h e  S tu d y  
V i l la g e s  by A ge  o f  W o m a n  a n d  D u r a t i o n  o f  E f fe c t iv e  M a r r i a g e . . 66
3 .9 I n d i r e c t  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  A g e -S p e c if ic  F e r t i l i t y  R a t e s  a n d  T o t a l
F e r t i l i t y  R a t e  for t h e  S t u d v  V i l l a g e s ............................................................. . . 67
3 .1 0 I n d i r e c t  E s t i m a t i o n  o f  I n f a n t  a n d  C h i ld  M o r t a l i t y  a n d  E x p e c t a t i o n
o f  Life a t  B i r t h  for t h e  S t u d y  V i l la g e s  ........................................................ . . 71
3 .11 A n n u a l  E x p o n e n t i a l  R a t e  o f  P o p u l a t i o n  G r o w t h ,  In d ia ,  U t t a r
P r a d e s h ,  a n d  F a r r u k h a b a d  D i s t r i c t  ............................................................. . . 73
4.1 M e a n  A g e  a t  M a r r i a g e  o f  C e n s u s  S y n t h e t i c  C o h o r t s ,  In d ia ,  U t t a r
P r a d e s h ,  a n d  F a r r u k h a b a d  D i s t r i c t ,  1 8 9 1 -1 9 8 1  ..................................... TT
4 .2 P r o p o r t i o n s  N e v e r  M a r r i e d  a t  A g e  4 5 -49 , I n d i a .  U t t a r  P r a d e s h ,  a n d
F a r r u k h a b a d  D i s t r i c t ,  1891-1981  ........................................................................ . . 79
4 .3 Sex R a t i o s  o f  t h e  P o p u l a t i o n  for I n d ia ,  U t t a r  P r a d e s h ,  a n d
F a r r u k h a b a d  D i s t r i c t ,  1891-1981  .................................................................. . . 81
4 .4 R a t i o  o f  F e m a l e  to  M a le  A g e -S p e c if ic  D e a t h  R a t e s ,  1976-78 , A v e ra g e s  
fo r  I n d i a  a n d  S e le c te d  S t a t e s ................................................................................ . . 83
ix
4.5 Mean Age at Marriage and Effective Marriage in the Study Villages by
Date of Marriage ..................................................................................................86
4.6 Average Time Elapsed Between Marriage and Gauna  by Age at •
M a r r i a g e ..................................................................................................................88
4.7 Changes in the Time Lag Between Marriage and G auna  in Three U ttar
Pradesh Villages ..................................................................................................89
4.8 Mean Age at Marriage and Effective Marriage in the Study Villages by
Education of Husband, and Education of W i f e .......................................... 94
4.9 Mean Age at Marriage and Effective Marriage in the Study Villages
by Caste ....................................................................................................................96
4.10 Mean Age at Marriage and Effective Vlarriage in the Study Villages by
Major Caste G r o u p ..............................................................................................97
4.11 Mean Age at Marriage and Effective Marriage in the Study Villages
by Occupation of Husband .............................................................................. 99
5.1 Number of Village Marriages by Relationship of M a tc h m a k e r ......................... 118
5.2 Number of Prospective Spouses Seen by Family Before Marriage . . . .  125
5.3 Number and Percentage of Dhola Weddings by Year of Marriage . . . .  132
5.4 M arital Dissolution and Remarriage in the Study Villages ............................ 134
6.1 Marriage Payments Reported by Mayer (1960) for a Madhya Pradesh
V i l l a g e ....................................................................................................................139
6.2 Average Wedding Expenses of Husbands' and Wives’ Families by
C a s t e ........................................................................................................................143
6.3 Average Wedding Expenses of Husbands’ and Wives’ Families by
Economic Status ................................................................................................150
6.4 Average Wedding Expenses of Husbands' and Wives’ Families by
Husbands' Occupation .................................................................................... 152
6.5 Average Wedding Expenses of Husbands' and Wives’ Families by
Education of Husband and W i f e .................................................................... 153
1C H A P T E R  1
A M IC R O -A P P R O A C H  S T U D Y  OF M AR RIAG E  
IN A RUR A L  N O R T H  IN D IA N  AREA:  
P U R P O S E  A N D  M E T H O D S
Marriage is one of the central events of hum an life, and besides being the primary 
institution for procreation and continuation of the species, serves a wide variety of 
economic, social, personal, and psychological functions.
Marriage may be defined as a relation of one or more men to one or more 
women which is recognized by custom or law and involves certain rights and 
duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of the 
children born of it. These rights and duties vary among different peoples ...
However,] marriage always implies the right of sexual intercourse ... At the 
same time, marriage is something more than a regulated sexual relation. It is 
an economic institution, which may in various ways affect the proprietary 
rights of the parties (Westermarck, 1926: 1).
Marriage implies mutual economic support, shared decision-making, and a pooling of 
resources between spouses. It often determines the place tha t  a newly born individual 
will occupy in the family lineage and in the social structure of his or her community.
Every culture has specific rules governing the formation of marriages. In order for 
the union to be acknowledged as a marriage, it must be transacted in accordance with 
the rules prescribed by local custom or law. These rules may require the consent of the 
man or woman entering into the marriage, or the consent of their parents, or both.
They may require a man to make some payment for his bride, or the bride’s 
parents  to provide a dowry. They may necessitate the performance of a particular kind 
of marriage ceremony. Unless the procedures outlined by custom or law are observed, no 
man and woman are considered to be husband and wife (Westermarck, 1926: 2). 
Marriage is an institution common to virtually all known cultures, both contemporary 
and historical, and seems to have its roots in prehistoric human development.
In India, marriage has a deep social and religious meaning.
2Marriage dominates the Hindu’s social life and plays a large part in his religion.
The social importance of marriage can be seen from a number of features. It is 
the most prestigious family ceremony |andi ... the most expensive ... The 
celebration of a marriage is the occasion on which a Brahmin priest is 
indispensable, as are the services of the barber, washerman and other castes ...
It is the occasion for a lengthy series of ceremonies and complicated 
prestations. Finally, it is naturally a m atter  which is strictly codified for each 
caste ... By its nature, marriage constitutes to a large measure the link between 
the domain of caste and tha t  of kinship (Dumont, 1970: 110).
Marriage is essential to the fulfillment of the religious precepts of Hinduism, and is 
one of the four essential stages which every Hindu must pass through in order to a tta in  
enlightenment.
Following the rules laid down in the sacred books, the life of an individual, be 
it a man or a women, is ideally divided into four ashram as , i.e. stages. After 
initiation the child enters the first stage, tha t  of brahmacharya. Under the 
guidance of a guru, he will study the Vedas and will develop his spiritual and 
intellectual capacities. This stage completed, he will enter the second one, that 
of grahastha , or marriage. Marriage in Hinduism is more than a social 
institution, it is a religious duty. Certain rituals can be performed only by a 
person who has been married. His family reared, the individual will retire to the 
forest to m editate during the third state , the vanaprastha. Finally he will enter 
sanyasa , the last stage of complete asceticism and preparation for death 
(Abeille, 1974: 267-268).
In addition, in Hinduism a son is essential to perform the necessary religious 
functions for the father at the time of his death. According to Hindu religious concepts, 
unless these functions are properly performed by the son, a man will be trapped 
indefinitely on this earth through an endless chain of reincarnations, and will not be able 
to reach nirvana  or heaven (Mamoria, 1962).
The religious and social sanctions encouraging marriage in India are strong, 
reflecting the great importance of marriage in the society. Early and universal marriage 
has been the traditional social norm in India for over two thousand years. In Vedic times 
(2500-1500 B.C.), women married around the age of 16 or 17, had a considerable say 
over the choice of a mate, moved about freely in society, and wielded considerable 
political and ceremonial power (Kapur, 1972:46-47). Divorce, although not often 
practiced, was permitted to women. The remarriage of widows was also allowed, and the 
custom of sa t i , or immolation of women on the husband’s funeral pyre, was altogether 
unknown (Altekar, 1959: 341).
3Beginning around 500-600 B.C., the position of women and the system of marriage 
arrangements began to change dramatically. Religious sages began calling increasingly 
for the marriage of daughters at puberty, women were banned from participation in 
religious ritual, and the education of girls, formerly important for their participation in 
religious ceremonies, became unpopular, and was virtually abandoned (Altekar, 1959: 
344-346). These changes were caused by a complex interplay of factors and 
circumstances then prevalent in the society, but basically stemming from two primary 
causes: 1) the consequences of cultural mixing between the Aryan conquerors and the 
indigenous population, whom they considered to be inferior; and 2) the effects of 
repeated foreign invasions, warfare, and conflict. During this period, the original Aryan 
invaders had largely finished the tasks of conquest and consolidation which had occupied 
them  during the Vedic period, and now settled down to live among the conquered. The 
caste system was in the process of development during this period, and the conquered 
indigenes, called Sudras and considered to be of low caste, were being brought into 
service to the Aryan masters. With the establishment of a substantial servant class, 
Aryan women largely ceased to be productive members of the society, and came to 
assume a secondary, and primarily decorative role in the household (Altekar, 1959: 344).
The barring of Aryan wives from education and the performance of religious 
ceremonies has been variously explained. Altekar relates this to the intermarriages 
between Aryan men and Sudra women which became common during this period and the 
objections of the Brahmin priesthood to having uneducated and unqualified Sudra wives 
play a major role in the performance of sacred rites. Unable to bar powerful kings from 
including their own favorite wife in the performance of religious ceremonies, the priests 
proceeded to bar all women from participation in these rituals (Altekar, 1959: 345-346). 
A feminist perspective sees this ban on religious participation of women in more 
fundam ental terms.
The Brahmins realized th a t  their greatest rival in influence and spiritual power 
was woman, especially so long as she still remained surrounded by the double 
halo - the mystery of her own life-bearing sex, and this enhanced and sanctified
4by the ancient worship of the female aspect of deity ... So began the slow, 
persistent and at last completely successful effort of the priests to wrest from 
woman her religious and cultural rights, her social and domestic equality and 
power. It was the unrolling in India - with variations peculiar to her - of the 
world-wide story of the struggle, unconscious, undefined and unacknowledged, 
yet none the less actual, between priest and woman to retain ascendancy over 
man (Das, 1932: 24-25).
Although the Aryans were by this time well established in north India, successive 
invasions of foreigners from the northwest continued. During this unsettled period 
characterized by repeated invasions, wars and skirmishes, marriage by capture of an 
unmarried and comely woman was recognized as a legitimate (though frowned upon) 
means of contracting a marriage (Thomas, 1964: 143-146). In this atmosphere, some 
restriction on the free movement of women became almost a necessity, and this paved 
the way for later stricter interpretations of purdah or seclusion of women. In such times, 
early marriage appeared advantageous, in encouraging high fertility to provide more 
fighters, in ensuring prem arital chastity (which assumed a greater importance in 
classical writings of the times), and in soon removing the difficult burden of adequately 
protecting and chaperoning unmarried daughters (Das, 1976: 135). With the cessation of 
education for girls, there was no reason to delay their marriages past puberty, and as the 
production of sons was highly valued in a time of war and conquest, popular opinion 
began to call for the marriages of girls immediately upon attaining puberty. From 
around 200 A.D. pre-puberty marriages became common practice (Altekar, 1959: 56). 
W ith such early marriage, the young girl was obviously unqualified to have any say in 
the choice of a husband. From  this time, the Indian woman lost her power of choice in a 
marriage partner, and was forced to marry the man of her fa ther’s choosing (Avasthi, 
1979).
The social and religious movements which began during this period continued and 
intensified during subsequent times. Religious lawgivers encouraged a further lowering of 
the age at marriage of girls, to age 8-10 (Altekar, 1959: 354). Religious texts threatened 
the direst consequences for the father and kin of a girl who was not married before 
puberty - they were all sent to hell (Thomas. 1964: 225). Widow remarriage was
5prohibited, and the custom of sati was favored as the highest duty of a loyal wife 
(Altekar, 1959: 352).
Upon the establishment of Muslim rule around 1100-1200 A.D. in north India, the 
custom of purdah  or seclusion of women, previously adopted only in the harems of a few 
powerful kings, became widespread in the society, as a growing number of people of 
different classes sought to emulate the practices of the Muslim rulers. Over time, purdah  
for women came to be regarded as a high class practice and an im portant means of 
differentiating between the higher classes and the peasantry - a connotation which it 
retains to this day. The custom of child marriage continued up until the British period, 
and has only shown a substantial decline in the past cen tu ry .1
It must be noted tha t  in all but a few very rare instances, child marriages were not 
consummated until after the a tta inm ent of menarche. Still, the custom of child marriage 
had a number of adverse effects on women and society at both a physical and a social 
level. Many authors have discussed the adverse effects of too-early pregnancy on the 
physical well-being of both mother and child, a finding which is corroborated by the 
nearly universally higher rates of infant mortality of babies born to teenage mothers 
(Puffer and Serrano, 1973; Potter, et a l., 1965; Thapa and Retherford, 1982). Thomas 
terms such child m aternity  “race suicide,'1 and posits this as the primary reason for both 
the physical deterioration of the Indians as a race, and the ease of the Muslim conquest 
of India (Thomas, 1964: 226).
Socially, the institution of child marriage contributed much to the low status of 
women in the extended family during this period. Her entry into the husband’s family as 
an inexperienced and uneducated child meant tha t  the young wife could command no 
respect, and she generally occupied the position of lowest s ta tus in the family. She was
1. It must be noted that the preceding history (as with virtually all historical works on India) 
gives disproportionate emphasis to the experiences of the Aryan upper classes. Information on the 
customs and practices of the lower classes is extremely sparse. However, there is little doubt that 
the history above describes the experiences of a substantial section of the population, as well as 
delineating the prevailing cultural ideals of the times, which were emulated in varying degrees by 
the lower classes.
6basically treated as an unpaid helper for the mother-in-law, made to do the hardest and 
most tedious work, and was trained to instantly obey and not talk back, as the 
displeasure or enmity of any family member might jeopardize her precarious position in 
the husband’s household. The young bride was taught to suppress her individuality, and 
was often completely cowed by the harsh demands for unquestioning obedience to her 
elders. In time the procurement of a young and unformed bride, who could be easily 
molded into a compliant and obedient daughter-in-law, and who could offer little 
resistance to her extremely low position (virtually tha t  of an unpaid servant) in her 
husband’s family came to be considered highly desirable in the society. Indeed, the 
bride’s very pliability and “ease of ad justm ent” to the family’s demands came to be 
lauded as one of the great advantages of pre-puberty marriages.
This situation of frequent child marriages in combination with low female status 
continued up until the advent of the British period, and has since shown slow 
improvement. In the past 100 years, the incidence of child marriages has decreased 
dram atically , although such marriages still occur. The Indian census documents the 
slow but steady increase in the mean age at marriage for females, from an initial figure 
of about 12.8 in 1891 to 18.2 in 1981 (see Table 1.1). This 1981 average is 4-5 years 
higher than  the average age a t  menarche, which for Indian populations is estimated to 
be 13-14 years (Singh and Ahuja, 1980; Sidhu and Grewal, 1980; Kaur and Singh, 1981; 
S a tyanarayana  and Naidu, 1979; Dubey and Srivastava. 1967; Ghosh and Kumari, 1973; 
P a t tna ik ,  1971). In many regions of India, there is a further delay between marriage and 
consummation, which suggests tha t ,  a t least for some areas, the actual gap between 
puberty and cohabitation may be larger, suggesting possible effects on fertility.
ON THE IM PO R TA N C E OF STUDIES OF M ARRIAGE  
TO D EM O G R A PH Y , AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETW EEN  
AGE AT M ARRIAG E AND FERTILITY IN INDIA
Studies of age at marriage have always been of central interest to demographers 
interested in fertility analysis. In a now classic study Davis and Blake (1955) included
TABLE 1.1
M EAN AGE AT M ARRIAGE FOR INDIA AND U T TA R  PRADESH, 1891-1981
Yeax
India
Males Females
Uttax
Males
Pradesh
Females
1891-1901 21.0 12.8 18.4 11.7
1901-1911 20.4 13.0 18.1 12.2
1911-1921 20.7 13.5 18.2 12.4
1921-1931 18.5 12.5 16.4 11.4
1931-1941 20.3 14.9 18.7 13.4
1941-1951 19.9 15.4 17.7 13.5
1961 21.4 16.1 18.7 14.8
1971 22.2 17.2 19.4 15.6
1981 23.3 18.2 20.9 16.7
Sources: 1891 through 1951 Figures are from Agarwala (1962: 72), based on decade
synthetic cohorts. 1961 and 1971 figures are from Goyal (1975: 337-341)
based on census synthetic cohorts. 1981 Figures were calculated by the author 
from Census of India, 1981, based on census synthetic cohorts.
“age a t entry into sexual union” as one of 11 intermediate variables regulating fertility 
levels in various societies. Similarly, in a more recent study of the proximate 
determ inants  of f e r t i l i ty /  Bongaarts and Potter  identified seven proximate determinants 
of fertility, one of which was “marriage (and marital dissolution).” The importance of 
marriage as a proximate determ inant was further emphasized in subsequent discussion:
Age at First marriage identifies the onset of exposure to the risk of socially 
sanctioned childbearing, and, as such, it is a principal determinant of the 
number of births a woman will have (Bongaarts and Potter, 1983: 57).
A number of Indian studies have examined the relationship between age at 
marriage and fertility in India. These studies have been of several different types: those
2. The proximate determinants of fertility are the biological and behavioral factors through 
which social, economic, and environmental variables affect fertility. The principal characteristic of 
a proximate determinant is its direct influence on fertility. If a proximate determinant - such as 
contraceptive use - changes, then fertility necessarily changes also (assuming the other proximate 
determinants remain constant), through this is not necessarily the case for a socioeconomic deter­
minant (taken from Bongaarts and Potter, 1983: 1).
8examining actual da ta  on the interval between age at marriage and the first birth; those 
examining actual da ta  on age at marriage and total reproductive performance; and those 
making theoretical projections of the fertility effects of a hypothetical rise in age at 
marriage above current levels.
In examining the relationship between age at marriage and fertility on a biological 
basis, we note th a t  the a tta inm ent of menarche does not imply the a tta inm ent of full 
reproductive potential (Pathak, 1978). While a very small percentage of girls may a tta in  
their full reproductive potential within a year or two of first m enstruation, the majority 
do not. For differing lengths of time after first menstruation, girls are biologically unable 
to conceive a child, and this period of time until the a tta inm ent of full reproductive 
potential is termed “adolescent sterility” (Roy et al., 1976: 35, 41). Because of this 
adolescent sterility, “there exists a critical line below which the postponement of 
marriage does not affect the b ir th ra te” (Das, 1967: 129).
D ata  from clinical studies in Bombay provide clear support for this notion of 
adolescent sterility affecting reproduction. When researchers measured the elapsed time
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between effective marriage"* and first delivery, they found tha t  girls whose marriages 
were consummated below the age of 16 took substantially longer to produce a first child 
(Prakasam, et al., 1979: 209 - see Table 1.2). Another factor which would tend to lessen 
the fertility effect of a rise in female age at marriage is the specter of increased 
pregnancy wastage, maternal mortality, and secondary sterility due to complications 
associated with childbearing at young ages (Roy et al., 1976; Bhatia. 1979). Because of 
these factors, it appears that ,  a t least on purely biological grounds, the consummation of 
marriages below the age of 16 would not lead to substantially higher fertility rates than 
would consummation at or above age 16. However, when age at effective marriage rises 
above 16, significant fertility effects are possible, as this would lead to a decrease in the 
total number of fecund years during which a woman is exposed to the risk of pregnancy.
3. Although the article does not specify. Indian tradition dictates, and we must assume that the 
consummation of all but a very small minority of these marriages occurred after first menses.
9TABLE 1.2
TIM E ELAPSED FROM CONSUMMATION OF MARRIAGE 
UNTIL FIRST DELIVERY BY AGE OF WOMAN
Age of Mother at 
Consummation of 
Marriage
No. of 
Women
Time Elapsed (in years) 
From Effective Marriage 
Until First Delivery
Standard
Deviation
10-12 82 5.29 2.17
13-15 367 2.92 2.07
16-18 530 1.79 1.19
19-21 336 1.46 0.87
22-24 135 1.54 1.07
25-29 47 1.29 0.59
Source: Prakasam, et al. 1979: 209.
A variety of Indian studies have found significant differentials in total reproductive 
performance between women married at different ages. The Mysore study found tha t  
rural Mysore women marrying between the ages of 14 and 17 gave birth to an average of
5.9 children during their lifetimes, while those marrying between ages 18 and 21 gave 
birth to only 4.7 children (United Nations, 1961). Similarly, in a Kanpur survey, 
M ajum dar found tha t  women marrying below the age of 16 gave birth to an average of
6.9 children while those marrying after age 19 gave birth to 6.0 children 
(M ajum dar ,1960). Other studies have obtained similar results (Agarwala, 1970; Goyal, 
1974). Although the overall pattern  is not definitive, there are strong indications tha t  
Indian females who marry at later ages (above 18 or 19) tend to have fewer children 
during their reproductive lifetimes. It is evident tha t  both social and demographic 
factors play a role in this. As noted above, delays in reproduction decrease the total span 
of childbearing. In addition, variations in age at marriage are often linked to 
socio-economic and cultural differences between groups, differences which may have
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implications for fertility change as well. For example, such factors as urban residence 
(Reddy and Gopal, 1980; Driver, 1963; Patnaik, 1981), higher social class (Pakrasi and 
Malaker. 1973) , and education, especially for women (Malaker, 1975; Bhatia, 1979; 
Hussain, 1970) have been put forward to explain the later age a t  marriage, as well as the 
lower fertility of certain groups. This illustrates the important role of age at marriage as 
a proximate or “in term ediate” variable between changes in socio-economic factors and 
fertility (Yauckey, 1973; Bongaarts and Potter , 1983).
A third genre of studies has concentrated on deducing the possible fertility impacts 
of a projected rise in the age at marriage of females in India. Coale and Tye, in a classic 
article on “The Significance of Age-Patterns of Fertility in High Fertility Populations” 
noted th a t  a delay in childbearing due to a rise in the female age at marriage can change 
the age structure  of the population, and thus have considerable impact on period fertility 
even if the to ta l number of children born per woman remains constant. In an analysis of 
the Indian situation, they noted tha t  a projected “increase of 2.7 years in the mean 
length of generation is associated with a reduction of 3.1 per thousand in the intrinsic 
rate of growth, which is equivalent to about eight percent lower fertility” (Coale and 
Tye, 1961: 643). In this projection, owing to the delay in the onset of childbearing, Coale 
and Tye actually had to increase age-specific fertility rates in order to keep cohort 
completed fertility constant - an unlikely situation in actual populations where the age 
at marriage is rising. Thus, the above result may be considered to be the minimum 
decline in the birth rate which is likely with a rise in the mean length of generation of 
2.7 years.
A number of subsequent studies have projected varying declines in fertility 
consequent upon a projected change in the age at marriage for females. These studies are 
of widely varying quality and entail different underlying assumptions which affect the 
outcome of the calculations. Although extremes in outcome are represented 
(Basavara jappa and Belgividad, 1967; Basavarajappa, 1968; Agarwala, 1967), most of 
these studies concurred in predicting a decline in fertility of approximately 11-16 percent
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with a rise in female age at marriage from 16 to 19 or 20 (Talwar and Seal, 1974; 
Krishnan, 1971; Malaker, 1972; Talwar, 1967). However, there are drawbacks in 
applying the “once and forever” approach to analyses of the possible fertility effects of 
changes in age at marriage. Any change in age at marriage cannot be viewed in isolation, 
and should not be separated from the socio-economic and cultural influences which 
caused it, and which may have im portant influences on other demographic and societal 
processes as well.
Thus, it appears th a t  the examination of female age at marriage is im portant to an 
understanding of Indian fertility patterns. For both sociological and biological reasons, it 
is likely th a t  a substantial change in the age at marriage for females in India would have 
im portan t  fertility impacts. In addition, the magnitude of these potential impacts is 
likely to increase if average age at marriage continues to rise past the teenage years and 
into the early twenties - the period of maximum female fecundity in India.
PU R PO SE OF THE STUDY
The aim of the current study is to examine the social and demographic 
implications of marriage practices and marriage change in a rural north Indian area. In 
this regard, the study focuses on the following issues:
1. Male and female age at marriage within the villages. Current age at marriage and 
changes in the age at marriage during the past 40 years, their causative factors, 
and socio-economic and cultural correlates.
2. The social and psychological significance of marriage in rural Indian society.
3. How marriages are arranged, especially regarding the methods of selection, the 
criteria of selection, and the method of decision-making within the family or 
community. Paths of communication within the family and village about 
prospective spouses and their attributes.
4. The direction, magnitude, and nature of wealth flows connected with marriage,
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both within the respective families, and between the bride’s and the groom’s 
families. How wealth flows and dowry or brideprice demands influence the timing 
and eventual outcome of marriage negotiations, as well as the types of marriages 
performed.
5. A fifth aim of the study is to obtain a broad-based understanding of the society in 
general, in order to better evaluate the implications of these behavioral patterns, 
for future demographic and social change.
Through an examination of these and other issues, I wish to form a composite of 
socio-economic, cultural, and environmental factors affecting marriage decision-making 
and marriage change in the study area, and their influences over time and into the 
future.
THE CHOICE OF A METHODOLOGY
It is apparent from the above-stated aims tha t  this study is concerned with more 
than  the collection of quantita tive  data. Equally im portant is the compilation of 
information on the belief systems, values, ideas, customs, and mores of a people. This 
type of detailed information is comparatively difficult to gather in a large-scale survey, 
and can be more readily gathered with a micro-approach or anthropological 
methodology.
A summary of the more direct problems of the closed-question survey was given by 
Cicourel (1967; 1982).
The fixed-choice questionnaire discouraged or simply cut off spontaneous 
comments by the respondent. Problems of ignorance or misunderstanding the 
questions often led to no responses or what appeared to be arbitrary choices ...
The interviewer frequently had to explain a question and then try to decide or 
improvise the significance of the respondent's answer within the context of the 
choices available. Hence both the respondent’s interpretation and response were 
managed, but often so was the interviewer’s marking of a particular response 
category based upon a more extensive interpretation of the respondent's answer 
than  the questionnaire itself permitted (Cicourel, 1967: 70).
Caldwell et al. further elucidated the methodological drawbacks of social science
surveys:
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Perhaps the most fundamental problem, and one which has been given far too 
little a tten tion , is the generation of hypotheses or assumptions upon which 
survey questions are based. Questionnaire construction, even in the largest and 
most reputable surveys, is rarely based on the concept of constructing questions 
which will rigorously test hypotheses put forward as a result of prior research 
in the culture. (Caldwell et a l., 1984: 7)
Rather, the majority of survey questions are simply questions tha t  have been borrowed 
from other surveys. These questions are often chosen for their easier quantification or 
because they produced an interesting statistical pa ttern  in another study, rather than 
because they are the most im portant issues from a purely theoretical standpoint. 
Similarly, when these questions are the only ones asked, there is little opportunity for 
the formulation of new hypotheses, since many other possibly more important issues are 
simply not inquired about (Caldwell et a l., 1984).
Another problem in analyzing survey da ta  is th a t  obtaining statistical correlations 
between selected items does not necessarily imply an understanding of causation or 
processes of change. W ithout a thorough knowledge of the society under study, the 
in terpreta tion of statistical relationships generated from survey analysis can be difficult.
Obviously, the method used should depend in large measure on the type of 
information to be gathered. However, empirical studies of survey reliability in India have 
illustrated problems of measurement, even on some of the most common items asked in 
social science research. Mukherjee, in family planning re-interviews of a sample from 
Haryana, India, found tha t  despite the fact tha t  individual interviews exhibited internal 
consistencies in excess of .95, the temporal consistency of the interviews was exceedingly 
poor.
The present study shows a wide range of individual response inconsistency, 
even in factual data. It demonstrates specifically tha t  factual-type questions 
such as those pertaining to age, number of adult males, number of children, age 
a t marriage, etc. do not necessarily have a high test re-test reliability 
(Mukherjee, 1975: 142).
As may be expected, reliability estimates on value questions such as attitudes towards 
family planning were exceedingly low. averaging around 0.4 (Mukherjee, 1975). In 
examining any issue as complex and as sensitive as marriage customs, and the causes
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and consequences of marriage change, a simple survey methodology would be 
inadequate.
An alternative to s tandard  social survey methodology is the techinque of “long 
discursive semi-structured conversation” used extensively by Caldwell in his studies in 
rural Karnataka. This discussion
is flexible and enquiry pursues what the respondent takes to be important, with 
occasional conversational nudges from the researcher so as to maintain the 
general direction. One pursues further what has been learnt from the 
respondent and a ttem pts  to confirm or discount testimony from elsewhere. The 
conversations tend to be based increasingly on temporary hypotheses which are 
subsequently discarded, or much more frequently modified, and which are 
written into notebooks each night (Caldwell, et al. 1984: 13).
The advantages of this method of questioning are several. Many of the basic 
problems inherent in survey work and mentioned by Cicourel can be eliminated, simply 
because more time is taken to ensure tha t  the respondent understands the type of 
information being sought. A respondent has time to discuss the m atte r  fully, and the 
researcher can explore the full extent of his knowledge on the subject. Responses are 
written down, rather than being placed into pre-coded categories which may not 
accurately represent the information given. The frame of questioning is deliberately kept 
broad, so often new ideas or relationships are mentioned in conversation which would 
not come up in the narrower atmosphere of survey interviewing. These new ideas can be 
followed up immediately in the context of actual conversation, and can then be 
incorporated into hypothesis formulation and later questioning.
In a recent study of fertility in a south Indian village, Vlassoff commented that the 
methodological contributions of this approach were primarily in “(1) improvement in 
da ta  quality, and (2) the development of locally relevant instrum ents” for measuring 
and assessing concepts such as “m odernity” (Vlassoff, 1984: 7). Another advantage of 
this approach is in its flexibility and adaptability to many different situations. When 
utilizing the micro-approach, it is easy to incorporate a variety of different methods and 
approaches - such as participant observation or case study - depending on the specific
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information to be gathered. Micro-approach studies can be a useful adjunct to standard 
social science surveys, providing a vehicle for identifying the important issues, 
pre-testing concepts and questions which may not translate easily into local languages, 
and providing a baseline of cultural understanding which can aid in the interpretation of 
survey results.
The micro-approach study borrows much from anthropology. It is, however, a 
distinct approach which takes into account some of the methodological and sampling 
techniques from demographic surveys. The methodology of the micro-approach consists 
of two principal steps. The first is in selecting an appropriate small population for study 
- often a village or group of villages, or a neighborhood in an urban area. Once selected, 
the method involves residence in the area and daily involvement with local life. The 
object is to gain an intimate knowledge of the area, not only in relation to the specific 
topic under study, but also with regard to every aspect of local life and culture. This is 
done through a combination of activities such as participant observation, informal 
discussions, participation in ceremonial and community functions, the maintenance of 
field notebooks and diaries, informal discussions with the people, and case studies, as 
well as through the more formal methods of census and survey interviews conducted in 
the area.
RATIONALE FOR LOCAL AREA AND VILLAGE SELECTION
Some formal demographers object to the village study on the grounds that a single 
village is not likely to be representative of a broader region. In response to this, Hull et 
al. reviewed village work in Java  by stating:
Even though a single village might have characteristics which differed from 
"‘averages’’ for Java as a whole, cultural, social and economic influences 
operating on the people derived from common sources. An understanding of the 
operation of these forces in one village would help establish approaches to study 
the forces in other settings, whether using sample surveys or community studies 
(Hull, et al. 1984: 3)
Since my regional interest was in the North-central Indo-Gangetic plains, I
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determined to select a village, or small group of villages in U ttar  Pradesh or Bihar for 
study. Previous studies of marriage and marital relations had been conducted primarily 
in urban areas (Kapur, 1970; 1973: Ross, 1961) or in rural areas of the more prosperous 
states (Caldwell et al., 1983; Van Der Veen, 1972; Kurian, 1974; Hershman, 1981). 
However, little research emphasis has been given to marriage patterns in villages of the 
Hindi-speaking “heartland” of north India - the poorer and more traditional states of 
Bihar, M adhya Pradesh and U tta r  Pradesh. Although exhibiting regional variation, this 
area is internally much more similar than different, and represents a coherent cultural 
and economic region which encompasses approximately one-third of India's population.
Farrukhabad  district was chosen as being roughly representative of the more 
traditional and economically less advantaged areas of U ttar  Pradesh. It is in a central 
location within the state , but sufficiently removed from the major cities of the area to 
exhibit a moderate to traditional economic and social pattern . Within this frame, I 
determined to select a m oderate to large-sized village with smaller outlying hamlets in 
order to be able to study patterns  in both smaller and larger villages. This village was to 
contain a predominance of Hindus over Muslims (as does the overall region), and to be 
not on a paved road, but within walking distance to a road (as are the majority of the 
villages in this region). Further, it was to be moderate in economic status (as determined 
by a comparative visual assessment of housing types, plus information from village 
leaders), and to be multi-caste in nature, to enable the study of as many different groups 
as possible. After visits to several villages in the district, and discussions with local 
officials, the village of Rajepur and its two adjacent hamlets were selected as most 
suitably satisfying the requirements of the study.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
As one of the primary aims of the micro-approach study is to directly involve the 
principal researcher in dialogues with the villagers (Caldwell et al., 1984), I determined 
to conduct all interviews and informal discussions myself. At first with the aid of an
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interpreter, and later alone, I proceeded to employ a variety of strategies to both learn 
about the village and allow the villagers to learn about me, and thus gain their 
confidence and trust.
In itia l E ncounters
After initial contacts were made and residence was established, I determined to 
meet as many people in the village as possible. The process of making a village map was 
a good entree for this purpose, as it led me into all areas of the village. Using village 
residents as my primary source of information, a complete map of the village and its two 
adjacent hamlets was constructed. This map delineated the names of the householders, 
the location of their houses, and the relationship of the housing areas to the surrounding 
ponds, rivers, fields, etc. As most of this information was gained from the villagers, the 
mapping occasioned much interaction and laughter as the villagers tried to explain the 
spatial organization of their village to me. Although several villagers had previously 
been to my house for visits, this mapping exercise was the first opportunity for the 
majority of villagers to meet me.
As I became acquainted with more village families, I continued my informal 
visiting, talking with villagers on a wide variety of issues, such as village political and 
social organization, farming techniques, indebtedness, strategies for economic improve­
ment, household expenditure patterns, advantages and disadvantages of education, 
availability of educational and medical services, beliefs about mortality and health care, 
interpersonal relationships, both within the family and between family groups, and 
intra-caste relations. In addition I made it a habit to take daily walks through the 
villages and surrounding fields, observing farming activities, sitting in on men’s smoking 
and wom en’s knitting circles, and involving myself in any other activities which were 
encountered. Detailed notes of all encounters were written down in field notebooks, and 
gradually a fuller picture of village life and what it meant to be a villager began to 
develop.
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V illage C ensus
At the same time a baseline census of all households of the village was begun - a 
household being defined by shared cooking arrangements. The census listed all 
individuals and their relationships to one another, as well sis their age, sex, caste, 
occupation, and education (see Appendix A). It also gathered information about each 
individual’s marital sta tus, age at marriage and consummation, and the number of 
children ever born and surviving to each village woman. In addition, information was 
gathered on the amount and types of land, animals, farming tools and household 
possessions owned by the family, and of the size, condition, and material of construction 
of the house. This information was used to construct an index of economic status to 
compare the relative economic prosperity of various households.
In constructing an index of economic status, specific numerical values were 
assigned to each item owned by the household, in several categories of possessions 
including land, animals, farming and other work implements, and household possessions. 
Numbers were assigned based on the purchase price and the relative utility of various 
items. For example, with regard to the ownership of animals, each goat owned by a 
household would count as one point, a milk cow as two, a buffalo (a greatly superior 
milk producing animal) as four, and a healthy bullock used for plowing as five. Tools 
used in non-agricultural occupations (such as the tools owned by a cobbler, or a flour 
mill owned by a miller) were also included, in order to accurately represent the economic 
s ta tus  of those village members not engaged in agriculture. The points for each category 
of item were added up, and divided by the total number of household members (adults 
counting for one point each, and children under 15 counting for one-half of a point). A 
sample calculation is given in Appendix A.
Many alternative strategies were used to elicit information which the villagers 
found difficult to provide. For example, many villagers had trouble accurately 
determining their own age or the ages of other family members. Many researchers have 
discussed methods to aid in the accurate determination of age (Scott and Sabagh, 1970;
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Hull, 1976; National Research Council. 1981). In this study, I utilized several different 
strategies to aid in the determination of age. Reference was made to im portant local or 
national events such as floods, the gaining of independence, or village elections, and 
villagers were asked to compare the dates of their b irth  with these external events. Once 
the dates of birth of various villagers had been established, a question could be asked as 
to whether a person’s birth occurred before or after the births of various neighbors and 
relatives. Among the higher caste families who utilized birth horoscopes in marriage 
arrangements, one could often ask to see the horoscope and thus determine the age of a 
particular person. One of the most useful methods of determining age was through the 
reconstruction of various life cycle events of individuals. For example, a question would 
ask a villager to estimate his current age. Subsequent questions would inquire as to his 
age at marriage, the time elapsed between marriage and consummation, the time elapsed 
between consummation and the birth of the First child, the current age of the first child, 
etc. By adding together the number of years elapsed between each of these life cycle 
events, a fairly good estimate of age could usually be obtained.
This combination of methods seemed to produce relatively accurate results, as 
compared to Indian census or large-scale survey data . When analyzing the single year 
age da ta  obtained in the village census I found a small am ount of the virtually inevitable 
heaping on digits ending in zero and five after ages 35 or 40, but virtually no systematic 
bias in the age returns for the younger ages.
In ter v ie w s  I n -D e p th
After familiarization with the village and the collection of basic information 
contained in the census, a group of approximately 40 percent of households were chosen 
for more concentrated study. All households which contained a member who had had an 
“unusual” marriage-related event (for example, “love” marriage or self-arrangement, a 
breakdown in negotiations at an advanced s ta te  in the engagement, divorce, bigamy, 
child marriage, or inability to marry) were selected for further study. In each of these
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households there were also several members who exhibited more typical marriage 
patterns, which served to round out the group. Additional households with more 
representative marriage experiences were chosen primarily on the basis of the age, sex, 
stage in the life cycle, and economic sta tus of their members. These households were 
used to counter deficiencies in the representation of certain social and economic groups, 
thus contributing to the typicality of the group chosen for interview.
Once selected, these households were the principal subjects of my in-depth 
discussions, and they were interviewed at least three further times, and in some cases, 
many further times, as the interview procedure led to the development of personal 
friendships. Discussions covered a variety of aspects of marriage, marriage arrangements, 
marriage expenses, marital adjustm ent, and power and decision-making within the 
family, as well as on the nature of village life in general. These interviews took the form 
of long, open discussions, and rather than relying on a fixed questionnaire covered topics 
of interest to myself and the respondents. This flexibility of approach proved to be 
highly advantageous in the current study. In general, I found th a t  certain questions 
which seemed more im portant initially, gave little insight into individual differences, and 
only served to reflect upon the general nature of the society. In contrast, other questions 
(such as those asked on the pre-viewing of brides before marriage) which were asked 
initially only in the interests of obtaining full background information, exhibited a wide 
variation in responses, and under more intense study and elaboration proved to be 
critical to an understanding of the overall situation. Similarly, points (such as the 
influence of factionalism in marriage arrangements) raised by the villagers in casual 
discussion, when followed up, contributed greatly to my understanding of causative 
processes. Individuals from many of these households as well as others were chosen as 
the subjects of case studies discussed in later chapters.
21
A tte n d a n c e  at C erem on ia l F u n ct ion s
During my residence in the village, I was able to a ttend a number of marriage, 
engagement, and consummation ceremonies, and thus observe in detail the ceremonial 
stages of marriage, the social interactions between brides’ and grooms’ families, and the 
actual economic exchanges involved in marriages. In addition, I was able to travel with 
the men of my village family to several other villages to interview prospective husbands 
for Rani, my village sister. This proved to be most instructive, as to the types, 
reliability, and channels of communication of information available to those who are 
choosing a spouse for one of their family members. The village astrologer was contacted 
concerning the timing and selection of auspicious dates for marriage and consummation 
ceremonies, and village leaders were interviewed concerning their roles as unofficial 
m atchmakers in the arrangement of several village weddings.
By periodic visits among the sample families, I was able to monitor progress in the 
arrangement of marriages for unmarried but eligible family members. This provided 
insight into the details of marriage arrangement, the criteria of selection of a spouse, as 
well as into the reasons for delays in marriage arrangements, and how individual 
differences in the method of searching can serve to shorten or prolong these delays. In 
addition, these discussions provided valuable insights into the im portant role tha t  
factionalism can play in obstructing or facilitating successful marriage arrangements in 
villages.
In the course of the study it was found th a t  this multi-stage approach had a 
variety of advantages over traditional survey methods. Not only were depth and insight 
added to the study, but previously unrecognized factors and interrelationships 
influencing marriage practices were discovered - factors which later proved to be crucial 
to a complete understanding of marriage in the North Indian setting.
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S T R U C T U R E  O F  T H E  T H E S I S
The reporting of the results from the study has been organized as follows: Chapter 
2 is designed as a general introduction to village life in north India, for readers with little 
acquaintance with the region, and it describes some of the value structures, customs, 
basic technologies and patterns of everyday living of the villagers. Those readers who are 
already well-acquainted with north Indian village life may proceed directly to Chapter 3, 
which discusses the general social and demographic characteristics of the study 
population, including discussions of caste membership and status, family structure, 
occupation, ownership of land, economic status, education, fertility, mortality and 
population growth.
Chapter 4 examines the general context of national and regional level changes in 
age at marriage over the past 90 years, and contrasts these with da ta  on trends in age at 
marriage and effective marriage for the study villages over the past 50 years. 
Differentials in age at marriage and effective marriage by caste, education, and 
occupation are examined. In addition, the influences on age at marriage of individual 
factors such as the absence of the father, the advice of the village astrologer, and the 
shifting labor needs of the natal and marital family are discussed.
Chapter 5 describes the nature of marriage arrangements in the villages. This 
includes a discussion of the views of villagers on the proper way to arrange marriages, as 
wrell as an examination of actual cases which deviate from these ideals. It outlines the 
prevailing norms which influence the field or pool of selection, the criteria of selection, 
and the party to selection of a marriage partner. The major ceremonies involved in the 
marriage process are described, and an example of a typical case of marriage 
arrangements for a village bride is given. The final section discusses marriage 
dissolution, remarriage, and multiple marriages in the study area.
The patterns of expenditure associated with marriages are explored in Chapter 6. 
The functions and meanings of marriage payments are discussed, and differences between
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appearance and reality as to who are the actual givers, and eventual controllers of 
wealth passed on in marriage are explored. This chapter also examines variations in the 
pattern  of marriage expenditure by caste, economic status, occupation, and education; 
and discusses marital and inter-family conflicts associated with marriage expenditures.
The major findings of the study are summarized in Chapter 7. The implications of 
these findings for future demographic and social change are discussed in the light of 
current and suggested future government policies and programs.
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C H A P T E R  2
E N T R Y  INTO THE VILLAGE
It was a scorching May morning when my assistant and I first alighted from the 
ra t t le trap  and overcrowded old bus onto the yellow dusty plain near what was later to 
become my study village. I had spent the previous two weeks in Farrukhabad, the 
district capital, trying to contact appropriate  officials and obtain information about 
possible study villages. This was difficult, as there was little information to be had, 
either in the District M agistra te’s (DM) or Tahsil D ar’s offices. The DM invariably sent 
me to the Tahsil Dar for information, while the Tahsil Dar sent me to the DM. After 
both were confronted with this tendency, they said tha t  I had better go to Lucknow, the 
State Capital, to obtain any information from the 1981 census, which had taken place 
two years previously in the area. After much coaxing I was allowed to look at an 
obviously rough draft hand-written list of villages, their acreages and total population 
size. No further information was available on the numerous other criteria which I had 
hoped to use in the selection of a study village. Any da ta  on economic and 
developmental indicators was “in Lucknow” , while da ta  on caste and some other 
im portant social indicators were not collected in the Indian census. When asked for 
advice on selecting a village, all of these officials seemed remarkably ignorant about the 
names, sizes, and general socio-economic makeup of the villages in their constituencies. 
Indeed they seemed to feel tha t  it was crazy for any educated person to take an interest 
in or want to go there, as the villagers were “dirty, ignorant, and backward” , and the 
villages “full of criminal elements.”
The Principal of the local college who graciously agreed to put me up and who 
proved so invaluable in later phases of my research, seemed not to understand the 
sampling and methodological constraints of my study. He felt th a t  as my topic was
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marriage, I should live in bis house in Farrukhabad, and he would take me to observe 
various marriages of his friends, relatives, and colleagues. The District Magistrate, a 
highly educated and cultured IAS (Indian Administrative Service) graduate, better 
understood my methodological constraints, but forbade me to live in a village in his 
district on the grounds th a t  he was responsible for me as a foreigner in his area of 
jurisdiction, and th a t  he could not guarantee my safety once I was outside of one of the 
district or tahsil headquarters. Although willing to take me to visit villages (in a police 
jeep with all of the requisite officialdom) they did not want me to travel on my own, and 
seemed surprised and somewhat wounded by my stubborn insistence on carrying out my 
study as originally planned; as if I was a wayward daughter, ungrateful and unheedful of 
a fa ther’s wise counsel. This negative advice became so insistent th a t  even my 
interpreter, a highly educated Delhi woman, began to be fearful and doubt my 
commonsense in wanting to live in a village.1
However, with the da ta  on village populations, together with a rough map of 
locations of major villages and the 1971 census volumes I had brought with me, I 
determined to select some likely villages according to my pre-established criteria, and to 
go and see for myself. My assistant and I began every morning to get on the local buses 
which the villagers took to and from town, and talk to the village women about their 
villages. When we got near to a village which I had selected for visiting, we got down 
from the bus and walked, often several miles inland over foot and cart paths to the 
village, asking our way in other villages and from passers-by. We visited several villages 
this way, which proved unsatisfactory for my purposes and my interpreter was 
threatening to quit, saying th a t  walking several miles in 40 ° C heat was not in the job 
description, when we got down from the bus near Rajepur.
1. Although problems can be encountered in the use of research assistants from the upper 
classes in a village study, I feel that in the present instance, such problems were minimized. My 
assistant was a sympathetic woman of intermediate caste from a struggling middle class family. 
She respected and related to the villagers as equals. Although she did have occasional problems 
adjusting to rough rural conditions, such concerns were voiced to me, not the villagers. As we did 
not let full details of her origins be known, villagers were frustrated in their efforts to categorize 
her as to caste and social class - a fact which allowed us considerable freedom of social movement 
within village society.
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Beside the road there was a small thatched shelter under which several people were 
squatting waiting for the bus going the other way. When asked the way to Rajepur, they 
pointed down a narrow footpath between fields of new wheat, and said tha t  the man 
disappearing down the path was going there, so we should follow him. I felt like Alice 
chasing the White Rabbit, winding my way down the narrow path, between patchwork 
fields of wheat, corn and pulses, following the bobbing and oft-disappearing turbaned 
head. Near the village we caught up with the man, who told us tha t  the Pradhan  (the 
village headman) was out of Rajepur today, but th a t  he himself lived there; and would 
we please come to his house for some refreshment? As we entered the village, I noted the 
plastered mud walls of the houses, the small children playing in the streets, and the 
veiled and partly veiled women, carrying water, grinding flour, cooking or chatting 
within the shadowed doorways. They all stopped to stare as we passed by, and a crowd 
of children began to follow us, as we walked down several narrow streets, and entered a 
shadowy doorway.
Thus began my first contact with the village which was to become my home for 
nine months. In this chapter I will describe life in the village and within the extended 
family. I will discuss the nature of the village environment and daily activities, 
socialization and role expectations of the young, and village politics and interpersonal 
interactions through an examination of factionalism.2 (For a more quantita tive  
discussion of village characteristics, see Chapter 3.)
THE VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT AND THE DAILY ACTIVITY CYCLE
Rajepur is a pseudonym for a village located in southeastern Farrukhabad district, 
U tta r  Pradesh, a t  27 ° 10’ north latitude and 79 ° 33’ east longitude. It lies in the 
east-central portion of U ttar  Pradesh, and is approximately 300 kilometers
2. I found that the patterns of village conflict were crucial to an understanding of marital 
alliances, especially as regards the inability of certain politically isolated young men to obtain 
brides (see Chapter 5).
27
east-southeast of Delhi (see Map 2.1). The village lies on the great Indo-Gangetic plain 
which stretches more than 4,000 kilometers across India and Bangladesh. The area is 
flat, having generally good alluvial soil, whose quality has been varyingly compromised 
by continuous agricultural utilization over the past 4,000 years. The climate, although 
extreme, is good for many crops, and on the better  plots, three crops are often planted 
each year. The three main seasons identified by the local population are summer, 
stretching from April to June, when it is dry and very hot, with tem peratures reaching 
47 ° C; the rainy season, from July to September, when it is hot and humid and rains 
nearly every day; and winter, from October to March, which consists of daytime 
tem peratures between 10 ° C and 17 ° C and nighttime tem peratures between 1 ° C and 
5 ° C. Although there are short transition periods between winter and summer which are 
pleasant for a couple of weeks, this highly continental climate is fairly extreme most of 
the year, and the uncomfortably hot weather gives way to uncomfortably cold weather 
very rapidly. The spread of agricultural crops follows closely the climate changes. During 
the rainy season, rice is the primary crop grown on the flooded lowlands, and corn, with 
occasional millet, pulses and Jerusalem artichokes on the uplands. In the winter, the 
primary crops are wheat and potatoes, with occasional pulses, and in the spring mustard 
(for oil), pulses, and assorted vegetables complete the cycle.
The village of Rajepur lies about 20 kilometers south of Farrukhabad, the district 
capitol, and about 22 kilometers from the river Ganges. It is bordered on the southwest 
by a small river, and on the other sides by neighboring villages. The main road from 
Farrukhabad runs on the far side of a neighboring village about two kilometers away. A 
regular bus service operates on the main road, and from there one must walk up a cart 
track to reach the village.
Although my original interest was in Rajepur village, I soon widened the focus of 
my study to include its two neighboring hamlets, in order to provide an interesting 
comparison between larger and smaller villages. Rajepur had a total de jure population 
of 1101 as of 30 June, 1983. Hamlet Shakkya, which lies approximately 200 meters
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northwest of Rajepur had a de jure population of 201, while Kisan, lying half a kilometer 
west of Rajepur, had a population of 183. The total population of the study area was 
1485 persons, of whom 816 were males and 669 females. The dearth of females in the 
study area (with a sex ratio of only 820 females per thousand males) is typical of the 
region and is largely due to higher female than male mortality (see Chapter 4). 
Forty-four percent of the study population is under the age of 15; this implies a fairly 
high rate of population growth, and suggests tha t  further growth is likely to continue for 
some time. Politically, Rajepur and its two adjacent hamlets are considered to be one 
village, and one Pradhan  and village council serves for all. However socially and 
economically, although there is considerable interaction, they function much more as 
separate units. The total land area of the village and two hamlets is 835 acres, yielding a 
population density of 443 persons per square kilometer, which is a very high density for 
a rural agricultural area.
The main village consists of a central housing unit surrounded by patchworks of 
small agricultural Fields. The houses are predominantly made of mud and clay gathered 
from the banks of the village ponds, which is how the ponds are formed over time. When 
the mud walls reach a height of approximately two meters, tree limbs are laid across the 
top, then smaller twigs and branches crossways to the larger limbs, and then a thick 
coating of mud over all. A few of the richer families of the village have been able to 
afford houses made of brick. The bricks are made locally by brickmakers, who gather 
clay from lowlying areas, shape the clay into bricks and fire them in a kiln using wood 
and cowdung Fires. The bricks are purchased by the villagers and are transported to the 
building site on donkey back. Bricks are used for the walls, but the roofs of brick houses 
are built the same way as in the mud houses, making wood an expensive necessity for 
anyone building a house. Although electric lines do extend to some of the village farms 
(where it is used to pump water to irrigate the Fields) there is no electricity inside the 
village, and villagers commonly use small oil lamps for lighting. These are made from a 
shallow clay dish Filled with g/iee, into which a wick of cotton string is inserted.
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The houses are mostly one story, although a few of them, and especially the brick 
houses may extend to two stories. The roof is an im portant area, which is commonly 
used for drying grain prior to storage, hanging out clothes to dry after washing, and the 
making and drying of cowdung cakes for cooking fuel. Often, one sees a student escaping 
the noise and commotion of the central courtyard for a few minutes of quiet study on the 
roof. The roofs are common places for socializing, watching the activity in the street, or 
for spying upon one’s neighbors, especially for the women. In addition, in the scorching 
summers, it is where nearly all of the villagers sleep at night. Most of the houses are 
contiguous and have common walls, creating a network of joined flat roofs, which are 
used by the womenfolk in varying degrees of purdah  for travel to one ano ther’s houses.
The average house consists of one or more mud rooms adjoining a central 
courtyard which is enclosed by walls all around but is open to the sun, and an optional 
front porch facing the street. Most of the main activities of the household - cooking, 
bathing, grinding and processing of grain, care of children, and socializing - take place in 
the central courtyard. In between the blocks of houses or “apartm ents” as they would be 
more likely termed in a western society, is a network of narrow unpaved lanes. These 
lanes are the main routes of travel inside the village, as well as a gathering place for men 
socializing and the playground for children. Bisecting these lanes are mud ditches which 
drain through a small opening from the courtyards of the houses down the village 
streets, and into the village pond or a field outside of the village. Although villagers go 
to their own fields for defecation (thus providing valuable fertilizer for the crops), all 
other household wastes drain through the streets in these open sewers.
Outside the perimeter of the housing complex lie the agricultural fields, which are 
divided into many small plots owned by a variety of different farmers. Because of the 
inheritance system which decrees that each plot of land should be divided evenly among 
a m an ’s sons, each field is divided into several pieces with each successive generation. 
Because of land fragmentation, the average farmer owns several small plots in different 
parts of the village, rather than one large plot, making any type of agricultural
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mechanization difficult. In addition to the patchwork of fields, many farmers have 
tubewells to irrigate their land.
Most of the irrigation of crops in the village is accomplished by tubewells. A 
tubewell is a narrow well usually 15 to 20 centimeters in diameter drilled from the 
surface down to the water table: in Rajepur about nine meters below the ground level. A 
metal pipe is inserted in the boring, and attached to a small electric or diesel engine 
which pumps water up from the well and pours it into an elevated ditch, from which 
point it flows slowly downhill to irrigate the fields. As the land is quite flat, farmers 
engineer sophisticated networks of ditches and canals which crisscross their fields, and 
which enable them to control the distribution of water with great accuracy, simply by 
opening and closing channels with a few shovelfuls of dirt.
Although some farmers leave the engine standing outside, most build a mud room 
around the engine to protect it from the weather and to store some of their tools. Many 
of these tubewells also function as meeting and discussion places for the men. If there are 
substantial tools and goods stored in the tubewell buildings, at least one, and often 
several men from the house will sleep there at night, effectively making them  into men’s 
houses. However, this is only practiced by a small minority (less than 10 percent) of the 
village families. The majority keep all agricultural implements, stored grain, and animals 
in their house in the village at night, and use the tubewell building only during the day.*'
Farming is done mostly by hand methods in Rajepur. One man in the village 
owns a tractor, which he uses to plow his own fields, and rents out to other farmers. 
However, the vast majority of farmers do not make use of his (expensive) services, but 
instead plow the traditional way with a bullock-drawn metal or wooden plow. The fields 
are plowed once or twice, then seed is hand scattered, the fields are irrigated and weeded
3. The tubewell is an interesting social escape mechanism, for if a man is totally ostracized and 
thrown out of the village for committing a socially unacceptable action, he may go to live at his 
tubewell in the fields. Although this did not happen to anyone in Rajepur during my stay, the 
villagers did tell me of one man in a neighboring village who was ostracized for marrying a low 
caste woman, and went with his bride to live at his tubewell.
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periodically, and then the crop is harvested - with a hand sickle in the case of corn, or 
wheat, and by digging up with a hoe in the case of potatoes, and other root crops. The 
threshing of rice or wheat is most commonly accomplished by tying the stalks into 
sheaves and beating them against a rock or log, thus loosening the grains from the stalk 
and making them fall to the ground. If a large field is harvested the crop can be laid out 
in a clearing and the farmer will make his bullocks walk around in a circle, trampling the 
plants until the grain separates from the stalk. In addition, some farmers have threshing 
machines for wheat, which chop up the stalks and blow air through, letting the heavier 
grains fall to the ground. The remaining stubble or plants are usually fed to animals or 
plowed under prior to the next planting.
The daily routine for the average villager goes something like this. The farmer’s 
wife gets up very early while it is still dark, and goes to the fields for defecation. She 
then comes back and washes her hands and feet and prays. Then she grinds the grain for 
the breakfast chapatis  in a stone mill.4 This mill consists of two large cylindrical 
grinding stones, one on top of the other, with a central hole for pouring in grain, and a 
handle for turning the top stone. The grain (wheat, corn, or occasionally millet) is 
poured a little at a time into the center hole. The housewife grasps the wooden handle 
and turns it around, thus causing the top stone to rotate and to grind against the 
stationary bottom stone. The grain migrates slowly outward from the center hole, to the 
perimeter, where the flour is collected in a shallow tray which encircles the lower stone. 
When she has ground enough flour, the housewife scoops it up from around the grinding 
stone, and sets it aside to mix with water to make chapatis.
The husband gets up about half an hour after his wife, goes to the fields for 
defecation, and washes his hands and feet. Soon after, the housewife begins her cooking 
routine. She will first plaster the chula with clay solution, and then begin preparing the
4. Although there is a mechanical flour mill in the village, the majority of grain is still ground 
by hand, as farmers cannot or prefer not to spend even the few cents that machine grinding costs. 
When asked about this, several farmers replied uWhy should I pay for the grinding machine? I 
have a wife/grinding machine right here in the house at no extra cost!”
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morning tea. The chula  is the cooking stove used by nearly all villagers in India. It 
consists of a low clay wall about 20-25 centimeters above the floor of the kitchen into 
which a semicircular hole about 15-20 centimeters in diameter is cut. The semicircle 
holds up the cooking pot while a cowdung and twig fire is built beneath it. Usually, 
families drink strong tea with milk and sugar in the morning, although many poorer 
families cannot afford it and often do without. Then, the men go to the fields for farm 
work, the landowners to work on their own farms, and the landless poor to work on 
other people’s farms, their payment being two free meals, and Rs. 7 (US $0.70) per day. 
The women then begin preparations for the morning meal, usually eaten between 11 am 
and 2 pm. They cook some type of curried vegetable (the most common of which are 
potatoes and Jerusalem artichokes, depending on the season) and chapatis. When the 
morning meal is prepared , the men either return to the house to eat, or depending on 
the workload, have some of the younger children carry the food out to them  in the fields. 
After the men and children have eaten, the women eat in the house, and then get on 
with their chores, washing dishes, bathing themselves and the children, mending and 
washing clothes, processing produce brought in from the fields (i.e. shucking corn, 
drying rice and wheat for storage in the house, etc.). They usually finish this work 
around three or four o’clock (except during harvest time when they are busy all 
afternoon), after which they have a little bit of free time to rest, visit their friends or 
engage in knitting, basketry, and other necessary crafts.
Soon, it is time to prepare the evening meal. Usually this consists of the same food 
and the same preparations as in the morning, although in October through December 
much rice is eaten, both morning and evenings. The rice as it comes from the fields is 
covered by an outer husk, which must be removed before it can be eaten. This is done by 
pouring a small amount of rice into a little round indentation on the floor, and pounding 
it with a long, heavy wooden stick. The sticks are approximately three feet long, and 
often have a brass tip to add extra weight and hardness. The woman sits on the floor 
with her legs straddling the hole. One hand holds the stick which she lifts up and thrusts
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down, pounding the rice in a rhythmic motion, while the other hand scoops and turns 
over the rice in the hole, thus making sure that it is pounded evenly. When much of the 
outer husk has been separated, the rice is scooped into a shallow basket made of reeds. 
The grains are thrown into the air and caught again in the basket, while the lighter chaff 
is blown by the wind and lands on the ground nearby. This process is repeated several 
times in order to remove all inedible portions, and to polish the rice; then it is cooked, 
either plain, or with some added lentils and spices.
The evening meal is eaten immediately before bedtime, usually around 9 or 10 pm, 
after which the dishes are washed and everyone goes to bed. Villagers do not eat their 
meals together, but each individual will eat on returning home, or when hungry. Around 
10 or 11 pm, all of the work is finished, the families go to bed, and the village grows 
quiet. Husbands and wives do not sleep together. Usually the wife will sleep next to, and 
often on the same cot as her children. The husband will sleep on a separate bed, and if 
he desires intercourse, he will have to wait until the children are asleep and then arrange 
for her to come to him. In the past in joint families, all of the women would sleep in one 
room, and the men in another. However, this pa ttern  seems to be changing somewhat in 
recent years. Although the women often sleep together, in houses with more than one 
room there is also a growing tendency to allow one couple to use one room, and another 
to use another room, with mothers-in-law and other relatives changing sleeping places 
from night to night. Although this was done very informally and somewhat randomly, 
there did seem to be at least some effort made to allow for marital privacy or access at 
night. However, this was done only for young couples, and a couple with grown children 
had little or no opportunity for sexual intercourse, as they would be afraid that their 
children would catch them in the act. Their shyness is consonant with Indian tradition 
which frowns upon a woman with children of marriageable age becoming pregnant, and 
accords with the frequently heard notion that sexual contact between husband and wife 
should taper off sharply around age 35 or 40.
The daily routine for children varies depending upon the age and sex of the child.
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In general, children over age six or seven are responsible for caring for the animals owned 
by the family, and in the case of females, for their younger siblings, thus freeing their 
mothers for other domestic work. In addition, children are expected to deliver messages, 
and fetch and carry things both inside the village, and between village and fields. 
Females of age eight or more are expected to gradually learn to help with the cooking, 
dishwashing, and domestic chores. Young boys have higher s tatus in the family than 
girls, and are generally given more freedom, but somewhere between the ages of nine and 
12 they are expected to begin to help their fathers in the fields. In addition to these 
chores, some children also a ttend  school, either at the elementary school in the village, 
or a t  a higher school in a nearby town. However, in the poorer families, or in families 
with a shortage of able-bodied workers, the work which the children perform is vital to 
the economic well being of the family, and these children are kept at home to work, and 
have no opportunity to a ttend  school.
T H E  H O M E  E N V I R O N M E N T ,  S O C I A L I Z A T I O N  O F  T H E  Y O U N G  
A N D  E X P E C T E D  R O L E S  A N D  B E H A V I O R
With the exception of the Himilayan regions, most of rural north India is typified 
by a patrilineal inheritance system and a patrilocal residence system. Although a large 
minority of rural Indian couples live in nuclear families, this for the most part represents 
a recognized stage in the life cycle and evolution of families, rather than a departure 
from traditional norms. A marriage almost invariably begins with a young man and his 
wife living with the m an’s parents in the parents’ house. In village India, the vast 
m ajority of children are born into and spend their early formative years in an extended 
family, in which their own parents live in the same household with their father’s parents 
and also sometimes married brothers, and their wives and children. Usually as the size of 
a household increases and the children grow older, the tensions inherent in maintaining 
the cohesiveness of the family group multiply. In addition, the uniting force of the older 
generation weakens as the parents and other senior relatives become old and lose their
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power to rule the family. Eventually, conflict between family members over m atters such 
as work duties, economic allocation of household resources, or living and cooking 
arrangements, becomes pronounced, and this often necessitates division. At such a time 
each nuclear family, although often still living within the same house, will claim a 
specific area within the house, to house their separate household property and cooking 
hearth. Depending upon the reasons for division, land and farming activities may also be 
divided at this time, or more rarely brothers may continue joint farming arrangements 
for some months or years after division of the domestic sphere.
The atmosphere in an extended family is happy, but hectic. Many people share the 
same central courtyard, and are simultaneously engaged in a wide variety of tasks. One 
wife may be cooking, while another washes clothes, and a third shucks corn, or bathes 
her baby. Children run through the courtyard, splashing in the water, chasing each other 
and playing local games similar to hopscotch or jacks. A teenage boy may study his 
schoolwork while his father eats lunch nearby. Grandmother will be sitting in the sun on 
the doorstep picking the stones out of the rice to be cooked for dinner, while a child 
picks the lice out of G randm other’s hair. An older daughter will be drawing water from 
the well to aid her mother in bathing the screaming and wriggling young one. Another 
daughter will be grinding grain in the flour mill, while the eldest son sharpens his sickle 
on a smooth stone. Dogs will wander in trying to grab a scrap of food from an 
unguarded c/iu/a, while a goat tethered in the front room will be trying to eat the corner 
of a sari hung up to dry. This all in a courtyard approximately eight by eight meters!
Life in the extended family provides a very rich and stimulating environment for a 
child to grow up in, making possible a wide variety of social interactions with many 
different people. On the other hand it is an environment where personal privacy is 
virtually nonexistent. A variety of sisters and aunties as well as the mother share the 
burdens of caring for and disciplining the child. The child grows up secure in the 
knowledge of many “m others” , but with a feeling tha t  his own mother is often too busy 
to pay attention to him. Up until the age of five or six the child is allowed to do pretty
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much as he or she likes. Although they are bathed and fed, sporadically fondled, or 
scolded for making a mess or disturbance, little systematic attention is paid to children 
in the way common to some groups in Europe or America, where the parents tell 
children stories, take them on excursions, and hold long conversations with them with 
the aim of instilling moral values. Village children are basically expected to relate to 
their peers within the extended family. Similarly, after age six, if children are attending 
school, they will be told to go there, but little attention is paid, at least at the primary 
level, to whether they actually reach the school, or whether they study hard. In addition, 
if the mother or father has some chore tha t  they want a child to do, they will tell one to 
stay home and help out.
The village primary school (there is no secondary school in the villages) consists of 
a few small brick rooms with mud floors. The rooms are much too small to house the 
number of students, and in any case are filthy and ill cared for; so they are never used. 
Instead, all of the 80 or so students from Rajepur and neighboring villages sit outside on 
burlap bags in an open field nearby, while a teacher sitting behind a desk in front has 
them recite their lessons. Attendance is sporadic, and the crowd of small children is often 
noisy and undisciplined. At least at the elementary level, children own no books - only a 
small slate to write on. The basic letters and numbers are taught, as well as simple 
reading, arithmetic, and Indian history; however, all lessons are learned by rote, and 
involve as much memorization as comprehension. The quality of the teachers is low: 
nearly all highly educated Indians aspire to live and work in the cities, and only those 
who are unable to find work in the cities will take a village job. Thus, even bright village 
children who are able to attend school regularly are at such a disadvantage when it 
comes to secondary education that relatively few are able to do well.
After school, the child is expected to help out in the house. Upon entry of the 
young daughter after school, the busy and harassed housewife will often exclaim “Good, 
you’re back! The baby is making me crazy! Go play outside and take him with you,’’ 
thus handing a two-year-old baby to the eight-year-old girl to carry around with her.
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Through such means, girls learn about motherhood and their future role at a very early 
age. Boys have a little more freedom because they are not assigned childcare duties, but 
are expected to help care for the family animals (bullocks used for plowing, and cows, 
goats or buffaloes, which provide milk), run errands and help with the farming.
In Indian tradition the wisdom of elders, and the ideal of a dutiful and obedient 
son or daughter is highly revered. A child is expected to not talk back, and to obey 
without question the commands of his father or grandfather. Self-sufficiency and 
self-decisiveness are discouraged. The primary concern of the elder generation is with the 
welfare of the extended family as a whole, rather than the best interests of the 
individuals involved. For example, in families with many sons, the elders of the family 
often make quite conscious decisions as to the future careers of the children. One son is 
told to study and try to get a skilled job, another to stay home and farm, and a third, to 
join the army or look for unskilled work in a factory. This is an efficient and rational 
game plan to maximize future family income and to minimize risk: if one loses his job, or 
the crops are bad, there is always another income devolving from an independent source, 
unlikely to be affected by the current disaster. However, this type of decision-making 
often tends to overlook the individual aptitudes and personality differences of the 
various sons. In my interviews, I came across several cases where quite intelligent and 
talented young men never had the chance to a ttend school because they were relegated 
at birth to the role of farmer. Meanwhile their less intelligent or motivated brothers were 
unsuccessful when assigned the role of scholar, head of the family, and mentor of the 
next generation.
In this environment individual differences are minimized for the greater good. 
Thus, a child grows up with less sense of his own individuality, and greater identification 
as simply a contributing member of an extended family unit. In India, most people 
address others by relationship terms, i.e. “big brother, little brother, son, 
mother-in-law, elder uncle, younger uncle, etc . * 1 rather than by name. Each relationship 
term  implies a specific set of behaviors, and people are expected to behave according to
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the niche in which they find themselves. The use of relational titles reinforces the 
youngster’s impression that he fulfils a given role within the family and is expected to 
behave according to tha t  role, regardless of, or perhaps overcoming individual 
personality differences.
People do act out the roles to which they are assigned. Many Westerners are 
surprised when, for example, the extremely quiet, submissive and dutiful daughter-in- 
law, after the death of her overbearing and tyrannical mother-in-law, quickly assumes 
the la t te r ’s role with regard to the younger female members of the family. Also quite 
marked in many families is the difference in behavior between the eldest son, who is 
trained from birth  to be responsible for and almost a father figure to his younger 
brothers; and the younger sons, who in spite of sometimes greater intelligence and ability 
will remain dependent on their elder brothers for advice and leadership throughout their 
lives. In any family, it is always the eldest males who take responsibility and make 
decisions for the entire family group, unless they become so old and senile that they are 
no longer able to fulfil this role. Thus a 30 year old married and employed son, if he has 
a father or elder brothers, may have relatively little independence. In contrast, a boy of 
15 may have to shoulder a major part of the responsibility for the extended family, if his 
father dies and he has no elder brothers.
More educated and aspiring teenage boys commonly suffer from a sense of 
alienation from the family. On one hand, they resent the fact that the family is making 
major decisions regarding education, career, marriage, etc. for them, perhaps not in the 
way th a t  they would like. On the other hand, not being trained in independence of 
thought or action, they have little idea of how to systematically make this kind of major 
decision for themselves. They are filled with idealism but have little experience, and 
when faced with a situation calling for an independent decision, often make it 
impulsively, emotionally, and sometimes foolishly, thus reinforcing their parents’ 
contention tha t  they are not capable of deciding for themselves. Other boys with fewer 
aspirations tend to be content to let the family serenely guide their lives, providing
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complete security, cushioning their contacts with the outside world, and removing from 
them the burdens of major decision-making.
Teenage girls are trained to a greater degree of submissiveness and exhibit little 
outwardly expressed desire for self-decision. The teenage girl has already experienced an 
abrupt change in her life as she approached puberty. Whereas before, she was allowed to 
run around in the village with nearly as much freedom as her brothers, from age 11 or 12 
onward she is expected to stay in the house for the most part, behave modestly, avoid 
contact with boys, and to interest herself in women’s work. After marriage, she is 
expected to observe strict purdah, veiling herself in the presence of older marital kin, and 
even her husband. (Although this is the ideal which all families try to emulate, among 
the lower service castes mores are not so strict, as young wives must occasionally work 
outside of the house through economic necessity). She must obey the commands of 
anyone in her husband’s family, and is often assigned the hardest and most tedious of 
the housework. She may not leave the house without specific permission from the 
family, and even then only when heavily veiled and escorted. It is only after she reaches 
the age of 50 or so tha t  she can again travel around in the village with relative freedom.
The young girl from birth is made aware through numerous examples of the low 
value and sta tus of women. She sees even within her own natal family how her brothers 
are given preferential treatm ent with regard to food, education, spending money, 
permission to speak in front of their elders, and freedom to roam around in the village. 
From infancy, she is told that it is her fate (and the fate of every woman she knows) to 
marry a stranger, to go to live in his family, and to fulfil the role of a dutiful and 
obedient daughter-in-law. From observing her own m other’s behavior and attitudes, she 
gains a powerful example and role model for the correct behavior of women. Her 
mother 's  primary roles are those of the obedient and submissive daughter-in-law, at all 
times ready to serve and obey without question the commands of the mother-in-law; and 
the shy and self-sacrificing wife, who worships her husband, will not eat until after he 
has eaten, or sleep until he returns home, and who derives her greatest pleasure from
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serving and caring for her husband. The young girl discovers that she cannot necessarily 
expect kind or even fair trea tm ent from her future husband’s family, and that her only 
recourse in the event of marital incompatibility is to be submissive and obedient and 
adjust to the unpleasant situation, as her husband and his family will make no effort 
whatever to adjust to her. Thus, the young girl is fraught with feelings of inferiority, and 
insecurity. She looks forward to marriage, because of romantic notions, and because it is 
only after marriage that she will be considered an adult. But she is also very afraid of it, 
as she will be entering an environment full of strangers who could be alternately 
sympathetic or hostile, based upon her luck.
It is the hierarchical nature of Indian society which creates repression for its 
members. The necessity of extreme respect, formality, and obedience to one’s elders and 
social superiors makes it difficult for people occupying the lower rungs on the social 
ladder to have any freedom of action or expression. Self-expression is evident in Indian 
society, but one can only express oneself freely to a person of lower, or sometimes equal 
s tatus. With persons of higher status, one must invariably show a compliant and dutiful 
front. This is not a strain for someone with a high social status - he or she can be 
unrestrained a good portion of the time. But for people such as young wives and 
members of the lower service castes who occupy the bottom end of the social spectrum, 
the burden of repression can be a cruel one. For the less powerful, it is only by being 
completely submissive and conforming perfectly to their established role, tha t  they can 
avoid conflict with others more powerful. The role and status of any individual varies 
greatly throughout the life cycle, depending on age and circumstances. Thus, every 
Indian villager at some time or another learns to associate a certain sense of safety or 
security with the conformance to an assigned role, and every villager - although often 
quite unrestrained with his close friends - carries with him a cloak of expected role and 
behavior which he can slip on at a moment's notice to clothe himself in perfect role 
obedience, and behind which he can conceal his inner thoughts.
It becomes obvious, given this type of socialization process, that, despite
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occasional resentments or conflicts, children grow up with a feeling of extreme loyalty to, 
as well as dependence on, the extended family group. Their identifications with 
outsiders, other groups, and the abstract concept of “m ankind” are relatively less 
developed. As stated before, an adolescent’s first experiences with the outside world are 
often fraught with rejection and disappointment, mostly because of his excessive 
idealism and inexperience. From this the individual develops a certain feeling of wariness 
in interactions with outsiders, and while outwardly very friendly and hospitable, the 
villager is often inwardly reserved. This, in conjunction with the extreme competition 
which can occur in an environment (such as a village) of limited land and resources, can 
cause disputes and strains in social relations between families. Conflicts between 
families, if sufficiently serious, may lead to a division of loyalties within the village, as 
various families lend support to one or the other disputant. When this occurs, it can 
cause a serious and long standing rift in village social relations, and factions are formed.
C ASTE, P O W E R , PO LITIC S, A N D  FA C T IO N A L ISM
When my assistant and I first came to Rajepur we were concerned about making 
an arrangement to rent a house inside the village. When we consulted the Pradhan (the 
elected headman of the village), he arranged for us to move into a small one-room mud 
house with a separate courtyard. It soon became apparent tha t  the very act of moving 
into a certain house was a political statement. The house we moved into belonged to our 
nearest neighbors, who were staunch Pradhan  supporters. It was not until two weeks 
later, while interviewing in houses in other sections of the village, that we came across 
our first indications of factionalism. The ladies of a house where we went to interview 
said th a t  they had wanted very much to meet us earlier (after our arrival we were 
overwhelmed by a spate of visits from all of the village women in our neighborhood), but 
had been afraid to come to our house, this journey, although spanning a distance of only 
50 meters, involving a crossing into “enemy territory.” Small children were largely 
exempt from this custom, but adults of opposite factions rarely visited each o ther’s
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houses, and then only on a formal occasion such as a festival, or upon specific invitation. 
Where the enmity was strong, as between the faction leaders, they would not visit at all, 
and would not even sit in the same circle of people talking or smoking. When I inquired 
into the origins of this division, I was informed that two years previously there had been 
an election for Pradhan in the village. There were five people who ran for election, but 
the two main candidates were both men from the dominant Thakur caste, Nawab Singh 
and Hoshiar Singh (all of the names used in this section are pseudonyms).
The controversy during the elections was quite heated, as these two men were both 
large landowners, and both provided employment for a number of men.5 In addition, 
both vied for the favoritism of the police, stationed at the substation in a small town, six 
kilometers away. The two leaders took every opportunity to harass or embarrass 
members of the opposite faction, and several fistfights as well as cases of minor thievery 
and vandalism occurred. When the voting was held, Nawab came out ahead. However, 
Hoshiar Singh accused him of bribing the police to invalidate a number of the ballots, 
changing the outcome of the election. There is currently a case in the District courts 
concerning this alleged infringement of election procedure; in the meantime Nawab is 
Pradhan, and his faction, although numerically somewhat smaller, dominates much of 
the political life of the village.
It must be emphasized that in Rajepur, as in other villages, the vast majority of 
social relations between villagers are friendly. Even when a dispute occurs, tensions and 
violence usually remain below the surface, and the disputants merely try to avoid one 
another until the situation blows over. However, some conflicts do not blow over, and 
this is when trouble and violence can occur.
5. In India, at least at the village level, patronage implies political allegiance. Thus in order for 
a poor man to work in another man’s fields, lease his land, borrow money from him, or ask for his 
support in a personal or legal crisis, the poor man must provide his better-off patron with ongoing 
loyalty and political support. Since all of the well-off people of the village align themselves 
through kinship or friendship with one of the candidates, all members of the lower classes are 
forced to commit themselves to a factional loyalty. Often the poor man has little choice in the 
matter, as his past debts to his patron necessitate his blind allegiance to the patron in all politics 
and disputes; if he were to suddenly change loyalties, his debts would be immediately recalled, he 
would lose his employment or the lease on his land, and thus his means for survival.
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Disputes and factional activity in Rajepur take several forms. The disputes 
between members of the same caste differ markedly from those tha t  occur between 
castes. Where the sta tus of the two parties is relatively equal, a stalemate often 
develops. If one party is clearly superior to the other in economic or social status, the 
stronger party usually wins, regardless of the justice of his position. However, the 
situation is more complex than this, as a less powerful person sometimes has the support 
of others more powerful than him. The Pradhan or faction leader has a nominal 
responsibility to champion his loyal followers in any dispute or trouble in which they 
might find themselves. However, in practice, the faction leader, although promising all 
sorts of aid, will rarely give it. He will actively lend his support only if the cause proves 
to be politically or economically advantageous to him personally; for example in an 
ongoing dispute when the faction leader uses a specific conflict of one of his supporters as 
an excuse to confront or harass rival faction members. Disputes are always clouded by 
controversy, as many people have conflicting versions of the same story. Often the 
contesting parties go around the village deliberately telling half-truths or conflicting 
stories to various people with the purpose of confusing the issue, or of strengthening 
their particular case. At times, people with a grudge against another family may 
manufacture a case against tha t  family, committing a “crime” themselves by hiding or 
vandalizing something on their own property, and then throwing suspicion on their 
enemy. Often the police know or suspect th a t  the accusation is false, but go along with 
it, as they are eager to accept the bribes terrified villagers will pay instead of having 
their loved ones hauled away to jail.
An incident shortly after our arrival in the village served to point out the working 
of factions in the village, their relationship with the police, and the helplessness of the 
average villager to fight for their rights against either. In 1974, a landholding farmer in 
the village died with no sons. Two Thakur families, both distant relatives but belonging 
to opposite political parties, attem pted to claim his land. The family of Kaptan Singh 
eventually occupied the land and began farming it, leaving the family of Janaki without
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any share. Janaki attem pted to contest their claim in the district court, and when 
unsuccessful, asked his faction leader Nawab (the current Pradhan) for assistance. 
Nawab asked for money to cover legal fees, and armed with Rs. 300 (a large sum to 
Janaki) promised to help. After several months, it became apparent tha t  Nawab had 
simply pocketed the money, and had made no a ttem pt to help Janaki. As the frustration 
of this chronically poor family mounted, conflict became inevitable. One afternoon, I 
returned from interviewing to find Jan ak fs  mother and a couple of women from 
K a p ta n ’s house in an absolute rage. They were standing out in the lane between the two 
houses threatening and screaming imprecations at each other at the top of their lungs. 
Other villagers were attem pting to separate them, but it was well over an hour before 
the women could be calmed down and persuaded to return to their houses.
A few days later, apparently someone broke into K ap tan ’s tubewell, tried to smash 
his engine, and stole some tools. I say “apparently” because little real damage was done, 
and some villagers felt that Kaptan might have himself dented the engine cover and 
hidden the tools in order to fake a crime wfhich could get his enemy into trouble. Kaptan 
and a few of his friends reported this to the police, and testified tha t  they had seen 
Janaki and his brother in the vicinity of the tubewell on the night of the break-in. The 
police began coming to Jan ak fs  house, demanding tha t  the family produce the brothers 
to be taken in for “questioning” . The family was terrified by the threatening manner of 
the police (there was a rumor going around the village that Kaptan had paid Rs. 500 - 
approximately US $50. - to the police to arrest the two brothers), and Janaki and his 
brother, upon hearing tha t  the police were entering the village, escaped to the fields and 
later to their married sister's house about 20 kilometers away to hide until things cooled 
off. Meanwhile, every time the police came and threatened them, the family would offer 
whatever money they could scrape up in order to placate them.
It was harvest time and as the sons were afraid to set foot in the village, the 
family was forced to pay laborers to help them harvest their crops. After four or five 
visits and the payment of about Rs. 350, the police eventually discontinued their
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harassment. After a few days, the brothers felt safe enough to return to the village. 
Meanwhile the family was in a grim financial state. Since they had no money, Janak i’s 
family had paid the laborers tha t  harvested their crops with a share of the grain 
harvested. Consequently, there was not enough food left to last until the next harvest. 
In addition, they were one month late in planting the winter wheat crop due to the 
troubles. Janaki wrote to his relatives asking for a loan of at least enough money to buy 
fertilizer to ensure tha t  the next crop would be all right. In the meantime, he and his 
brother began hiring themselves out as laborers on other men’s fields in order to get at 
least a little money for food.
Janak i’s troubles exemplify the type of disputes which occur between members of 
the same caste. However, disputes between members of different castes are further 
complicated by the patterns of dominance and power between the separate caste groups. 
There are approximately twenty different castes represented in the village having a wide 
variety of economic and social statuses (see Chapter 4). However, only two or three of 
these groups wield significant political power. The Thakurs, the second-largest caste 
group, enjoy a very high status within the village, based on their high economic status 
and high ranking in the caste hierarchy. They are, by far, the most politically powerful 
caste group in the village. The Thakurs are very possessive of their great political and 
economic power, and do not like to concede any sort of power or high status to a 
member of any other caste. Despite the extreme divisiveness between village Thakurs 
(as between Janaki and Kaptan, or Nawab and Hoshiar), in any dispute with a member 
of another caste the Thakurs will invariably set aside their internal disagreements, and 
band together to support members of their own caste. In practice, this gives the Thakurs 
virtual impunity of action, and a free reign in actions and mischief against the lower 
caste members of the village. If a crime is perpetrated against a member of the lower 
castes, the victim can do very little about it, except in the unlikely event tha t  he can get 
support from another powerful person in the village. In addition to the Thakurs, there 
are two other families (one Brahmin, and one Srivastav) which enjoy considerable
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economic power in the village. However, they are politically isolated, and extremely 
reluctant to antagonize the Thakurs, as they feel tha t  their position could be 
jeopardized.
Several villagers told me of a conflict which occurred in 1980 between members of 
the Thakur and Dhobi (washerman) castes. Apparently, one Thakur boy, Manoj, was 
having an affair with a Dhobi girl. The Dhobi girl, originally forced into it (the villagers 
used the word ‘‘raped” ) by Manoj, was ashamed and also afraid of what might happen if 
the tru th  became known, and so hid the fact from her family. In the meantime, her 
family was in the process of negotiating her marriage, and so after a few months she 
married and left the village. Several months later she returned to Rajepur to visit her 
parents. Manoj went to her house and began to forcibly seduce her, but her parents 
interrupted his advances. They were furious, and accused him of raping their daughter. 
There was a heated dispute and considerable controversy in the village. As he was a 
member of their caste, all of the Thakurs supported Vlanoj, even though his behavior 
was considered reprehensible. Most of the other villagers quietly supported the Dhobi 
family, although few would stand up openly against their powerful Thakur neighbors. 
The Dhobi girl had a brother, Ajay, who was considered to be a criminal type and who 
belonged to a gang that was purported to commit robberies in other villages. When Ajay 
heard of the rape he was furious, and openly and vehemently threatened the Thakur boy. 
Vlanoj, who worked in the police force himself in another district, felt insulted at being 
reviled by a low caste person, and was also probably afraid of retribution by Ajay. So, 
according to the villagers, he paid the police some money to get rid of Ajay. After a gun 
battle in nearby Mohammadebad, where Ajay had a hideout, the police shot him dead.
It is not only members of the lower castes who have recurring conflicts with the 
Thakurs. Thakurs are particularly jealous of other caste members who manage to a ttain  
a reasonably high social or economic position in the village. For example, in 1976 the 
village Brahmin family purchased a tractor. This was the First tractor to be purchased in 
the village, and was considered to be a considerable accomplishment. The Thakur
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families felt offended that a non-Thakur had bought such an ostentatious piece of 
equipment, seemingly elevating himself above them. From the beginning the Brahmin 
had a hard time making the purchase of the trac tor profitable. Because of caste feeling, 
none of the Thakurs in the village would hire the Brahmin's tractor, instead renting one 
from a Thakur in a neighboring village. The Thakurs took every opportunity to obstruct 
the work of the Brahmin family's tractor, harassing and threatening the hired tractor 
driver, and vandalizing the tractor if it was left unguarded. On one occasion, the 
cultivator a ttachm ent, worth about Rs. 5,000, was stolen. Due to both the lack of 
business and periodic damage to the equipment, the Brahmin family were unable to 
make any money out of the tractor, and in fact sustained substantial losses. Bowing to 
the inevitable, the family sold their tractor a year later.
In 1979 the Brahmin family went into partnership with Hoshiar Singh in the 
purchase of a tractor. They hoped that by going into partnership with a village Thakur, 
they could avoid the problems of jealousy and harassment. However, from the 
beginning, Hoshiar cheated them by doing private contracts and not giving them their 
rightful 50 percent share of the profits. Through this and other means, Hoshiar forced 
the Brahmin family to give up their share of the tractor. He promised to pay the 
Brahmins for their share, but actually paid only part of the agreed upon amount. A few 
months later, Hoshiar sold tha t  trac tor  and bought a brand new tractor which he owns 
outright. He now uses this tractor to do plowing contracts within the village, and makes 
a handsome profit.
It can be seen from the previous discussion that there is a strong element of 
lawlessness in village social relations. The police, at least at the local rural level, are 
undoubtedly corrupt. A person with political and economic power has virtual impunity 
of action against those who are less fortunate, as long as he proceeds in an indirect 
manner, and cannot be “caught red-handedr in a major criminal action. In the 
Thakur-Dhobi dispute, the boy was caught “red-handed'’ (which is the reason why the
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incident assumed such major proportions), but he did use the services of an intermediary 
party (the police) when exacting final retribution. Similarly, in the tractor disputes, the 
Thakurs seldom committed a clear and serious crime directly against the Brahmin 
family. Rather their harassment was limited to mischief and vandalism at night when 
there was no chance of being recognized. If a direct attack is deemed necessary, villagers 
will hire the help of men from other villages to avoid local recognition. Reciprocally, 
people from another village may hire Rajepur men to assist in illegal actions as part of 
their disputes. The Pradhan , for example is rumored to have been involved in 
kidnapping cases in other villages, but owing to the difficulties of identification, has 
never been formally charged.
The question arises as to how typical these incidents are of north Indian villages as 
a whole. During my stay in Rajepur, I heard stories of numerous disputes in other 
villages, and although some villages seemed to be singularly law abiding, I believe that 
at least 50 percent of the villages in my region experienced similar levels of factionalism 
and violence. Farrukhabad district, together with Districts Etah, Etahwah and 
Mainpuri were considered by the police and district officials to be “criminal areas,” and 
to have a higher level of violence than surrounding districts. Yet I have heard similar 
sta tem ents about almost a third of the districts in U ttar  Pradesh! Villages with 
considerably more violence are documented in the anthropological literature. Rastogi, for 
example, described a village in western U ttar  Pradesh in which there had been an 
ongoing dispute which involved numerous cases of arson, litigation and violence, and 
even several murders over the course of 30 years (Rastogi, 1964; 1965). Rajepur, by 
comparison, seems relatively calm, with only one murder of a villager occurring within 
the past 30 years. I would venture to say tha t  Rajepur, with its concomitant level of 
violence is typical of villages in Farrukhabad and its surrounding districts, as well as of 
many of the more backward, or socially isolated areas of U ttar  Pradesh.
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C H A P T E R  3
SOCIO-ECONOM IC A N D  
D E M O G R A P H IC  C H A R A C T E R IST IST IC S  
OF THE S T U D Y  P O P U L A T IO N
In this chapter I will study a variety of characteristics of the population of the 
study villages including caste, education, occupation, ownership of land, family type, 
fertility, mortality, and rates of population growth.
CASTE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND ECONOMIC STATUS
Of the 1485 persons resident in the study area as of 30 June, 1982, some 18 
different Hindu castes, plus one non-Hindu group (the Muslims) were represented. Table 
3.1 delineates the number of individuals and households belonging to each different 
group. The village is somewhat different from the district and state as regards major 
caste divisions, having a slightly smaller proportion of Scheduled Castes, and a much 
smaller proportion of Muslims (who comprise 15.9 percent of the population of Uttar 
Pradesh); however, unlike in many villages found in the area, most major caste divisions 
are represented. The various castes differ greatly in their basic characteristics as regards 
average family size, economic status, and average size of landholding. Although the 
number of households representing some castes is small, reducing the ability to 
generalize about some of the differentials observed, for other castes the numbers are 
sufficient to obtain a fair idea of their basic characteristics. There is a strong 
relationship between economic status and the social s ta tus of the caste group, with the 
high status castes being considerably above the economic average for the village.
A similar relationship is found between caste sta tus and the ownership of land. 
W ith the exception of the Baniyas, who are primarily involved in trade, the high status 
castes have an average size of landholding which is nearly twice tha t  of any of the
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TABLE 3.1
PO PULA TION OF TH E STUDY AREA BY CASTE AND RELIGION
Population 
Male Female
Number
of
Households
Average
Persons
per
Household
Average
Economic
Status1
Avg. Size of 
Landholding 
per HH 
(in acres)
High Status Castes2 
Brahmin 7 10 1 17.0 + 15 20.0
Thakur 162 137 38 7.9 + 7 5.8
Srivastav 16 15 4 7.8 + 27 6.1
Baniya 12 14 2 13.0 + 8 0.7
Intermediate Status Castes 
Kacchi (Village) 155 112 39 6.8 + 3 2.2
Kacchi (Hamlet) 112 89 36 5.6 + 3 1.7
Baxhai 1 1 1 2.0 - 1 0.0
Jot si 14 12 4 5.2 - 6 1.2
Kisan (Hamlet) 104 79 31 5.9 + 7 3.5
Darzi 22 20 8 5.3 - 3 0.1
Kahar 35 46 20 5.1 - 4 0.4
Khori 13 14 4 6.8 - 2 0.0
Teli 9 10 2 9.5 - 3 0.0
Burgi 9 7 2 8.0 - 5 1.0
Scheduled Castes 
Dhobi 52 43 16 5.9 1 1.1
Cham ax 21 16 7 5.3 0 2.4
Dhanuk 9 10 3 6.3 - 3 0.3
Nai 12 8 3 6.7 - 3 1.1
Bhangi 6 6 2 6.0 - 2 0.8
Non-Hindus
Muslim 27 20 7 6.7 + 2 1.0
TOTAL 816 669 230 6.5 0 2.5
1. This index of economic status is based on a survey of possessions and has been 
converted to s tandard scores with a mean of zero and a s tandard deviation of ten. 
For a discussion of the construction of this index see Chapter 1 and Appendix A.
2. The relative status of various caste groups has varied considerably both temporally 
and regionally in Indian society. The level of s ta tus assigned to various castes in the 
current study does not reflect any type of cultural absolute; rather it is based upon 
the relative status of various castes in the study area and surrounding locality.
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
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intermediate or scheduled caste groups. Those intermediate s tatus or scheduled castes 
whose economic sta tus is at or above the mean also exhibit a much higher average size of 
landholding, emphasizing the importance of land ownership to economic prosperity in an 
agricultural community.
The relationship between caste and average household size is also clear, as the 
higher s ta tus  castes, and those castes which have relatively few members within the 
village prefer to live in extended family groups in order to maximize their social power 
and prestige through family and caste solidarity. The other im portant indicator of 
household size is size of landholding, as those families with larger holdings are more 
likely to remain in one household owing to the greater labor requirements of farming 
their comparatively larger parcels of land.
OCCUPATION AND LAND TENANCY
In ancient Indian society, many caste divisions originally developed from 
occupational categories. Thus, among the castes represented in the study, the Brahmins 
were originally priests, the Thakurs were traditionally warriors although they have been 
involved in farming for hundreds of years, the Baniyas were traders and moneylenders, 
and the Srivastavs were scribes. Among the intermediate s tatus castes, the Kacchis, 
Barais, Jotsis and Kisans were respectively vegetable growers, carpenters, astrologers 
and farmers; the Darzis, Kahars, Khoris, Telis and Burgis were respectively tailors, 
water carriers, weavers, oil pressers, and grain parchers. Among the scheduled castes, the 
Dhobis, Chamars, Dhanuks, Nais and Bhangis were traditionally washermen, 
leatherworkers, watchmen and midwives, barbers, and sweepers ( transla te  privy 
cleaners). The traditional occupations of some of these castes (for example, leather 
workers, weavers, and oil pressers) are now in lesser demand than previously due to the 
mechanization of these processes, and many of these displaced workers have become 
involved in agriculture, most commonly as landless laborers. Those occupations which 
are still in demand are overwhelmingly practiced by members of the traditional
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occupational caste. For example, among the eight army officers in the village, five are 
Thakurs. Similarly, among the Darzis, Dhobis, and Chamars, those workers not involved 
in agriculture are overwhelmingly still practicing their traditional caste occupations. 
Among the traditionally agricultural castes, the percentage of agricultural workers, or 
more significantly, the percentage of landed farmers is higher than among the 
nonagricultural castes (see Table 3.2).
When the castes are placed into major groupings according to status, several 
im portant pa tterns emerge (see Table 3.3). The proportion of workers involved in 
agriculture is higher among the intermediate s tatus castes than among either of the 
other two groups. This is because of the fewer opportunities for nonagricultural 
employment available to them. While the high status caste members are more likely to 
obtain comparatively ‘‘high status" or better paid employment, either within or outside 
the village, as village officials, teachers, police officers, army recruits, agricultural 
commodities traders, factory workers, shopkeepers, or mill operators; many of the 
scheduled caste workers have stayed with their traditional occupations, most of which 
have proved less dispensable than the traditional occupations of the intermediate status 
castes. Thus, although 83.5 percent of the intermediate s ta tus castes are employed in 
agricultural occupations, the percentages for high status and scheduled castes are 68.5 
and 65.3, respectively.
Although the occupational categories from the 1981 census differ substantially 
from the categories employed here, the limited comparisons possible emphasize the 
typicality of the study population. Of the male agricultural wrorkers for Farrukhabad 
district, 87.1 percent are enumerated as “cultivators” (which includes farmers and 
sharecroppers), while 12.8 percent are agricultural laborers. The total proportion of male 
workers employed in agriculture is 79.8 percent, which is very close to the 78.0 percent 
found for the study population. The census data  on nonagricultural occupations are 
classified by industrial rather than occupational categories, which makes classification or 
comparison by the sta tus or earning potential of the job unfeasible.
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The differentials by caste for nonagricultural employment in the study population 
are even more striking than those for agricultural occupations. While 93.1 percent of the 
high status caste members in non-agricultural occupations were able to obtain one of the 
“high s ta tus” jobs listed above, only 35.7 percent of the intermediate status and 5.9 
percent of the scheduled caste workers employed outside of agriculture were able to 
obtain such jobs. Conversely, only 6.9 percent of the high status, 64.3 of the 
intermediate s tatus, and an overwhelming 94.1 percent of the scheduled caste 
non-agricultural workers were employed in low sta tus and low paying jobs, primarily in 
traditional service occupations and dependent upon the poorer village economy for their 
subsistence (primarily through payment for services rendered to the higher castes). 
These were occupations such as washerman, cobbler, sweeper, barber, tailor, laborer, or 
door to door petty salesman.
Of those working in agriculture, 90.5 percent of the high sta tus caste members are 
farmers on their own land, as compared to only slightly over half for the other caste 
groups. The incidence of sharecropping and agricultural laboring is much higher among 
the intermediate and scheduled caste groups, emphasizing the chronic shortages of 
agricultural land in the village, and its unequal distribution in favor of the high status 
castes. Further details of agricultural land tenancy are given in Table 3.4, which 
demonstrates tha t  out of 230 village households. 101, or 43.9 percent either own no land 
at all or own less than one acre, which from my observations seems to be the minimum 
holding adequate to support a family of Five at bare subsistence level. Consequently, 
many families seasonally rent land in this or neighboring villages in return for giving 50 
percent of the crop to the land owner.
Families prefer to farm their own land if at all possible, so usually the only 
families who lease out land are those in which there are insufficient workers with which 
to farm a large parcel. In these cases the family will usually lease out a few of the less 
productive acres, keeping the prime agricultural land for their own use. Typically, there 
are more people wishing to rent than land available to be rented, and many workers are
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TABLE 3.4
PA TTER N S OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TENANCY IN THE STUDY VILLAGES
S i z e  of 
P a r c e l  
(in a c r e s )
N u m b e r  a n d  
O w n  L a n d  
No. 7.
P e r c e n t a g e  of 
R e n t  L a n d  
No. 7
H o u s e h o l d s
L e a s e
No.
w h i c h : 
O u t  L a n d
7.
0 . 0 39 17 .0
0 . 2 - 0 . 6 38 16.5 11 4 . 8 3 1.3
0 . 7 - 1.0 24 10 .4 15 6 . 5 5 2 . 1
1 . 2 - 1.6 27 11 .7 12 5 . 2 5 2 . 1
2 . 0 - 2 . 7 31 13 .4 10 4 . 3 1 0 . 4
2 . 8 - 4 . 0 26 11.3 7 3 . 0 3 1.3
4 . 1 - 8 . 0 36 15.7 1 0 . 4 5 2 . 1
1 0 . 0 - 20 . 0 9 3 . 9 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0
T O T A L 230 100.0 56 24 . 2 22 9 . 3
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
forced to resort to agricultural labor, which pays the bare subsistence wage of six to 
seven rupees (U.S. $0.60-0.70) per day.
Patterns of female labor force participation are strongly influenced by the 
prevailing social norms of seclusion of women within the house. I found th a t  with the 
exception of one full time woman sweeper, and two dhobi women whose primary 
occupations were washing the clothes tha t  their husbands picked up from village 
customers, the primary occupation of all other village women was housewifery. Being a 
housewife in an Indian village involves more than cooking, cleaning and childcare, as 
village wives, and especially those whose husbands are landowning farmers, are 
responsible for a great deal of work involving the care of animals, and the processing of 
agricultural crops once they have been brought in from the fields. In general, even the
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village wives who were "just housewives” worked 12 to 16 hours per day, which was 
three to four hours longer than their agriculturalist husbands.
As regards secondary occupations, although some village women were involved in 
occasional work besides housewifery, their degree of participation outside the home was 
often limited, especially among the upper castes. As regards participation in agriculture, 
Brahmin, Baniya, Srivastav, Thakur and Kacchi women are forbidden by custom to hire 
themselves out as laborers in other people's fields, although they may occasionally help 
out in their own family’s fields. The 16 or so village women who reported themselves as 
having had at some time worked as agricultural laborers were Muslims, or members of 
the Kahar, Chamar, or Dhobi castes. However, apart  from the short rice planting season 
when women’s labor was often preferred to tha t  of men due to their supposedly greater 
care with the young shoots, women were only hired as agricultural laborers when there 
were no men available to do the work. As labor shortages are infrequent, in practice 
these women only worked about 20 to 25 days a year. Even among the castes which 
permitted female participation in agriculture other restrictions were present. Thus, 
almost universally, the women who worked in the fields were either daughters of the 
village or older women past the childbearing age, as social norms encouraging the 
seclusion of young wives within the home are strong even among the intermediate and 
scheduled caste women.
As regards non-agricultural occupations, the female relatives of men involved in 
service occupations such as tailoring, washing clothes, or shopkeeping often assisted their 
male family members with this work. In the study villages there were eleven such women 
who assisted in this manner. While the older women of the shopkeepers’ families would 
occasionally wait on customers if the men of the house were absent and the customer 
well known to them, the participation of women almost universally involved work that 
could be done within the home. In general, women workers had little or no contact with 
their customers, relying on male family members to take orders and deliver the finished 
goods.
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As regards other women's work, two Muslim women regularly received tobacco 
and rolling papers from a supplier, and rolled bidi (homemade cigarettes) as a household 
industry. One village woman of Dhanuk caste acted as midwife in village deliveries. One 
comparatively well-off widow supported herself by leasing out the small parcel of land 
left to her by her husband who had no other near male relatives. Two less well-off 
widows subsisted by selling milk from their buffaloes for four or five rupees per day, or 
helping to carry well water at weddings and festivals. However, the general pa ttern  was 
tha t  of women’s non-participation in activities other than the traditional “housewifely” 
duties of cooking, cleaning, caring for children and animals, and the processing of 
agricultural crops; and under this somewhat broad definition of household work 
approximately 90 percent of village women aged 15-59 were solely occupied as 
housewives. This pattern  of women’s non-participation in the labor force is typical of the 
region, and the crude work participation rate (number of workers divided by total female 
population of any age) for Farrukhabad district from the 1981 census is an extremely 
low 1.7 percent. The difference between the two rates can be largely accounted for by the 
difference in divisors (the rate for the district would be approximately doubled if only 
divided by the population in the 15-59 age group), as well as probable underreporting in 
the census of women's occasional work, especially when the work consists of part-time 
help in the family business.
EDUCATION
Strong differentials in the education of children by caste and sex were apparent in 
the d a ta  on school attendance and educational a tta inm ent for the study area. Despite 
the fact tha t  the study village exhibits a higher level of school attendance and especially 
female school attendance than the statewide average (for example the attendance rate of 
10 to 14 year olds for the district from the 1981 census is 56.9 for males and 18.6 for 
females), wide differentials are apparent in school attendance and educational 
a tta inm en t by caste and sex (see Table 3.5). Analysis of da ta  on the percentage of
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TABLE 3.5
PER C EN TA G E OF SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN CURRENTLY 
ATTENDING SCHOOL BY M AJOR CASTE GROUP
Percentage of Age Group Currently Attending School 
6-8 9-11 12-15 16-19 20-23
M A L E S
High Status Castes 58.3 73.3 70.0 64.7 33.3
Int. Status Castes 41.9 60.0 59.1 31.9 8.1
Scheduled Castes 27.3 38.5 45.5 18.2 0.0
TOTAL 42.9 60.2 59.8 39.0 13.8
F E M A L E S
High Status Castes 62.5 90.9 64.7 7.1 0.0
Int. Status Castes 28.1 32.0 11.9 2.6 0.0
Scheduled Castes 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0
TOTAL 32.2 43.9 21.1 3.4 0.0
Note: Values calculated on the basis of ten or fewer cases are indicated by
parentheses.
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
children of each major caste group currently attending school indicates tha t  for every 
age group and for both sexes, the percentage of children attending school was highest for 
the high sta tus castes, intermediate for the intermediate s ta tus castes, and lowest for the 
scheduled castes. For example, for males aged nine to eleven, the percentages attending 
school were 73.3 for the high sta tus castes, 60.0 for the intermediate s tatus castes, and 
38.5 for the scheduled castes. Although the percentages of children currently enrolled in 
the six to eight year old age group are slightly lower than those for the nine to eleven 
year old age group, this is not an indication of a recent decline in educational
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attendance, but rather reflects the fact that children do not uniformly s tar t  school at the 
age of six, but may begin their schooling at age five or eight, depending on their physical 
and social m aturity , and the wishes of their parents.
For high caste females, it is evident tha t  the attendance rate, at least at the 
younger ages, is close to tha t  for males; the large fluctuations represented here are due to 
the small size of the sample. The availability of a primary school within the village 
makes it relatively easy for these families to send their daughters to the school for a few 
hours a day. For both males and females, attendance at the village school is somewhat 
sporadic, and dependent upon the varying labor needs of their families. Because of this, 
repeating a grade is a common occurrence, and this coupled with the variable age at 
initial enrolment means tha t  age is a much less reliable indicator of grade attended than 
in American or Australian schools. For example, in the 12 to 15 year old age group, 
19.7 percent of the males currently enrolled, and 41.2 percent of the females currently 
enrolled were still attending primary school.
Although female school attendance is similar to male for the high status castes at 
the younger ages, the percentages who continue on to secondary education or continue 
studying past puberty drop sharply, as is evidenced by the low rate of school attendance 
at age 16 and above. Although the attendance of small girls at the village primary school 
poses few headaches for parents conscious of the necessity of seclusion and chaperonage 
of adolescent females, those girls who wish to continue on to secondary school are 
inhibited by the double bind of their approaching physical m aturity  necessitating their 
seclusion in the immediate vicinity of the parental home, and the unavailability of a 
secondary school in their own village. While village boys can easily walk the two to 
three kilometers to a neighboring village for secondary schooling, adolescent females 
could not contemplate such a trek without adult male chaperonage. Although one or two 
of the most progressive village families allow their prepubertal daughters to walk with 
their elder brothers to the middle school in a neighboring village, this practice is frowned 
upon by the majority of villagers. Even among the most progressive families, this
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practice definitely stops when the girl begins menstruating or shows other signs of 
approaching physical m aturity. Thus, the few village girls still studying past the age of 
fifteen are enrolled - with varying degrees of seriousness - in private correspondence 
courses, and there are no adolescent village girls who daily commute to neighboring 
villages or towns for the purpose of secondary education.
While the high sta tus castes value at least primary education for girls, mostly on 
the grounds tha t  they will have a better chance of marrying an educated boy in a well 
paid position, the situation for the intermediate and scheduled castes is radically 
different. The reader will recall tha t  while a considerable number of high caste men held 
uhigh s ta tus” non-agricultural jobs with comparatively better earning potential, the 
proportion of intermediate and scheduled caste workers holding this type of job was 
minute. Since few intermediate and scheduled caste men can aspire to such jobs, the 
incentive to educate a daughter in order to a t t rac t  a more educated and high-earning 
bridegroom is greatly reduced. Consequently, the percentages of intermediate caste 
females currently attending school are less than half of those of the high sta tus caste 
females, and at the time of the study there wrere no females from any of the scheduled 
caste families currently attending school.
The inter-caste disparities seen in current school attendance hold remarkably 
constant when educational changes over time are examined (see Table 3.6). Although 
average educational a tta inm ent, and the proportions who had ever attended school 
increased substantially over time, the large differentials in educational atta inm ent 
between the various caste groups have persisted and in the case of females even widened. 
For example, the percentage ever attending school for the study area as a whole has 
increased substantially from 37.8 for males and 8.3 percent for females for the 1923-33 
birth cohort (those aged 50-59 at the time of the study) to 77.3 percent for males and 
45.1 percent for females for the 1953-63 birth cohort (those aged 20-29 at the time of the 
study). However, the amount of variability is equally great between different caste 
groups belonging to the same cohort. The differentials are especially pronounced for
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TABLE 3.6
AVERAGE EDUCATIONAL A TTAINM EN T OF ADULT VILLAGERS 
BY M AJO R CASTE GROUP
Age at Time Average % Ever Attended Average Educational
of Survey by Educational School Attainment of Those
Caste Attainment Who Did Attend School
Males Females Males Females Males Females
High Status Castes:
20-29 8.3 5.1 84.2 81.3 9.9 6.2
30-39 8.2 4.6 77.7 75.0 10.6 6.1
40-49 8.9 2.6 93.3 47.1 9.5 (5.6)
50-59 2.3 0.7 50.0 18.2 (4.6) (4.0)
Intermediate Status Castes:
20-29 6.8 1.8 79.2 31.3 8.5 5.9
30-39 4.7 0.4 64.1 8.1 7.3 (4.7)
40-49 2.6 0.2 41.9 4.5 6.2 (5.0)
50-59 1.2 0.1 32.3 4.5 3.6 (2.0)
Scheduled Castes:
20-29 4.6 - 56.3 (0.0) (8.1) -
30-39 (2.1) - (28.6) 0.0 (7.5) -
40-49 (0.0) - (0.0) 0.0 - -
50-59 (1.0) - (33.3) (0.0) (3.0) -
TOTAL
20-29 6.9 2.8 77.3 45.1 8.9 6.1
30-39 5.3 1.3 63.6 22.7 8.4 5.8
40-49 3.5 0.7 46.5 13.2 7.6 5.5
50-59 1.4 0.2 37.8 8.3 3.8 3.3
Note: Values calculated on the basis of ten or fewer cases are indicated by
parentheses.
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
women, as the percentage of ever-attendance in the 20-29 age group plummets from 81.3 
percent for the high status castes to 31.3 percent for the intermediate sta tus castes, and 
to 0.0 for the scheduled castes. In fact, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate tha t  no scheduled 
caste female had ever attended school in the study area.
Owing to the small number of Muslim families resident n the village, it was
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impossible to gain an accurate picture of their educational patterns. However, from the 
scanty evidence available, the educational patterns for males seemed to most closely 
resemble those of the intermediate sta tus castes, while for females, their educational 
pa tte rns  were similar to those of the scheduled castes in that no female Muslim had ever 
a ttended school in the study area.
TABLE 3.7
POPULA TION OF THE STUDY AREA BY FAMILY TY PE
Household
Type
High Caste 
Hindus 
No. 2
I n t .Caste 
Hindus 
No. 7.
Scheduled 
Castes 
No. 7
Muslims 
No. %
Total 
No. %
Nucleax or
Supplemented
Nucleax 19 4 1 .3 79 5 3 .7 16 53 .3 3 4 2 .9 117 5 0 .9
Lineal Joint 10 2 1 .7 44 2 9 .9 11 36 .7 4 57 .1 69 30 .0
Lineal-Collateral 
Joint 17 3 7 .0 24 16.3 3 10.0 0 0.0 44 19.1
TOTAL 46 147 30 7 230
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
FAMILY STRUCTURE
As regards family organization, approximately 50 percent of the households in the 
village were of a nuclear or supplemented nuclear type (see Table 3.7). This encompasses 
families which contain one married couple and their children (with or without 
supplemental unmarried relatives). Approximately 30 percent of households were of a 
lineal joint or supplemented lineal joint type in which two couples of different 
generations lived together with or without supplemental unmarried relatives. There were 
no households of a collateral joint type including two married couples of the same
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generation (usually two brothers); however 19.1 percent of households were of a 
lineal-collateral joint or supplemented lineal-collateral joint type in tha t  three or more 
married couples of at least two generations were present (with or without supplemtal 
unmarried relatives). This usually took the form of a father and mother living in the 
same household with two or more married sons and their families.1 Although a 
cross-sectional analysis disguises to some degree the natural fluctuations which occur in 
every family between the nuclear and extended family state  as family members die or get 
married, it can provide a rough indicator of strong differentials in practices between 
groups. Here the differentials by caste group are consistent with those obtained for 
family size in Table 3.1, indicating clearly tha t  the high caste families are more likely to 
remain as extended family units, and have a lesser propensity to split into nuclear units 
than the intermediate or scheduled caste families. The reasons for this are primarily 
economic, as more families tend to stay together in order to have the necessary labor 
force to farm their comparatively larger land holdings.
FERTILTTY
Indirect estimates of fertility and mortality rates were calculated based on 
information collected on the number of children ever born and children surviving to 
village mothers (see Table 3.8). Indirect methods of estimation were utilized because the 
small number of births and deaths which occurred in the study villages (population 
1485) over a 10 month period of observation made the direct calculation of vital rates 
from so few events unreliable. Fertility was estimated by the Arretx method of 
estimating age-specific and total fertility rates (Arretx, 1973). This method was chosen 
in preference to the more commonly used Brass P /F  ratio method (Brass, 1964; United 
Nations, 1983), because of the above-mentioned unreliability of the direct calculation of 
age-specific fertility rates based upon a small population. The Arretx method operates
1. definitions of family types used are as per Kolenda (1968: 346-347).
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TABLE 3.8
AVERAGE NUM BER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND 
SURVIVING IN THE STUDY VILLAGES BY AGE OF WOMAN 
AND DURATION OF EFFEC TIV E MARRIAGE
Ag e  of C h i l d r e n C h i l d r e n N o . of
W o m a n E v e r  Born S u r v i v i n g W o m e n
15-19 0.233 0.180 133
20-24 1.783 1.317 60
25-29 3.410 2.615 39
30-34 5.432 3.865 37
35-39 5.674 3.977 43
40-44 7.824 4.725 51
45-49 6.622 3.838 37
Total 400
Duration of
Effective
Marriage
0- 4 0.417 0.321 84
5- 9 2.232 1.768 56
10-14 3.837 2.698 43
15-19 4.966 3.345 29
20-24 6.261 4.413 46
25-29 7.962 4.792 53
30-34 6.750 3.750 36
Total 347
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
on the assumption that the difference in average number of children ever born between 
women of two different age groups (between two census dates, or within a single census) 
reflects the fertility experience of women during the interval.
Although originally designed as a two census method, the procedure can also be 
applied to da ta  from a single census or survey, providing tha t  rapid fertility change is 
not occurring. Although there were a few older, high parity village women who had
67
recently undergone sterilization operations, most of these had occurred in the several 
m onths prior to the survey and their potential effects on fertility would not have been 
reflected in the study data. Even counting those recent cases and the two couples who 
reported condom use, at the time of the study fewer than four percent of married women 
aged 15-49 were currently protected by any family planning method. Certainly, no 
systematic bias based on fertility change in the younger cohorts (the most critical factor 
precluding use of the method in the single census application) was in evidence, as there 
were no women under age 32 practicing any form of family planning, and no evidence 
whatever of the use of contraceptives for spacing (rather than stopping) pregnancies. As 
no other evidence of systematic control of fertility was evident, it was felt that the use of 
this method in the current application was warranted.
TABLE 3.9
INDIRECT ESTIMATION OF AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES AND 
TO TA L FERTILITY RATE FOR THE STUDY VILLAGES (ARRETX METHOD)
Age Group Age Specific Fertility Rate
15-19 .214
20-24 .322
25-29 .324
30-34 . 262
35-39 .231
40-44 .048
45-49 .001
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE =7.01
Source: Calculated by the author from village census data.
The age-specific and total fertility rates obtained from the Arretx method of 
estimation are given in Table 3.9. The age-specific fertility rates follow a normal 
early-marriage and low fertility-control pattern f substantial fertility in the 15-19 age 
group, maximum fertility between the ages of 20 and 29, and substantial but declining
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fertility in the 30-39 age group. The very sharp reduction in fertility after age 40 appears 
slightly atypical of such populations, and may involve some misreporting of age around 
age 40 which has tended to slightly elevate the figures for the 35-39 year age group, and 
depress those for the 40-44 year age group. Traditional Hindu society has many cultural 
constraints which tend to limit sexual contact of couples in the late childbearing years.
o
Due to “pregnant grandm other” taboos, traditional beliefs tha t  sex (involving the loss 
of vital fluids) is weakening, especially for men, ideas of the proper behavior of ‘‘sedate” 
couples in their forties, and the logistical problems of obtaining uninterrupted privacy in 
a one or two room household full of grown up children, many couples do practice 
considerable periods of abstinence around these ages. Thus, a substantial drop in fertility 
around age 40 is likely, although the magnitude of this drop appears to be overstated in 
the present instance.
The total fertility rate of 7.01 obtained from the study villages is slightly higher 
than  larger scale estimates obtained by other authors for U ttar  Pradesh as a whole. For 
example, a recent study by Mari Bhat et al. (1984) obtained a to ta l fertility rate for 
U ttar  Pradesh of 6.89 based on a Brass P /F  ratio methodology applied to da ta  from the 
1972 Fertility Survey. However, the authors later indicated that they considered this 
estimate to be less reliable than the total fertility rate of 6.45 obtained from 1961-71 
intercensal estimates (Mari Bhat et al., 1984: 132-133). There is considerable 
controversy over vital rates for U ttar  Pradesh as different da ta  sources and methods of 
calculation may yield estimates of the total fertility rate differing by 0.5 or greater. 
Certainly, a total fertility rate of seven is well within the realm of probability, given the 
likelihood of regional variations in fertility, and as rural rates can be expected to be 
somewhat higher than  rates for rural and urban populations combined (Govt, of India, 
1985: 76,78). A more recent estimate based on Sample Registration System data  alone 
puts the total fertility rate for U ttar  Pradesh in 1980 at 5.9, with the rural rate being a 
slightly higher 6.1 (Govt, of India, 1985: 76).
2. in which it is considered shameful for a woman with grown or married children to become 
pregnant.
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In general, the age-specific and total fertility rates derived from the study indicate 
an overall high level of fertility, and relatively little evidence of systematic fertility 
control, other than  tha t  indicated by some possible practice of abstinence in the 40 to 49 
year age groups.
M ORTALITY
Mortality estimates for the study villages were calculated by a variety of methods 
in order to enable a comparison of results. Infant and child mortality as well as 
expectation of life at birth were estimated by the age of woman and duration of 
marriage methods based on the Palloni-Heligman equations for United Nations South 
Asian model life tables (Palloni and Heligman, 1983) using a new computer program 
(MORPAK) developed by the United Nations Population Division (United Nations, 
1985). The Palloni-Heligman equations have a similar theoretical basis to the method 
originally developed by Brass (1964) However, the multipliers used in the computations 
have been recalculated in order to make use of the new United Nations regional model 
life tables for developing countries (United Nations 1982). The Palloni-Heligman 
method, as with the earlier Trussell (1975) modification of the original Brass, et al. 
(1968) method is based upon an equation tha t  compares the proportions dead among 
live born children to mothers of different ages to the life table mortality rate (qx) for 
children of different ages. Thus the is based on the number of children born and 
surviving to women aged 15-19, q2 to women 20-24, q<> to women 25-29, q- to women 
30-34, q 1Q to women 35-39, and q 15 to women 40-44. As these estimates encompass an 
increasing period of time as the average age of the mother increases, time reference 
periods are also calculated in order to indicate the approximate time period to which the 
different rates (calculated on the basis of different age groups of mothers) refer. Once 
these original qx values are derived, the infant mortality rate, child mortality rate, and 
expectation of life at birth for each time reference period are extrapolated by fitting a 
model life table to the specific q values derived. Thus, the choice of the correct model
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life table is im portant in obtaining proper results. In the case of India, the use of the new 
United Nations model life tables is generally preferred, as these are the first major set of 
life tables calculated from recent mortality da ta  derived from developing countries, 
rather than (as with previous model life tables) from historical d a ta  derived from 
present-day developed countries. The South Asian regional model was chosen as the life 
table which most closely approximated India’s mortality pattern.
In addition to the methods described above, infant mortality rates were also 
calculated by the Feeney (1976; 1980) method to provide a check on the results obtained 
from other methods. The Feeney method assumes Brass’ “General S tandard” model life 
table patterns prevails, and tha t  this mortality pattern stays constant over time (Brass 
et a l., 1968).
The results of the various calculations are presented in Table 3.10. In his original 
writings on the indirect estimation method, Brass cautioned tha t  the results obtained 
based on the da ta  from women age 15-19 were likely to be unreliable because these 
women generally had few births, few deaths, and few infants who have been exposed to 
the risk of dying for a long enough period to enable the calculation of reliable infant 
mortality rates (Brass et a l., 1968). However, I also found a similar problem in my data 
by age of women for the 20-24 age group. One possible explanation for this could be that 
the traditional long visits of newly married brides to their natal homes and consequent 
reduced risk of exposure to intercourse and thus pregnancy, in conjunction with the 
fairly small size of the sample has tended to extend the unreliability effect mentioned by 
Brass over a longer period. Once these unreliable results for the youngest age groups of 
mothers are discarded, a fairly regular pattern  of mortality experience emerges. 
Although the fluctuations in rates between different time periods and methods of 
calculation are greater than  would be expected from a larger da ta  set, the pattern of 
mortality decline over the previous 15 to 20 years is unmistakable. The general trend has 
been a decline in infant mortality from around 206-218 in 1965-69 to a rate of 175-185 in 
1974-76, then to a rate of 156-164 in 1979. Child mortality rates exhibit a similar decline 
from 200-210 in 1965-69, to 145-165 in 1974-76, then to 121-123 in 1979.
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Larger scale estimates of infant and child mortality for U ttar  Pradesh based on 
differing da ta  sources and methods of calculation yield widely varying results (Mari Bhat 
et al., 1984). W hat is apparent is the consistently high levels of infant and child 
mortality in U ttar  Pradesh compared to other Indian states. Evidence is also 
considerable for a decline in early age mortality during the sixties (Mari Bhat et al., 
1984) and slower decline during the seventies (Government of India, 1985). Although 
Sample Registration System estimates of early age mortality for U ttar  Pradesh in the 
early seventies exhibit wide fluctuations (Government of India, 1982), probably because 
of differential completeness in reporting of deaths in various surveys (Mari Bhat et al., 
1984), the rates for the late seventies exhibit a more consistent pattern. Alrhough the 
figures must be interpreted as approximations, recent estimates of infant mortality for 
U ttar  Pradesh based on Sample Registration System da ta  yield infant mortality rates of 
184 in 1976 and 167 in 1980 (Govt, of India, 1985), which are consistent with the results 
obtained from the current study.
Although the expectation of life at birth is the least reliable Figure obtained from 
this method of estimation, as it is derived merely by deducing overall mortality from 
early-age mortality by means of a model life table, it is included for comparative 
purposes. In these calculations, the expectation of life at birth for both sexes rises from 
35-37 years of age in 1965-69 to 40-43 years of age in 1974-76, and finally to 46-47 years 
of age in 1979. Although more recent estimates based on the 1981 census are not yet 
available, the comparable figure for U ttar  Pradesh for the 1961-71 decade is 42.97 years 
(Census of India, 1971). The large discrepancy between this figure and the figures for my 
study population could be due to an overestimation of mortality for the 1960s from my 
study da ta  because of the variability possible in a small sample size, a relationship 
between early age mortality and life expectancy in my study population which does not 
coincide with the model life table used, although the use of another model life table does 
not make a great deal of difference in the results; a higher mortality rate in my study 
area than  in the state  as a whole; or an overestimation of expectation of life at birth for
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the s tate  based on inaccuracies in the census and Sample Registration Survey da ta  used 
as input to the calculation. It is probable tha t  a combination of these factors would 
account for the differences in rates, although it is not possible to determine whch are the 
more im portant influences without further study.
TABLE 3.11
ANNUAL EXPONENTIAL RATE OF POPULATION GROW TH. 
INDIA, U TTAR PRADESH, AND FARRUKHABAD DISTRICT
Year India Uttar Pradesh Farrukhabad District
1901-1911 0.56 -0.10 i o K) 00
1911-1921 -0.03 -0.31 -0.49
1921-1931 1.04 0.64 0.44
1931-1941 1.33 1.27 0.84
1941-1951 1.25 1.12 1.34
1951-1961 1.96 1.54 1.70
1961-1971 2.20 1.79 1.84
1971-1981 2.25 2.29 2.25
Source: Census of India, 1901-1981.
POPULATION GROWTH
With the exception of the 1971-81 decade, population growth in this century has 
been slower in U ttar  Pradesh than in India as a whole (see Table 3.11). Although high 
fertility rates have been characteristic of the region throughout the century, the 
mortality decline experienced in India since the turn of the century and especially since 
World War II has occurred later and at a slower rate for the poorer and more backward 
s ta te  of U ttar  Pradesh, thus leading to its slower rate of growth. The patterns of growth
for Farrukhabad  district are similar to those for U ttar  Pradesh. While the growth rate in 
the First half of the century was slower for the district than for the state, in the second 
half of the century the pattern  was reversed, although in both cases the differentials are 
small.
The comparison of growth rates for an individual village is not particularly 
meaningful from a demographic viewpoint, as the probability of substantial in- or 
out-migration biasing the results is much greater than within a larger population. 
However, such a comparison is meaningful from a sociological perspective, as it 
emphasizes the increasing pressure on land and resources of a growing population 
resident within a fixed area of land. When attem pting such a comparison based on 
census data , one finds tha t  the da ta  for individual villages from the Indian census are 
often inconsistent from decade to decade through frequent boundary changes, differential 
reliability of individual enumerators, or arbitrary inflation or deflation of figures for 
political reasons. However, it is sometimes possible to obtain a reasonable enumeration 
of a village population from the census returns. When examining the census da ta  for the 
study villages, I found tha t  boundary changes had occurred in 1971 rendering those 
figures unusable. However, a population total of 939 for the study area was available 
from the 1961 census, which when compared with my study da ta  yielded an exponential 
growth rate of 2.06 percent per annum. Although this figure can be taken only as a 
rough approximation, the rate obtained closely resembles the rates obtained for the state  
and district for the period 1961-81, and is largely consistent with the fertility and 
mortality rates calculated for the study population over a similar period.
It is evident from the preceding discussion tha t  the study population is 
characterized by a hierarchical and highly stratified social system, with factors such as 
sex and caste strongly influencing an individual’s access to land, education and 
employment opportunities - perhaps the three most im portant factors determining 
success and prosperity in the local setting. It is also apparent tha t  moderate to rapid 
population growth is occurring in the study area creating pressure on land and resources.
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and tha t  this growth is likely to continue for some time, until social norms regarding the 
desirability of large numbers of children (especially sons) and the acceptability of family 
planning are modified. The next chapter examines age at marriage in the study area, and 
discusses the im portant factors which influence both past and present-day norms and 
practices regarding age at marriage.
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C H A P T E R  4
AGE AT M A R R IA G E
Many authors have commented upon the apparent rise in age at marriage of both 
males and females in India since the turn of the century. Most of these studies are based 
on census da ta  and examine age at performance of the marriage ceremony rather than 
the age at gauna  or actual beginning of cohabitation of the couple. This time lag 
between ceremonial and effective marriage has varied considerably both temporally and 
regionally within Indian society, and is an im portant factor which should be addressed in 
any census analysis of Indian marriage customs. For example, MacDorman (1981) 
observed th a t  much of the difference in the observed age at marriage between two Indian 
states was due to differential customs regarding the time lag between the marriage 
ceremony and gauna, and did not reflect a genuine difference in age at effective 
marriage. Similarly, in examining any change in age at marriage over time in India, one 
must take into account changing customs regarding the time lag between ceremonial 
marriage and gauna : information which is difficult to obtain from most macro-level
da ta  sources.
THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
However, an examination of census da ta  can give some indication of general trends 
regarding changes in marriage patterns in India. Table 4.1 shows singulate mean ages at 
marriage of male and female census synthetic cohorts for India, U ttar  Pradesh, and 
Farrukhabad district, 1891 to 1981. It must be noted tha t  the all-India figures prior to 
1947 refer to undivided India (including what are now Pakistan and Bangladesh), while 
those after 1947 refer to current Indian boundaries. There are daunting problems in 
reconstructing current Indian boundaries for censuses prior to 1951, as the boundary
TABLE 4.1
MEAN AGE AT MARRIAGE OF CENSUS SYNTHETIC COHORTS, INDIA, 
U T TA R  PRADESH, AND FARRUKHABAD DISTRICT, 1891-1981
Census
Year
India
Males Females
Uttar
Males
Pradesh
Females
F arrukhabad 
Males
District
Females
1891 19.6 12.5 18.2 12.3 21.1 12.8
1901 20.0 13.1 17.7 12.3
1911 20.3 13.2 17.8 12.2
1921 20.7 13.7 18.3 12.4
1931 18.6 12.7 16.7 11.7
1941 19.9 14.7 18.2 13.1 20.5 14.0
1951 19.9 15.6 18.1 13.8 20.21 14.61
1961 21.4 16.1 18.7 14.8 20.6 14.5
1971 Total 22.2 17.2 19.4 15.6 20.2 16.1
Urban 24.3 19.2 22.5 18.3 22.1 17.6
Rural 21.6 16.7 18.8 15.1 20.0 15.9
1981 Total 23.3 18.2 20.9 16.7 20. 1 16.1
Urban 25.1 20.1 23.5 19.3 22.1 18.1
Rural 22.6 17.7 20.2 16.1 19.8 15.9
1. 1951 figures for Farrukhabad district are an approximation calculated on the basis
of 10 year age groups.
Sources: Agarwala, 1962: 72; Goyal, 1975: 337-341; Figures for 1981 and for
Farrukhabad District calculated by the author from Census of India, 
1891-1981.
divisions which occurred did not always follow previous administrative divisions. As our 
purpose here is to provide only a general illustration of marriage trends in India, this 
exercise was deemed unnecessary, and such a compromise has produced useful results for 
other authors (see Agarwala, 1957; 1962).
Age at marriage for both males and females has risen considerably in all-India, 
slightly less in U ttar  Pradesh, and least in Farrukhabad district. This makes sense in
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terms of overall development indicators for the three regions, with U ttar  Pradesh being 
a comparatively less developed state  within India, and Farrukhabad an average to 
slightly less developed district within U ttar  Pradesh (see Srivastava, 1981). The age at 
marriage has risen faster for females than males in all areas, leading to a decline in the 
age difference between husbands and wives. Although small fluctuations between census 
years are apparent (for example, the lower age at marriage in 1931 was probably due to 
increased marriage activity before the implementation of the Sarda Act in 1930 raising 
the legal minimum ages at marriage to 14 for girls and 18 for boys - Agarwala, 1962) the 
general upward trend is unmistakable.
Female age at marriage for all-India has risen 5.8 years, from an average of 12.5 in 
1891 to 18.3 in 1981, and 4.4 years from 12.3 in 1891 to 16.7 in 1981 in U ttar  Pradesh. 
In Farrukhabad, the rise has been from 12.8 in 1891 to 16.1 in 1981, a rise of only 3.3 
years. Age at marriage for males in all-India has risen 3.7 years, from 19.6 in 1891 to 
23.3 in 1981. For U ttar  Pradesh the rise was from 18.2 in 1891 to 20.9 in 1981. So the 
age at marriage for U ttar  Pradesh, initially lower than tha t  of all-India, has also risen at 
a slower rate than the all-India average. However, for Farrukhabad district, age at 
marriage for males, initially higher than the state  average, has not increased, but rather 
has remained remarkably constant over the entire 90 year period (the small variations 
observed may not be highly significant, due to the lesser quality of the Indian census 
da ta  when applied to small area measurements).
For all three populations, and for both sexes, marriage in urban areas occurs at 
later ages than marriage in the villages. This is primarily due to the fact tha t  urban 
dwellers are more frequently educated past the primary level, and more often delay their 
marriages until their education is completed. In addition, it has been the au thor’s 
observation tha t  city marriages generally involve immediate consummation or a shorter 
waiting period between marriage and consummation. This suggests that the difference 
between rural and urban averages is partly due to differential customs regarding 
consummation as well as to an actual difference in age at beginning of cohabitation of 
the couple.
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Despite strong cultural sanctions encouraging early and universal marriage, an 
examination of proportions unmarried at age 45-49 reveals striking differences between 
males and females (see Table 4.2). Proportions never marrying to age 45-49 for females 
are uniformly small, rarely exceeding 1.0 to 1.5 percent, and tend to show a slight 
decrease in recent years. However, proportions of males never marrying to age 45-49 
vary dramatically between the three populations. All-India shows the smallest 
percentage of permanent celibacy, which exhibits a general downward trend from around 
four percent in 1891 to 2.3 percent in 1981. U ttar  Pradesh exhibits a higher proportion 
of males never marrying than does all-India, with an initial rate around six to seven 
percent, decreasing to 3.6 percent during the period. For Farrukhabad district the 
percentage of males never marrying has been uniformly much higher than tha t  for either 
the s ta te  or the nation, fluctuating between eight and 11 percent in the early years and 
then decreasing slightly to around seven percent in 1971 and 1981.
An examination of urban-rural differences sheds some light on these patterns. For 
all three populations, the rates of female permanent celibacy are uniformly lower in rural 
than in urban areas. This is consistent with the prevailing cultural norm of early and 
universal marriage for females, and the gradual erosion of this norm due to Western 
influence. In rural areas, it is only tha t  very small fraction of females with severe 
physical or mental handicaps who do not marry. In urban areas this group is augmented 
by a few well educated and modernized career women who do not want to tie themselves 
to a traditional marriage which would drastically limit their potential for self 
decision-making or pursuit of a professional career. For males the pattern is somewhat 
different. For all-India the urban-rural differences follow the female pattern. However, 
for U tta r  Pradesh and more strikingly for Farrukhabad District, the pattern is reversed 
with higher rates of permanent celibacy occurring in the rural areas. This is due to the 
addition of a small group of rural males of lower socioeconomic s tra ta  who because of 
difficulties in arrangement and their lesser desirability as partners are occasionally 
unable to obtain a bride (see Chapter 5).
so
TABLE 4.2
PROPORTIONS NEVER MARRIED AT AGE 45-49,
INDIA, UTTAR PRADESH, AND FARRUKHABAD DISTRICT, 1891-1981
Census
Year Males
India
Females
Uttar
Males
Pradesh
Females
Farrukhabad
Males
District
Females
1891 3.9 1.0 6.3 0.6 8.4 1.0
1901 4.7 1.3 7.4 1.2 11.01 2.4
1911 4.1 1.1 3.7 1.01 9.41 1 .01
1921 4.1 1.3 6 .4 1.0 9 .62 1.02
1931 4.6 1.3 5.8 0.9 8. I2 0.62
1941 3 .63 5 .73 1 .2 8.7 0.4
1951 3.8 1 .04 7.0 1 .04 10.04 0.94
1961 Total 3.3 0.5 6.1 0.3 9.6 0.6
Rural 3.3 0.4 6 .4 0.2 10.2 0.2
Urban 3.4 0.9 4.2 0.6 4.5 0.7
1971 Total 2.7 0.5 4.8 0.3 6.9 0.1
Rural 2.6 0.4 5.2 0.3 7.1 0.0
Urban 2.7 0.9 3.0 0.4 4.5 0.2
1981 Total 2.3 0.4 3.6 0.1 6.9 0.1
Rural 2.2 0.1 4.0 0.1 7.1 0.0
Urban 2.5 0.9 2.2 0.3 4.5 0.2
1. based on 40-60 age group
2. based on 40-50 age group
3. figures from Agarwala, 1962: 238, 246, 252, 260.
4. based on 40-44 age group
Source: calculated by the author from Census of India, 1891-1981.
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TABLE 4.3
SEX RA TIOS1 OF THE POPULATION FOR INDIA, 
U T TA R  PRADESH. AND FARRUKHABAD DISTRICT, 1891-1981
Census Yeax India Uttar Pradesh Farrukhabad District
1891 963 930 849
1901 972 937 848
1911 964 915 822
1921 955 909 826
1931 950 902 827
1941 945 906 869
1951 946 894 817
1961 941 909 839
1971 930 879 878
1981 933 885 825
1. Sex ratios are based on the number of females per 1000 males in the population. 
Source: calculated by the author from Census of India, 1891-1981.
The phenomenon of high rates of permanent celibacy for males coincides with the 
dram atic differences in sex ratios and female survivorship between the three populations. 
Table 4.3 shows the sex ratios for India, U ttar  Pradesh, and Farrukhabad district from 
1891 to 1981. Sex ratios, calculated as the number of females per 1000 males, have been 
decreasing among all three populations. However, the overall levels vary greatly. India 
shows only a slight deficiency of females, as compared to males, U ttar  Pradesh a more 
dram atic  deficiency, and Farrukhabad district exhibits a drastic dearth of females, with 
only 825 females per 1000 males in the population in 1981. This dichotomy is largely a 
product of the much higher female than male mortality rates found in certain North 
Indian states, including U ttar  Pradesh (Table 4.4 - see also Miller, 1981, Dyson and
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Moore, 1983). Although district level da ta  are not available, statistics for U ttar  Pradesh 
indicate tha t  three females die for every two male deaths in the 0-4 age group - an 
amazing difference considering the inherent biological superiority of the female child. So 
the higher rates of male celibacy in U ttar  Pradesh and Farrukhabad district may be 
related to a shortage of females in the population - a Finding which is corroborated to 
some degree by my village data.
AGE AT M ARRIAGE AND EFFECTIVE M ARRIAGE AND  
CHANGES OVER TIME FOR THREE UTTAR PR A D ESH  VILLAGES
The singulate mean ages at marriage calculated for the three study villages in 1982 
were 19.3 for males and 15.9 for females. These figures closely resemble the figures for 
rural Farrukhabad district derived from the 1981 census (Table 4.1), the male figure 
being slightly lower for the study villages, and the female figure being identical. 
Proportions never marrying for the study villages were lower than those for either the 
s ta te  or the district. In the study area there were no women over 25 years of age who 
had never married. In contrast, there were five males over the age of 27 who had never 
married. Of these, two were from the main village, and three from hamlet Kisan. Of the 
two from the main village, one was an orphan who had been unable to marry because of 
extreme poverty and lack of family support, while the other was deaf. However, all of 
the three men from hamlet Kisan had full family support, and no physical or mental 
defects, but were unable to marry because of problems of village factionalism which 
inhibited the arrangement of their marriages (see Chapter 5). Thus, although the overall 
rate of male permanent celibacy for the three villages was 2.8 percent, the rate for the 
main village alone was only 1.7 percent, and there were no cases of permanent celibacy 
in hamlet Shakkya. In contrast, the rate for hamlet Kisan was a remarkable 13.6 
percent, illustrating the large amount of variation in permanent celibacy possible in a 
small area.
Singulate mean age at marriage is an indirect estimate of age at marriage used
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primarily for census analyses where no direct question on age at marriage is asked. 
However, for the study villages, more direct measures of age at marriage are available, 
based on retrospective questions on age at the marriage and gauna (consummation) 
ceremonies. A mean age a t  marriage based on this type of d a ta  is often considered to be 
more reliable than singulate mean age at marriage in village study applications, as it is a 
more direct measure of age at marriage, and is less sensitive to the constraints of small 
sample size. The mean age at marriage is also preferred in cases of recent marriage 
change, as singulate mean age at marriage yields a measure for a “synthetic cohort” , 
which will resemble the mean age at marriage for a particular point in time only if age 
at marriage has been relatively constant over the last generation.
Table 4.5 shows the average ages at marriage for the study villages by the date of 
marriage. The mean age at marriage is given in average number of completed years, 
whereas the singulate mean age at marriage yields a measure of the average number of 
person-years lived in the unmarried state, so to compare them  one must add 0.5 to the 
mean age at marriage. When this is done, one sees that for both males and females the 
average of reported ages at marriage for 1980-83 is 0.8 to 0.9 years lower than the 
singulate mean ages at marriage of 19.3 for males and 15.9 for females. As the two rates 
are computed by different methods, and from different da ta  (singulate mean age at 
marriage is computed from current marital s tatus, while the mean age at marriage is 
computed from retrospective questions on the age or date of marriage) small differences 
between the results are to be expected. These differences may be accentuated by errors 
in reporting of current age (in the case of singulate mean age at marriage) or in age at 
marriage (in the case of mean age at marriage). However, it is encouraging to note that 
when a mean age at marriage was calculated for just the 21 marriages occurring in the 
year prior to the census, the results were 19.3 for males, and 15.5 for females. These 
figures are much closer to the calculated singulate mean age at marriage for the same 
year, and seem to indicate tha t  the differences reflect the yearly fluctuations in age at 
marriage common to a small sample, rather than a large amount of reporting error. The
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calculation of the female singulate mean age at marriage for this population was heavily 
dependent on the number of married women in the 10-14 age group, and as only one 
marriage of a girl in tha t  age group occurred in 1983 (but seven in 1981!), had SMAM 
been calculated for 1981, a lower figure would have resulted. Because of this, I believe 
th a t  the mean age at marriage computed for 1980-83 is more representative of the actual 
marriage patterns of the village population, which exhibits a slightly younger average 
age a t  marriage than  the district as a whole.
When changes over time are compared, it is evident tha t  the average age at 
marriage for males exhibits considerably more fluctuation than that for females (see 
Table 4.5). Originally rather low, average age at marriage for males seems to have risen 
in the 1940s, returned to normative levels in the fifties and sixties, fallen slightly in the 
early seventies, and again regularized in the 1980s. The age at effective marriage begins 
at normative levels, and shows the same general trend of increases and decreases, 
although in general the magnitude of the fluctuations is somewhat less than tha t  for age 
at marriage. It is notable tha t  the higher-than-average mean ages at marriage and 
effective marriage found for the 1940s and 1960s are accompanied- by higher standard 
deviations, suggesting tha t  these increases are for the 1940s partly, and for the 1960s 
primarily due to the presence of a few outliers on the marriage curve (i.e. men marrying 
in their thirties or forties): this supposition is confirmed by an examination of the 
frequency distributions for the various cohorts. For the 1940s decade, the additional 
slight upward shift in the marriage curve for males may be related to political and 
economic disturbances and localized food shortages which occurred during World War II 
and the struggle for independence. As most of these upheavals occurred between 
censuses, it is likely tha t  many small fluctuations in male age at marriage in the 
mid-1940s would not be reflected to any large degree in the singulate mean ages at 
marriage calculated from 1941 or 1951 census data. The slight drop in the 1970s may 
simply reflect local changes in availability of brides vis-a-vis grooms, or the random 
fluctuations common to a small sample. The most consistent trend is in the marked
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decrease in the average time lag between marriage and g a una}  from 2.0 years in the 
1930s to 0.8 years in 1980-83.
It should be noted here th a t  two extreme outlying cases of men contracting first 
marriages around age 50 have been excluded from these and subsequent tables. Both of 
these marriages occurred in exceptional circumstances, one involving the bigamous 
marriage of a crippled beggar, the other marriage having been delayed because of 
disputes over land (both cases are described in detail in chapter 5). As these exceptional 
cases only served to skew' the results obtained from a small sample, they have been 
excluded from subsequent tables.
The mean age at marriage for females has risen steadily, from 13.2 in the 1930s to 
14.6 for 1980-83. However, age at effective marriage has remained remarkably constant 
over the 53-year period, showing a slight but inconclusive increase only in the most 
recent time period. The sharp decline in the time lag between marriage and gauna is also 
evident for females. The combination of a slowdy rising age at marriage for females with 
a relatively constant age at marriage for males has led to a slight decline, of about half a 
year, in the age difference between spouses.
This rather constant age at effective marriage for females may give the erroneous 
impression of an established social norm delineating the proper age, related to biological 
m aturity , at which a girl’s marriage should be consummated. How'ever, w'hen the time 
elapsed to gauna is examined by age at marriage, it becomes apparent that this is not 
the case. As illustrated in Table 4.6, girls married before the age of 12 wraited 
substantially longer on average for gauna. probably because of strong social prohibitions 
on pre-menarcheal consummation. However, among post-pubertal girls the influence of
1. Although the collection of information on marriage consummation could present difficulties 
in some societies, 1 encountered no such problems in the current study. Gauna.  like marriage, is a 
major and public life cycle event, not a secret or sensitive issue, and even older respondents 
readily recalled the details of their gauna.  Although some difference in prestige was associated 
with the separation of marriage and gauna ceremonies, the length of the interval between them 
had few prestige connotations Thus. I believe that the data collected on gauna are of high quality 
and of comparable accuracy to that collected on age at marriage.
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TABLE 4.6
AVERAGE TIM E ELAPSED BETW EEN  M ARRIAGE 
AND G A U N A  BY AGE AT M ARRIAGE
Age at 
Marriage
M A L E S
Gap1
N o . of 
Cases
F E
Age at 
Marriage
M A L E S
Gap1
N o . of 
Cases
<11 43 18
11 22 47
12 17 33
<14 29 28 13 17 102
14 16 23 14 17 53
15 14 69 15 13 77
16 19 59 16 14 60
17-18 14 58 17-18 9 21
19-22 16 63 19-23 15 12
23 + 13 20
1. Average time in months between marriage and gauna.  
Source: Village interview data.
age at marriage on the time lag until gauna was reduced, and the average wait until 
gauna for girls married between the ages of 19 and 23 was not greatly different from the 
wait until gauna for girls who married at ages 12-14. This point is emphasized when 
individual durations are examined. For example, among the 15.4 percent of marriages 
where the female age at marriage was less than 12. 42.7 percent were consummated 
within one year or less, and 15 percent were consummated immediately. Conversely, 
among the 7.8 percent of marriages where the female age at marriage was greater than 
16. 51.5 percent waited 12 months or longer until gauna.  while 12.0 percent waited for 
three years or more. This emphasizes the point that gauna is primarily a social 
convention, and only secondarily a function related to biological maturity .
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Although we have indicated tha t  the lack of change in age at effective marriage for 
females is not related to any overwhelming social norm which requires consummation to 
occur a t  or around 15. we still have not explained the sharp decrease in the time elapsed 
between marriage and gauna over time shown in Table 4.5. The percentage of marriages 
consummated at various intervals between 1930 and 1983 is show’n in Table 4.7. It is 
evident tha t ,  although gaps of five years between marriage and gauna were relatively 
common up until the 1950s, they had almost completely disappeared by the 1970s. The 
proportion of marriages whose consummation was delayed for three years also decreased 
steadily. Conversely, the percentage of marriages which were consummated immediately 
increased sharply, from only 3.2 percent in the 1930s to 28.1 percent in 1980-83. I believe 
th a t  this decline in the time lag between marriage and gauna is both a cause and an 
effect of changing marriage patterns. Marriage customs influencing the timing of 
consummation are discussed in more detail in chapter 5, but briefly it appears tha t  the 
practical functions of gauna are to provide another occasion for exchanges of wealth, and 
to delay marriage until the girl is physically mature. In the first half of this century, 
there was much public controversy in India about the debilitating effects of the 
numerous child marriages, both on young brides, and on the society as a whole. Such 
public outcry led to the passage of the Sarda Act, in 1929, raising the legal minimum age 
at marriage to 14 for girls and 18 for boys (Pathak, 1980: 407).2 Although this (in 
conjunction with laws prohibiting the giving of dowry) is probably one of the most 
widely violated sta tu tes in India, the loud and prolonged public outcry over child 
marriages has had some small influence on marriage customs, if only in slightly delaying 
the age at which public ridicule for the families of unmarried “spinsters* begins. 
Probably because of the trickle-down effect of these outside influences, villagers began to 
marry their daughters at slightly older ages. Thus, the decrease in time lag between 
marriage and gauna was in large part a practical response to a small but definite rise in
2. In 1978. the legal minimum age at marriage was again revised upwards to 18 for girls and 21 
for boys (Srivastava. 1981: 154).
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TABLE 4.7
CHANGES IN THE TIME LAG BETW EEN  M ARRIAGE AND GAUNA  
IN TH REE U TTA R PRADESH VILLAGES
PERCENTAGE OF CASES CONSUMMATED AT DIFFERENT INTERVALS
Year of 
Marriage Immed. <1 Year 1 Year1 3 Years 5 Years N
1980-832 28.1 14.1 47.0 11.0 0.0 64
1970-79 14.4 6.3 58.6 19.8 0.9 111
1960-69 5.9 4.4 58.8 28.0 2.9 68
1950-59 14.7 11.6 45.3 22.2 6.3 95
1940-49 11.1 5.6 42.6 33.4 7.4 54
1930-39 3.2 0.0 51.6 38.7 6.5 31
1. Although the social norms prohibiting consummations in even numbered years were 
strong, a few such consummations occurred, primarily due to family crises (such as 
the death or illness of the husband's mother) during which the wife's household 
labor was required. Thus, this category includes one marriage consummated at 15 
months, and 5 marriages consummated at 24 months. Similarly, the category w3 
yearsT includes one marriage consummated a t  35 months and one marriage 
consummated at 40 months.
2. Technical Note: The inclusion of da ta  from the most recent 1980-83 cohort 
introduces the possibility of truncation bias in the figures for the most recent 
marriages. For this reason, 1 have included the nine marriages which had occurred 
by the time of the study, but which had not yet been consummated. For these 
cases, I have used expected date of consummation as a proxy for actual date of 
consummation. Although not entirely adequate, this procedure creates less of a bias 
than the exclusion of unconsummated marriages. In any case, the relationships 
demonstrated are unmistakable, even if the 1980-83 cohort is omitted, or only the 
shorter durations (such as the percentage of marriages consummated immediately) 
considered.
Source: Calculated by author from village interview data.
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mean age at marriage. As the proportion of post-pubertal marriages increased the 
practical utility of a long time lag between marriage and gauna  decreased, and as a 
shorter delay between marriage and consummation became customary, a slightly older 
age at marriage began to seem logical. In this wray the changes in one served to reinforce 
and lend legitimacy to slight changes in the other.
S O C IA L  A N D  E C O N O M I C  C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  
I N F L U E N C I N G  T H E  A G E  A T  M A R R I A G E
When age at marriage is compared with the social and economic characteristics of 
husband and -wife, several interesting relationships emerge between age at marriage and 
various socio-economic indicators, notably education, caste, and occupation of the 
husband. All of these factors maintained a strong relationship with age at marriage (p < 
.05 for male education, and p < .01 for female education, occupation of husband, and 
caste) when the other factors were controlled through partial correlation. Contrary to 
expectations, economic sta tus did not have a significant relationship with age at 
marriage: although initially significant at the .05 level, its effect on age at marriage 
disappeared when controls for education and caste were introduced.
Education was found to be an important factor influencing age at marriage, 
especially for girls. In-depth interviews indicated that the education of parents has some 
effect on ideal ages at marriage through the dilution of traditional value systems. 
However, the more important factor in influencing both ideal and actual ages at 
marriage seems to be the varying strength of aspirations for the education of children. 
Among the first few village boys educated to high school or university levels, little 
change in age at marriage occurred, as villagers still adhered to traditional norms, and 
married their sons at the proper age whether they had finished their education or not. 
However, as higher education became less of an oddity, an increasing number of villagers 
began delaying the marriages of their sons until their education was completed. For 
girls, education had little direct influence on the age at marriage, as the young girl's
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education was usually terminated as soon as a suitable match was arranged. However, 
the indirect effect of a more educated (and therefore “modern’1) parent simultaneously 
valuing girls’ education and a slightly later age a t  marriage still exerts a powerful 
influence.
This change in value systems was apparent in the da ta  collected on ideal ages at 
marriage. The least educated and most traditional hamlet dwellers exhibit the lowest 
ideal ages at marriage, averaging around 12-14 for girls and 15-16 for boys. The less 
progressive intermediate and lower caste families report ideal ages at marriage only 
slightly higher than those of the hamlet dwellers - averaging around 13-14 for girls and 
16-17 for boys; although the more educationally motivated Darzi families reported 
higher ideal ages at marriage of 15-16 for girls, and 20 for boys. Among the higher 
castes, the Thakurs and Brahmins report the lowest ideal ages at marriage - 14-15 for 
girls and 16-18 for boys: and the highly educationally motivated Srivastav families 
reported the highest ideal ages at marriage in the village - 17 for girls and 21 for boys.
As regards actual variations in age a t  marriage by education, Table 4.8 illustrates 
the strong influence of education on the delaying of marriageA When da ta  on male age 
at marriage are examined by the number of years of school attendance of the husband, a 
curvilinear relationship between years of schooling and age at marriage and effective 
marriage is evident. For those with 0-5 years of schooling, age at marriage was slightly 
higher than for those with 6-8 years of schooling, owing to the greater desirability of a 
match with an educated boy. For those educated past the ninth grade, age at marriage 
was higher because of delays in marriage until the education was completed. When age 
at effective marriage is considered, this curvilinear relationship is even more striking,
3. One possible bias sometimes found in this type of table is that of possible changes over time 
in educational attainment biasing the results of an analysis of age at marriage. In order to test for 
this, 1 ran a multiple classification analysis on age at marriage with education as the independent 
variable and duration of marriage as a covariate. The technique of multiple classification analysis 
enables the researcher to identify the effects of the independent variable both before and after 
controlling for the covariate (i.e. time). For both males and females, the introduction of this 
covariate made almost no difference to the substantative results, thus indicating that the bias 
introduced by possible changes over time is negligible.
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due to a decrease in the time lag between marriage and consummation, from 1.7 years for 
illiterates to 0.9 years for those with more than 12 years of schooling.
When male age at marriage and effective marriage is examined by the education of 
the wife, little variation is observed until the wife’s education increases past the primary 
level, at which time male age at marriage rises substantially. However, the number of 
women educated past the primary level is small, and their behavior probably reflects the 
vanguard of village social change, rather than the prevailing value systems of a broad 
sector of the population.
When female age at marriage is examined by education of the husband, we find 
that age at marriage increases by 1.7 years, from 13.5 for those married to illiterate men 
to 15.2 for those married to men with more than 12 years of schooling. However, w’hen 
age at effective marriage is examined the increase is only about one year because of the 
decreased waiting period between marriage and gauna with increasing education of the 
husband. A comparison of female age at marriage by wife’s education reveals the same 
increase, from an age at marriage of 13.6 years for illiterate women to 15.1 years for 
those with 6-8 years of schooling, and to 17.1 years for the seven village women with 
9-12 years of schooling. For age at effective marriage the increase is somewhat smaller, 
from 15.1 years for illiterate women to 17.6 years for those with 9-12 years of schooling.
As discussed in Chapter 3, wide variations in educational s ta tus  occur between 
castes, and these differences influence age at marriage through the modernization of 
value systems, the ability to compete for high status jobs, and through the direct effect 
of delaying marriage (at least for boys) until the education is completed. However, caste 
membership also exerts an independent influence on age at marriage, even when 
educational status is controlled for (p < .05 in partial correlation coefficient). Tables 4.9 
and 4.10 illustrate the wide variations in observed age at marriage present between 
different caste groups. When the individual castes are considered, one observes a wide 
variation (of nearly ten years) in age at marriage and age at effective marriage for males, 
and a smaller variation (of nearly five years) for females. This reflects differential values
A
G
E 
AT
 
M
A
R
R
IA
G
E 
A
N
D
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
IV
E
 
M
A
R
R
IA
G
E 
IN
 
TH
E 
ST
U
D
Y
 
V
IL
L
A
G
E
S 
BY
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
O
F 
H
U
SB
A
N
D
94
w
+J
<
w
Pt4
O CO
a 
• co 
o 03 
2  C_3
cu
a
o
a)
>
•H
4J
c3 a  
a/
<D u-i
to u-i
0) CO
to
03
< a s s
r-H Q 1 Nt O m CO on 30• 1 • . « • • •
CD (73 1 OM CM CN| r-N CM CM
to 14J 03 1
03 •H 1
U C 1 un m i-N NT 03 CM03 u CO 1 • • • • •
to CO <D 1 on on NT NT NT m
< S 2 1I »—4 ■—1 r—4 r—4 r—4
CD
1
1
a 1c 1
w ■CD C 03 1
CI4 U 03 <D 11—1 03 03 C/3 1
s <4-1 3 O 1
CD <4-4 4-1 O 1 O 30 ON CO m OC14 00 -H <D a. 1 • . • »
0 < Q £0 to 1 NT on CM CNJ on NT
z
1
1
0 M-4 11-4 O CO 1
H CD 1
< • CO l 00 NT on 30 On mC_3 O CO 1 m to m m CM f—423 2 CJ 1 »—4a 1
w 1
Q CM
1
1
2 1
< Q. 1 30 on CM on O 03
w
hJ
<
03 O  
<D
0) u_i
£4) y-i
<  ÜJ
03
u
03 (73 
00 
03
c
03
CD
<4-1
O
CO
u
03
CD
>4
<D (73 
£0 
4-j ca
03 "H
l-l c
01 M 03
£0  J3 CD
C ^  2
"Oto c
C  03 
•H 73  
1—I 03 
O Z3 
o  —•
03 O  43 ON CO N  
on o'« co 173 cm 1—4
0  ' f  03 -o- O  CO
*—4 r-4 1—4 r—4 f—4 * N
m  on co r s  04 0 3
0 1  r 4  M  1—I CM CM
h  on <■ m  a\ o
(O  < J  iO  lO  (O  4 3
0 3  O  ®  O  O  O n 
0 3  CN CM 0 4  0 3
t—t <3- CNi m nt I—t
on co 00 co a\ o
r —4 1—4 r—4 1— t r—* CN|
Ol CM rN r-1 < r CM 
■C 03 CM CM OM N?
m  ^  o  cm < r cm 
r-~ r— 1—. r-N co on
O  CO CO O  CNJ 
r—4 1—4
1 1 1 1  +
1— • 3 0  ON r -4  o n
0 3  4 3  CM I N
h  43 n  
on
U3 CM o  U3
»—4 <—4 r—4  C~3
n  n  h  o
CM H  CM CM
H  4 3  r 4  N O
4 3  4 3  4 3  I—
on vo on o  
CM r 4  CM CM
NO 0 3  - 4  f 4
on nt m
toc
1-4
r—4
o
o
a
(73
O  CM 0 3  CM
on on on nt
CM CM CM rN
on  no  o n
CNI
4 3  0 3  ON M - 
r—1 i-n  o n
m  m  \ o  r— 1
on cm cm on
N  X  0 3  N  
CO CO 0 3  r 4
no no co on 
on cm cm on
cm m  < r on
r-N m  co 1—i
r H  f—4 1—4 CNJ
O  4 3  CO CNI
I I I
H  4 )  ON
C/3
V4
CvJ
CD
>N
"O
CD
/*3
E
o
o
<4_|
o
u
CD
73
E
3
C
0)
to
03
1-4
03
>
<
S
o
u
rc
e:
 
C
a
lc
u
la
te
d
 
b
y 
th
e 
a
u
th
o
r 
fr
om
 
v
il
la
g
e
 
ce
n
su
s 
d
a
ta
.
95
between castes regarding the ideal age at marriage, as well as differences in their ability 
to meet their ideals in actual marriage negotiations.
The time lag between marriage and consummation also varies greatly by caste, 
from 0.3 years for the Brahmins to 2.6 years for the Kisan caste. Although this is in part 
a function of the female age at marriage the independent effect of caste is demonstrated 
through partial correlation coefficients (p < .01). Age difference between spouses varies 
considerably between castes, ranging from a low of 2.2 years for the Bhangi caste to a 
high of 7.8 years for the Srivastav caste. However, for many of the caste groups the 
sample size is less than ten and thus can provide only a general indicator of marriage 
patterns  within the caste.
When the da ta  are grouped into major caste groups a clearer pa tte rn  emerges. 
Among both males and females ages at marriage are substantially higher among the 
higher status castes, moderate among the intermediate s ta tus castes, and lowest among 
the scheduled castes. This result coincides with the results of other studies which have 
found tha t  average ages at marriage are lower among the scheduled castes (Agarwala, 
1957; 1962). For males the range is from 16.8 for the scheduled castes to 18.3 for the 
high castes, while for females, the range is from 12.8 for the scheduled castes to 14.9 for 
the higher castes. The time lag between marriage and consummation also varies by caste 
group, with the high status castes averaging 0.9-1.0 years, intermediate s ta tus  castes 
averaging 1.6 years, and the scheduled castes averaging 1.3 years. So when age at 
effective marriage is considered, for males the range is from 17.9 for scheduled castes to 
19.2 for the high status castes, and for females from 14.1 for scheduled castes to 15.8 for 
the high sta tus castes. When examined in this large aggregate, the age difference 
between spouses varies relatively little from 3.9 years for scheduled castes to 3.3 years 
for the high status castes.
When examining da ta  on occupation (or similarly with economic status) 
difficulties arise because of the necessity of comparing reported occupation at the time of 
the survey with age at marriage over time. Although such a comparison would be
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inadvisable in a population with a high degree of economic or occupational mobility, the 
extreme rigidity of economic and occupational categories (both strongly related to 
hereditary caste classifications) observed in current study, has minimized this problem: 
little mobility of individual families has occurred in either area. When the data  were 
analyzed according to different time frames, little difference in the results was observed. 
On the basis of this assurance. I have included marriages over the past 30 years in Table 
4.11 (and in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 in the marriage expenses chapter).
The results presented in Table 4.11 indicate that mean age at marriage is 
significantly higher for the high sta tus non-agricultural occupations, which include 
village officials, teachers, shopkeepers, army and police officers, etc. Men of these 
occupational groups have, in general, been more exposed to modernizing influences, 
frequently through higher education. In addition, many, though not all, of these men 
have delayed marriage until higher education was completed and employment found. 
Female age a t marriage was also higher among women married to men with high status 
jobs. This is because an educated man will more often insist that his parents find a bride 
for him with at least some education, and such brides are likely to be slightly older than 
their illiterate counterparts.
Among the three other occupational groups mean ages at marriage were similar for 
males, although the larger s tandard deviations found among the men with low status 
non-agricultural occupations, and to a lesser extent, those involved in sharecropping or 
agricultural laboring were due to a typically lower age at marriage, in combination with 
larger proportions of men who because of problems in marriage arrangement were not 
able to marry until their twenties or thirties. Among these groups, although ideal ages at 
marriage were generally lower, marriages were more often delayed for involuntary 
reasons, such as the difficulty in finding a family willing to give their daughter in 
marriage to a poor landless man. and in delays in marriage due to the time needed to 
raise a brideprice.
For females, mean ages at marriage are relatively similar among the wives of men
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employed as farmers, sharecroppers and agricultural laborers, and in low status 
non-agricultural occupations. The slightly higher age at marriage for wives of 
sharecroppers and agricultural laborers is again coupled with a higher s tandard 
deviation, and is due to two cases of women who married in their twenties. The two 
lower status occupational categories show slightly shorter delays between marriage and 
gauna  consistent with the cultural norms of the lower service and scheduled castes 
predominantly involved in those occupations.
Perhaps one’s natural inclination at this point might be to resort to multivariate  
analysis in order to examine the relationship between the dependent variable (age at 
marriage), and combinations of several of the socio-economic factors. I feel th a t  such an 
inclination is wrong in the present case, and thus although I have applied m ultivariate 
analysis to the da ta  with reasonable results (variance explained on the order of 16-28 
percent), I have not included the results in this thesis. The purpose of the 
micro-approach study in the present instance is to examine customs, value systems, and 
societal processes influencing a given behavioral response (age at marriage). It is this 
wealth of detail and insight into societal processes which makes the micro-approach 
unique. However, the modelling systems inherent in multivariate anaysis are often 
inadequate to encompass the wealth of complex and interrelated processes influencing 
the behavior under study. Similarly, any multivariate analysis of such da ta  is in a sense 
misleading as it gives undue emphasis to certain variables (such as the standard  socio­
economic indicators) for the simple reasons tha t  they, unlike other variables, can be 
placed into the simplified coding categories necessary for the application of the method. 
For standard large-scale surveys the omission of more ethnographic material is 
understandable, and the use of multivariate modelling is necessary, as it is impossible to 
make sense of the thousands of questionnaire responses without some recourse to 
numeric abstractions."1 The multivariate technique summarizes masses of numbers
4. However, I feel that the narrow concentration of some subfields of demography on a few 
standard socio-economic and family planning variables - variables based upon questions which 
can be quickly and easily asked in large-scale surveys, and which can be coded into simple  
categories - is one of the major problems in demography today.
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which are meaningless without such summaries, but with micro-approach fieldwork, the 
researcher knows these people from personal experience, and the use of such abstractions 
can do damage to what is observed directly. In the case of a micro-approach study, 
where detailed and in-depth information is available, to knowingly apply a methodology 
and modelling process which is inadequate to examine the full complexities of the 
situation, and which necessitates the omission of some of the most im portant factors and 
processes uncovered by the study is, I believe, nothing less than poor scientific method, 
and poor research.
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL FACTORS INFLUENCING  
THE AGE AT M ARRIAGE
In addition to the group level factors already discussed, many villagers discussed a 
variety of individual-level random or idiosyncratic events which frequently influenced the 
ages at which villagers married. A factor which tended to hasten a marriage was a 
desire for marital security in the face of uncertainty, such as a sickly father wanting to 
ensure his child’s future security by arranging his or her marriage as soon as possible. 
Another factor in hastening marriage or especially gauna for girls was the shifting labor 
needs of the husband’s family. For example, several women reported tha t  their marriage 
or, more frequently, their gauna was held early when their husband’s mother or other 
female relative became ill, and her household labor was required. In addition many 
people mentioned external pressure from the mediator or the proposed spouse’s relatives 
as significant forces in hastening a marriage.
The factors which tended to delay marriage seemed to be more numerous than 
those which hastened a marriage. For example, among the high status castes who 
practice astrology, many mentioned the role of the priest/astrologer (p u n d it) in 
influencing the age at marriage and effective marriage. Villagers traditionally go to the 
pundit to set an auspicious date for marriage and gauna  ceremonies. Usually an 
auspicious date is found within a few days of when the family wants the marriage to
102
take place. However, if the pundit  sees something unfavorable in the boy or girl’s 
horoscope, he may advise the family not to marry their child at a particular time, as 
disaster may result. This type of advice is heeded in varying degrees by different 
families. However, a number of cases were reported where marriage or gauna  ceremonies 
were delayed by one to two years on the advice of the pundit.
Many marriages were delayed for some time for financial reasons, both through the 
difficulty of finding a partner who would accept the amount of marriage payments that a 
family was capable of making, and through delays because of the time needed to raise 
the money (see Chapter 6). Although prevalent in many families, this effect was 
especially notable among large families with closely spaced children, as the marriages of 
the younger children, especially the younger boys, tended to be delayed because of the 
time needed to arrange and pay for the marriages of the elder siblings. Many other 
marriages were delayed because of the death or temporary absence of the father, elder 
brother, or other responsible male family member capable of representing the family in 
marriage negotiations. The importance of higher education in delaying the marriages of 
boys has already been discussed.
The absence of a good marriage offer can substantially delay marriage for boys, 
especially in cases where they are illiterate or come from poor families and are not 
considered to be desirable marriage partners. In cases of village disputes, fellow villagers 
can often sour a marriage offer by criticizing a boy to the family of the potential bride, 
and thus over a period of time substantially delay a boy’s marriage (see Chapter 5).
Thus, we have seen tha t  substantial variations in age at marriage are found in the 
study area between various educational, caste, and occupational groups: variations
which may be linked to differential customs regarding marriage ideals as well as to 
differences in the practicalities of marriage negotiations and expenses. Although mean 
age at marriage for males has fluctuated more widely, the mean age at effective marriage 
for females - the nuptiality indicator most directly linked to fertility change - has
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changed relatively little over the past 53 years, showing a slight, but inconclusive, 
increase only in the most recent (1980-83) cohort. In subsequent chapters, the details of 
marriage arrangements and marriage expenses will be discussed, while possible fertility 
implications will be considered in Chapter 7.
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C H A P T E R  5
A R R A N G E M E N T  OF M A R R IA G E
Sometimes this feeling comes to me,
As though the wedding flutes are being played.
It is our wedding night, I am unveiling you,
And you are coyly, folding into your own arms.
Sometimes this feeling comes to me,
T hat you will love me the same way forever,
Your eyes will always rise to me with love.
I know tha t  you are a stranger, but still 
Sometimes this feeling comes to me.
Lyrics from Kabhi K abh i, sung by Mukesh Chand Mathoor.
This Hindi song popular at the time of my fieldwork speaks of loving a stranger 
and fantasizes about the details of the wedding night. Loving and later marrying a 
stranger tha t  one meets is probably the single most common topic of popular Hindi 
songs and movies. Although most villagers cannot afford to see many movies, this 
message of romance and longing is blasted across the village airwaves daily by the 
numerous radios owned by village families. However, the social realities of village life are 
in marked contrast to this romantic ideal.
Within village society, women are secluded within the home, and it is considered 
to be indecent and shameful behavior for a man to speak to or take any notice at all of a 
village girl, as she hurries past on her way to the well. When asked about their views on 
love marriage, villagers consistently stated tha t  it was not a good idea, as the person so 
chosen may not be a suitable partner according to the field and criteria of selection 
acceptable to the family. Even if the girl or boy so chosen were suitable in every way, 
the mere idea of a love match was considered reprehensible, disruptive to family 
harmony and solidarity, and to have about it the flavor of an illicit affair. In Hindu
society
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Love was regarded as an uncontrollable and explosive emotion which makes a 
young person blind to reality, reason and logic. The family’s stability may 
even be jeopardized since the emotions might lead one to marry an unsuitable 
person not only to his temperament but to the entire joint family. . . .The 
Hindu system regarded mate selection by self choice as undesirable and feared 
+hat freedom of choice might upset the process of adjustment of the bride in her 
^Rao and Rao, 1982: 16).
sidered to be disruptive to traditional family relationships because of 
ncy towards a strong conjugal bond in love matches. Villagers felt that 
,e a situation in which loyalty to the wife might transcend the normally 
alty of a young man to his parents and patrilineal kin group.
trast to the perils of love marriages, the system of parentally arranged 
/as considered to have a number of im portant benefits in reinforcing parental 
crengthening the power of the kinship group, maintaining caste and class 
es allowing for social and financial consolidation, and maximizing the 
lity of continuing the ancestral line (c/. Rao and Rao, 1982: 17).
Among arranged marriages, the system of selection of a marriage partner was 
complicated by an intricate system of rules and prohibitions which defined who were 
acceptable and unacceptable marriage partners. In addition, many familial and some 
personal a ttr ibu tes  of the prospective bride or groom were considered in the selection of 
marriage partners. Also important was the question of who were the family members 
who had the power of making decisions about spouse selection. These three factors of the 
field of selection, the criteria of selection, and the party to selection of a marriage 
partner will each be discussed in turn.
FIELD OF SELECTION
In North India, the field of selection of a marriage partner is subject to certain 
rules of caste, kinship, and spatial distance. In south India, intra-village marriages are 
common, while in North India, marriages between members of the same village are 
prohibited. This rule was followed strictly by villagers in the study area, the only
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exception being tha t  of an orphaned girl staying temporarily with her paternal aunt in 
the village. She was able to marry a village man because by prevailing standards she was 
considered to be a temporary resident rather than an actual member of the village, and 
thus was not subject to endogamous restrictions.
Caste is another im portant factor in circumscribing marriage relationships. 
Virtually all arranged marriages in India are negotiated within caste and subcaste 
boundaries. However, among the more progressive urban elite, some love marriages are 
occurring which cross caste boundaries (Kapur, 1970; 1973; Ross, 1961). The
arrangement of these marriages is always fraught with difficulties, as members of both 
families object to a marriage with a member of a different caste. However, among the 
urban elite, young lovers are sometimes able to overcome these barriers and either elope, 
or eventually reconcile the parents to the match. This type of arrangement is virtually 
unknown in the villages, as the more traditional villagers would object much more 
strongly to inter-caste alliances.
Because of this, the few boys who have the urge to develop friendships with girls 
before marriage (the vast majority do not have premarital friendships with marriageable 
girls) will usually concentrate their interests on girls belonging to their own caste. Of the 
five self-arranged or “love” marriages reported in the current study, four took place 
within caste and subcaste boundaries. The one exception was when a Harijan man ran 
away with a prostitute of another caste who was staying temporarily in the village. 
However, it can hardly be considered an exception, since it was not a true marriage, and 
met with extreme social disapproval, necessitating the couple’s move to a nearby town.
The families of the potential partners are scrutinized to ensure that no previous 
marriages have taken place which have transgressed caste or subcaste restrictions. For 
example, the parents of a Srivastav girl of the village had arranged her marriage to a 
Srivastav boy from a nearby town. The arrangements had all been settled, and the 
preliminary stages had taken place when the girl’s family found out tha t  the boy’s 
mother was Saxsena (same caste, different subcaste). Upon hearing this news, the girl’s
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parents promptly cancelled the match, and later arranged her marriage into a family 
which had not transgressed caste restrictions.
As regards gotra membership and marriage restrictions, among the Thakurs 
marriages within one’s own gotra are prohibited, and gotra exogamy is universally 
practiced. However, among the majority of the other village castes (with the Brahmins 
being an exception), there was little awareness of an exogamous group other than tha t  of 
the village and near relatives. Certainly, I found no evidence of a prevailing system of 
hypergamy as Dumont (1966; 1970) and others have described. Even among the 
Thakurs, an analysis of intermarrying gotras indicates that 70 percent of marriages were 
definitely non-hypergamous, in that two-way intermarriages between gotras were 
common. Among the remaining 30 percent of Thakur marriages, the information from a 
single group of villages was insufficient to definitely rule out the possibility, although I 
found no evidence of hypergamy as reflected either in differential wedding expenditures 
or in the subsequent treatm ent of the bride in the husband's home.
As far as hypergamy in an economic sense is concerned, because of village exogamy 
the collection of the necessary data  for a quantitative analysis of this point was not 
logistically feasible, as it would have necessitated travel to the hundreds of different 
villages which were the natal homes of village wives. However, from discussions with 
young wives and their descriptions of their natal homes, it appeared that in some cases 
their natal homes were richer, and in others their marital homes were richer; however, in 
the majority of cases the economic status of natal and marital homes was approximately 
equal. Although it is desirable to marry one’s daughter into a wealthy family in the hope 
tha t  she will have a better standard of living, wealth is only one of many im portant 
factors influencing the selection of bridegrooms.
In general, although hypergamy has been widely discussed in the literature 
(Yalman, 1967; Van der Veen, 1972; Dumont, 1970; Kapadia, 1955) the majority of 
studies discuss it in the context of ceremonial or observed s ta tus  differences. There have 
been few careful and quantitative studies which conclusively document hypergamy with
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da ta  from a substantial sample of actual weddings, documenting the relative wealth of 
the families of husbands and wives in the case of economic hypergamy, or the gotra 
membership of the families of husbands and wives (together with information on the 
sta tus differences between unilaterally intermarrying gotras) in the case of social or caste 
hypergamy. W hat is apparent from the observation of Indian weddings is the 
cerem onial difference in s ta tus between bride givers, who are considered to have a lower 
ceremonial status, and bride takers, who are considered to be of higher ceremonial 
status. This is universal in Hindu weddings, and is apparent in the am ount of fuss and 
worry which goes into catering for the bridegroom’s party , their arrogant and disdainful 
reactions if anything is found to be inferior in quality, the ceremonial touching of the 
feet of the groom by the bride’s father throughout the wedding ceremonies, and many 
other examples. These ceremonial differences in s ta tus are apparent in all Hindu 
weddings, even in cases where the bride is definitely from a higher s ta tus  family. 
Hershman in his incisive study of Punjabi kinship and marriage makes this point 
succinctly: “It is marriage which creates inequalities between kin groups; marriages do 
not conform to and reinforce existing inequalities” (Hershman, 1981: 5; see also Jeffery, 
1979: 33). Although hypergamy has probably occurred in specific contexts within the 
North Indian setting, both its prevalence and importance may have been overemphasized 
by social scientists who have misinterpreted the ceremonial appearance of hypergamy as 
an actual difference in social or economic status between the families of bride and groom.
A corollary of this custom of ceremonial inequality is that of the unilineal direction 
of the bride giving or bride receiving of a particular localized clan or family group. 
Hershman discusses the differences in roles between marital relatives:
Sister’s husband as opposed to wife’s brother are exclusive roles, and Punjabi 
Hindu-Sikh kinship is concerned to keep them completely separate and apart,  
both in real and classificatory terms ... Therefore,' where a man gives a 
woman in marriage, he cannot take one, and where a man takes a woman in 
marriage he cannot give one (Hershman, 1981: 192).
However, this applies only at the level of localized clan segments (i.e. all residents of a 
particular village who belong to the same subcaste), and does not in any way imply a 
hierarchical system of unilaterally or hypergamously intermarrying gotras.
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As regards the principles of consanguinuity, marriages between close relatives 
(notably cross-cousins) are common in South India (Dumont, 1970; Kapadia, 1955). 
However, in the north, such marriages are forbidden to Hindus, and are only practiced 
by the Muslim portion of the population. In theory, the rules regarding marriage 
between relatives are quite strict.
The marriage rules as regards Sapinda relationship or consanguinuity define 
tha t  a man should not marry a girl who is related to him through a common 
male ancestor up to the seventh generation in the father’s line and up to the 
fifth generation in the mother's line (Karve, 1953: 55).
However, in practice, the degree of marital consanguinuity tolerated varies considerably 
by caste and region. The lower caste groups of the village had a slightly higher 
proportion of marriages between relatives - usually second or third cousins, although 
such marriages were infrequent and occurred in less than five percent of cases. The 
difference between maternal and paternal relations was quite significant in determining 
the acceptability of the marriage, particularly among castes which married into different 
gotras. Thus, although the Thakurs practiced strict gotra exogamy, there were three 
cases of marriages between first maternal cousins. Since gotra membership is assigned 
through the fa ther’s line, these spouses belonged to different gotras, which made their 
marriages acceptable in the eyes of society.
CRITERIA OF SELECTION
Questions on the criteria of selection elicited a wide variety of responses as to the 
desirable traits  of a potential bride or groom. Some tra its  were considered almost 
universally im portant and were mentioned in nearly all interviews, while others were 
specific to a particular family and their individual interests and preferences. Traits 
which were most often considered important for boys were the social and economic 
sta tus of the boy and his family, their reputation and respectability, the amount of 
dowry demanded and potential cost of the marriage to the bride’s family, the health and 
potential earning power of the boy, and less importantly skin color and attractiveness.
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The amount of land owned by the boy and his family was considered crucial in all cases, 
since for the agricultural majority, there was a direct correlation between amount of 
land owned, and economic prosperity. However, land ownership was considered crucial 
even in those cases where the boy was working in a professional job, for villagers 
reasoned th a t  the ownership of land would provide extra security in case of 
unemployment, as well as providing some economic security for the wife in the event of 
the husband’s death. Similarly, some families were reluctant to marry their daughters to 
an only son, since they feared for her security in the event of her husband’s death. 
Others, however, had no objection to this practice.
The education of the groom was not considered to be important among some of 
the less progressive families of farmers and agricultural laborers, none of whom had been 
employed in non-agricultural occupations. They reasoned tha t  education made little 
difference if the husband was to spend his life farming anyway. However, to the majority 
of villagers, education was valued in and of itself, regardless of future occupation. If the 
boy was college educated with a professional job his value in the marriage market 
increased dramatically, and the family could have their pick of girls, and demand a large 
dowry.
Marriages of unmarried girls to previously married (whether widowed, divorced, or 
bigamous) men were considered much less desirable, involving greatly reduced 
expenditures or a demand of brideprice by the bride's family. However, such marriages 
did occur primarily because of the tremendous social pressure felt by girls’ families to 
quickly effect their marriages, as considerable scorn and ridicule fall on a family tha t  
fails to marry daughters promptly; although varying by caste, this ridicule can begin 
when the girl is as young as 19 and will certainly occur if the girl is not married by age 
25.
Among the Thakurs and other higher caste families, horoscopes were considered 
im portant in determining marital compatibility, and if the horoscopes of the prospective 
spouses did not match, the marriage arrangement was often cancelled. Different families
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varied in the degree of importance tha t  they attached to matching horoscopes. Some 
families said th a t  if the horoscopes were unfavorable, the match would definitely be 
cancelled even if the other party was considered to be an ideal marriage partner. In 
contrast, others a ttr ibu ted  less importance to matching horoscopes, and there were at 
least two cases in which marriages took place despite unfavorable horoscopes. In these 
instances, the parents were very enthusiastic about the qualities of the prospective 
partner, and persuaded the astrologer to reassess the compatibility of the boy and girl 
using numerology. When a favorable result was obtained from this method, the 
marriages took place.
Many people also considered joint family residence to be an im portan t indicator of 
cooperation and harmony in the boy’s family, and showed a preference for arranging the 
marriages of their daughters into extended family groups. A family which was split into 
nuclear units due to quarrels and conflicts between its members was not considered to be 
a good environment for the girl. Much thought was given to whether the boy’s family 
would provide a peaceful and happy setting for their daughter to live in, as well as one 
in which she could enjoy a comfortable economic standard of living.
In general, much more a ttention and concern went into choosing the proper groom 
for the marriage of a daughter, than into choosing the proper bride for the marriage of a 
son. This tendency is related to the prevailing system of patrilocal marriage, as well as 
to the limited role and low status of young brides. After marriage, a bride goes alone, 
vulnerable and unsupported, to her husband’s house, where she has relatively little 
impact on the functioning of the husband’s family. She is expected to be extremely 
hardworking, obedient, and biddable, and to suppress many aspects of her individual 
personality, lest she displease the mother-in-law. The young bride shoulders the entire 
burden of adjustment in the new household, as she knows tha t  the husband’s family will 
not make any effort to adjust to her. Her initial role in the husband’s house is basically 
tha t  of a low sta tus laborer and helper for the mother-in-law. In such a situation, the 
bride’s individuality is largely submerged in hard work and strict discipline, and has
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little impact on the members of the husband’s family. Thus, the boy’s parents want a 
girl who is young and biddable, but are not concerned about her individual personality 
or characteristics which might assume greater importance in spouse selection in a more 
egalitarian society.
The primary characteristics tha t  villagers desired in a bride were tha t  she be 
healthy and free from defects, come from a respectable family, be chaste, hardworking 
and obedient, and have the necessary skills to perform the household work. Virginity is 
im portant, and widowed or divorced women, or girls with known premarital experience 
were not accepted for marriages to previously unmarried boys. Although educated 
brides were often desired by university educated men, the majority of families did not 
particularly care if the girl was educated or not. Some families preferred a less educated 
girl on the grounds tha t  she would be more submissive and not talk back or think herself 
sm arter than her elders. Potential marriage expenses were always an important 
consideration in marriage arrangements for both boys and girls. Thus, the amounts of 
dowry or brideprice demanded were major factors in marriage decision-making, and 
could often umake or breakr a match. Although beauty and fair skin were considered 
desirable, these a ttr ibu tes  were not of primary importance, as is indicated by the fact 
tha t  most families did not even bother to view the bride before the wedding, relying 
instead on information given by the mediator to determine if the girl was suitable.
The information on differential previewing of brides vis-a-vis grooms is interesting 
in this regard. Although the bride’s family had virtually always seen the boy before 
marriage, the percentage of boy’s families who had seen the girl before the marriage was 
quite small, around 18 percent. Even among those who had seen the girl before 
marriage, the majority had seen the girl more or less by accident at a festival or wedding 
or while visiting a friend or relative, rather than  because of a specific intent to view and 
evaluate a girl to determine her suitability for marriage. As discussed above, villagers 
felt th a t  it made little difference which girl they got, as long as she did not have major 
physical or mental defects. There was also some feeling tha t  it was not nice to refuse a
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girl’s family who approached for marriage, and th a t  if pressured they would arrange the 
marriage with whichever girl’s family desired it.
In general, villagers exhibited a blind support and trust in the man chosen to 
mediate in the marriage negotiations, and I found tha t  the relationship of the mediator 
to the girl’s and boy’s families was the single most important criterion in determining 
whether marriage negotiations would be successful. In cases where the mediator was a 
close friend or relative to both the girl’s and the boy's families, the marriage was 
virtually assured even if other factors were less favorable. The sta tem ent of a 40-year-old 
Kacchi farmer is interesting in this regard. When asked if it was not risky to marry a 
girl no one from the family had seen, he replied tha t  no one from his family went to see 
girls. It was their custom to blindly support the mediator in marriage arrangements, but 
if, by chance, the girl was blind or crazy it was his duty to keep and love her. Although 
this may be an ideal expressed by some informants, it does not reflect actual practice. 
In actuality, if the family finds itself saddled with an undesirable girl, it will simply send 
her back to her parents’ house, thus effecting a de facto divorce.
This happened in the case of one young Teli boy, who found himself married to a 
severely retarded girl, who could not bathe herself or reliably control her motions. In this 
case, the family had gone to see the girl. However, when they viewed her, she simply sat 
there beautifully ornamented with her head bowed and did not speak. As the girl is 
supposed to appear shy and modest upon the visit of a boy’s family, the groom's 
relatives thought nothing of it, and went ahead with the marriage arrangement in which 
the boy’s family paid a substantial brideprice. It was not until after the marriage when 
the girl came to stay at the boy’s house tha t  they discovered their misfortune. Since 
marriage is considered mandatory for all females, the girl’s father felt a compelling social 
pressure to get his daughter married regardless of her handicap. He called upon the 
services of a close relative to help him, and the two entered into a somewhat elaborate 
deception in order to effect her marriage. When the boy’s family discovered her handicap 
they were angry, but set out to make the best of it and to try to teach the girl simple
114
tasks. After a couple of months it became apparent tha t  she was incapable of doing 
anything constructive, and in fact required a large amount of care herself, so they sent 
her back to her parents’ house. Subsequently, the boy wanted to remarry, but no girls’ 
families have made an approach as he is now considered to be a divorced man, and thus 
a much less desirable commodity in the marriage market.
Ideas about previewing brides are changing slowly among a minority of educated 
and more urban-oriented villagers. Lewis, in a 1953 study in a Delhi village, remarked 
somewhat baldly with regard to marriage arrangements tha t  “none of the boy’s 
relatives, either male or female, see the girl” (Lewis, 1958: 166). In the current study, I 
found th a t  approximately eight percent of villagers considered it im portan t to view the 
bride before marriage. When questioned about this, many stated that ,  as in the above 
case, going to view the girl yielded little or no useful information, and thus did not 
substantially assist in their decision-making process. In the prevailing climate of female 
seclusion (purdah ) and extreme modesty and respect before elders, this argum ent has a 
great deal of validity and the unfortunate experience of the Teli boy is bound to be 
repeated until the customs of purdah  are sufficiently relaxed to allow adequate viewing 
and a brief conversation, if not actual acquaintance with future brides.
Both social and spatial distance between the girl’s natal and marital households 
were considered to be im portant factors by some respondents. Several families rejected 
marriage offers from girls’ families in neighboring villages, on the grounds th a t  they 
wanted a girl from a sufficient distance so that any adjustment problems th a t  she had in 
her marital family would not be readily apparent to her parents (see Jeffery, et al., 
1984). Similarly, one village mother rejected a match for her son because the girl came 
from her own natal village. She was afraid tha t  the girl would be more familiar and less 
likely to obey her than a girl from a different village. Although other villagers did agree 
to such matches, considerations of distance and respect were common in marriage 
decision-making. It is apparent tha t  one of the incidental advantages of exogamy is to 
create the separation and status differences necessary to ensure the bride’s complete
115
submission and obedience to her husband’s family. This is an advantage which villagers 
appreciate and are anxious to maintain.
P A R T Y  T O  S E L E C T I O N
As regards party to selection, the primary initiators and decision-makers in 
marriage arrangements are not the young man and woman to be married, but rather 
their parents, close relatives, and other extended family members. The person with 
primary responsibility for marriage decision-making is usually the father of the boy or 
girl to be married, although in joint families this responsibility may occasionally be 
taken over by the joint family head - usually the fa ther’s father or elder brother. In 
families where the father has died, other relatives take over responsibility for the 
marriage arrangements. There were sixteen marriages in the study area where other 
relatives had made the arrangements in the absence of the father. In seven of these, the 
arrangement was made by the elder brother, five by the paternal uncle, and one each by 
the maternal uncle, mother, sister’s husband, and village friend. Many families 
commented on the difficulty of arrangement in the absence of elder male members 
resident in the family group, as the assistance of relatives from outside the residential 
family cannot always be relied upon, and depends on the conscientiousness of various 
relatives. Financing the marriage can also be a problem. In several cases, relatives gave 
no money for marriage expenses, or gave money in the form of a loan to the groom. In 
either case, the boy himself had to spend several years working and saving up the money 
to pay for the marriage expenses.
Although the father has the ultimate responsibility for marriage decision-making, 
many other friends and relatives are involved in the selection process. There are no 
professional matchmakers in the study villages, and due to the requirement of village 
exogamy, suitable marriage partners are not always initially known to the family. In this 
regard, the elder married women of the family are in a unique position to aid in the 
search for an eligible boy or girl. Because of their connections with their natal village
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and with other villages through the exogamous marriages of their aunts, sisters, and 
other female relations, they are able to determine the availability of potential partners in 
a wide range of villages. When it becomes time to decide about a young person's 
marriage, a woman will inquire of her mother as to the availability of a suitable partner 
in her natal village. Similarly, she will inquire of her married sisters, aunts and other 
female relations about the availability of a suitable partner in those villages.
Even after a potential partner was- located, the parents of the bride never 
approached his family directly, as a direct rejection might entail shame and 
embarrassment for both parties. Although women were more often the “finders” in the 
sense of first locating potential spouses, the active role in informing and mediating 
between the two families nearly always fell to men - usually to the husband of the 
woman who originally located the potential partner. Thus, when villagers were asked to 
name the matchmaker or arranger of their marriages, the responses were most often 
given in terms of a married couple, with the wife usually as the discoverer of the 
potential partner, and the husband as the actual mediator in the marriage negotiations.
The approval of fellow villagers and especially fellow caste members is im portant, 
as they may have considerable personal influence with the family, as well as having the 
potential to obstruct the match by giving false or libellous information to the opposite 
party. There were two cases in the study area where a marriage arrangement was 
terminated due to the disapproval of fellow villagers. In both cases, a poor man had 
arranged to marry his young daughter to an older widowed or divorced man. Upon the 
strenuous objections of fellow villagers, both of the matches were cancelled.
In other cases, misinformation given about the boy or girl to the opposite party led 
to the cancellation of the match. For example, a village girl was engaged to a boy from 
another village until some villagers intent on mischief told the boy th a t  she had squint 
eyes. After hearing this, the boy refused to marry her, and her marriage was 
subsequently arranged into another family. This type of obstruction is more damaging 
in the case of boys' marriages, as the boy’s family plays the passive role in the marriage
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negotiations, and must wait for the girl’s family to approach them. In another case of 
village conflict, a number of Kisan boys were unable to marry in part because of the lack 
of support by fellow villagers (see below). Similarly, the largest landowner of the village 
was unable to marry until the age of 50 owing to the obstruction of fellow villagers. As 
the man was an only son, fellow villagers reasoned tha t  if he died without progeny his 
land would be divided among them. They refused to help in arranging a match for him, 
and a ttem pted  to sour any offers made by girls’ families by making unfavorable 
comments. It was only due to the persistence of a particular girl's family who were 
having some difficulty marrying off their daughter tha t  the man was able to marry at 
all.
Table 5.1 shows the marriages performed in the study area by the relationship of 
the m atchmaker to the boy or girl concerned. Among the 410 marriages studied 
(including first, second, and third marriages, as well as stable de facto unions), 
approximately two-thirds were arranged by relatives, one-third by family friends and 
two percent were partly or fully “self-arranged” . Of the marriages arranged by relatives, 
approximately 30 percent of the respondents who specified indicated that their marriages 
were arranged by their married sister and brother-in-law, 27 percent by their maternal 
aunt and uncle, 27 percent by their paternal aunt and uncle, 10 percent by cousins, 2.3 
percent by grandfathers, and 3.7 percent by the first wife’s father (discussed below).
Although married sisters and brothers-in-law were important arrangers in the 
marriages of both sexes, I found th a t  they played a particularly active role in the 
arrangement of marriages for girls - probably because of the naturally close and 
sympathetic bond between sisters. Of the 63 marriages arranged by the sister and 
brother-in-law, seven involved the bride’s marriage to her sister’s husband’s younger 
brother, while in several other cases the bride had married into her sister’s own marital 
village - to a man unrelated or only distantly related to her sister’s husband. 
Grandfathers and paternal and maternal aunts and uncles seemed to play an equal role 
in the marriages of both boys and girls, while male cousins were more likely to concern
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TABLE 5.1
NUMBER AND PER C EN TA G E OF VILLAGE MARRIAGES 
BY RELATIONSHIP OF M ATCHM AKER
Arranger 
of Marriage
No. of Percentage Cumulative 
Cases of Cases Percentage
A. MARRIAGES ARRANGED BY RELATIVES
Unspecified Relatives 58 --
Married Sister and Brother-in-law- 63 29.5
Paternal Aunt and Uncle 58 27.2
Maternal Aunt and Uncle 58 27.2
Male Cousins 21 9.9
Grandfather 5 2.3
Father of Deceased First Wife 8 3.7
271 100.0 66.1
B. MARRIAGES ARRANGED BY NON-RELATIVES
Rajepur Village People, Friend 83 63.8
Hamlet People, Friend 8 6.2
Friends from Other Villages 39 30.8
130 100.0 31.7
C. SELF-ARRANGED MARRIAGES
Levirate 4 44.4
Other Self-Arranged 5 66.6
9 100.0 2.2
Total Sample 410 100.0
Source: Village interview data.
themselves in the arrangement of boys’ marriages. The final category of relatives refers
only to remarriages for widowed men. Upon the death of the wife, the wife’s father often 
feels a certain responsibility to assist his son-in-law in remarrying. In four of the eight 
reported cases, the widower was remarried to his first wife's younger sister, in two cases, 
he was remarried to the niece of the first wife, and of the two remaining cases, one was 
to the first wife’s paternal aunt, while the second was to an unrelated girl from the 
father-in-law’s village.
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Of the marriages arranged by non-relatives. 64 percent were arranged by people 
from the central village unit (Rajepur), six percent by people from one of the two 
neighboring hamlets included in the study area, and a further 30 percent by people from 
villages outside of the study area. When the da ta  were analyzed on residence of arranger 
by residence of the boy or girl to be married, an interesting pattern  emerged. I found 
tha t  for Rajepur marriages, 49 of the 52 matches were arranged by fellow Rajepur 
residents, and only three by friends from one of the two hamlets. However, for the 
hamlets the situation was reversed. For hamlet Shakkya, 20 of the marriages were 
arranged by friends from Rajepur, while only six were arranged by fellow hamlet 
dwellers. The tendency was even more accentuated for hamlet Kisan residents, as 14 
marriages were arranged by Rajepur residents, and none by fellow hamlet dwellers. This 
pa tte rn  illustrates the close social ties between hamlet and village, and the reliance of 
hamlet residents on the advice and assistance of their more “cosmopolitan” neighbors. 
Thus, a person living in a larger multi-caste village would naturally have a greater range 
of contacts and acquaintances, and would be a useful helper in marriage arrangements 
for a person from a small single-caste hamlet with relatively fewer outside contacts.
However, the complete absence of inter-hamlet marriage mediation in hamlet 
Kisan is further indicative of divisiveness and conflict within the hamlet in regard to 
marriage arrangements. In hamlet Kisan, difficulties in arranging marriages for boys 
have led to several young men becoming unwilling lifelong bachelors, simply because of 
their inability to secure a bride. The villagers a ttr ibu te  this in part to a shortage of and 
therefore competition for available brides. In this situation, avaricious parents may 
approach several families and eventually marry their daughters to the family which 
offers to pay the highest brideprice. In addition, many men listed village jealousy and 
conflicts as the primary reason why their marriages were delayed or they were unable to 
marry. As noted before, fellow villagers can easily obstruct a marriage simply by telling 
un tru ths  about the boy or girl concerned. Respondents reported tha t  this practice was 
common in hamlet Kisan. Often fellow hamlet dwellers wished to procure the bride for a
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marriage into their own or one of their relatives' families, while personal enmity was also 
an im portant factor.
The importance of women in searching for and locating prospective spouses is 
emphasized in the da ta  on marriages arranged by friends from outside the study area. In 
14 of the 39 cases the bride was the mediator's wife's sister, in five cases she was the 
m ed ia to rs  wife's niece, and in 11 cases she was from the mediator's wife’s natal village. 
In two cases, the m ediator’s wife was originally from Rajepur, and had found a match 
for a Rajepur boy in her marital village. In the remaining seven cases, the connection 
was through the m edia tor’s family rather than tha t  of his wife. Four of the brides were 
the m ediator’s sister’s daughters, two were from the m edia tor’s m other’s natal villages, 
and one was from the m ediator’s sister’s marital village.
Approximately two percent of marriages in the study area had a strong component 
of self-arrangement in their inception. There were four cases of levirate remarriage in 
which a man married his elder bro ther’s widow. In all cases levirate remarriage of 
widows was a de facto rather than an official marriage arrangement, as were all second 
marriages for women in the study villages. After the death of the elder brother, at some 
point the younger brother began cohabiting with the elder brother’s widow who was 
living in the same household. This evolved into a stable marital union recognized by 
society, and in none of the cases did the young man take a second or “official” wife. This 
type of union can be classified as “self-selection'1 in the sense that the brother could 
always fail to cohabit with the widow, or send her back to her parents’ house if he did 
not like her. However, it is by no means a “love” marriage in the western sense of the 
term. There were cases when the younger brother did fail to cohabit with his elder 
b ro the r’s widow. However, in cases where there was an unmarried younger brother in the 
house, the levirate arrangement was the most common, and was probably encouraged by 
the family on the grounds tha t  such an arrangement provided for the widow, as well as 
saving the family the trouble and expense of arranging an official marriage for the 
younger brother.
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The remaining five marriages in the self-arranged category are largely divergent 
types. In two of the cases, the boy and girl had previously met and started a 
relationship. However, the actual arrangement of the marriage was made in the 
traditional manner, with the girl’s father formally approaching the boy’s father with 
regard to marriage. In one case, the boy and girl had met each other at school, while in 
the other case the boy had met the girl while visiting at his father’s friend’s house. In 
both cases, the boy indicated a marked preference for that particular girl, and refused all 
other marriage offers. In one case when the girl's parents were not forthcoming, the boy 
sent a message through an intermediary to the girl’s family to tell them to approach his 
father. In this instance, the girl’s father offered very little dowry, which made the boy’s 
parents inclined to refuse the match. However, the boy was adam ant and said tha t  if he 
couldn’t marry this girl he would never marry. His parents, although disappointed about 
the small amount of the dowry, eventually acceded to his wishes and arranged the 
match.
In another case, a highly educated man was in his youth married to a relatively 
uneducated girl. The marital relationship was not particularly close, and the young man 
used to leave his wife in the village when he went to the city to work in his government 
job. After 16 years he remarried, this time to a girl that he had met in the city. The 
marriage was arranged with the approval of the girl’s father and appropriate dowry was 
given. However, the bridegroom’s father was furious, because the man already had a wife 
at the father’s house in the village. No one from the father’s family attended the 
wedding, and this second marriage caused a rift in relations between the younger man 
and his father which continues to this day.
Another self-arranged marriage took place in response to difficulties in 
arrangement in the absence of the father together with lack of support from fellow 
villagers. Because of a fight in the village, a certain family was ostracized, and the 
obstruction of villagers in combination with the lack of a father made marriage appear 
increasingly unlikely for a son of the family. Finally, his mother told him to go and see
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what he could arrange himself. The boy went to his maternal aunt's  house and she 
helped him to meet a girl in her village, obtain permission from the girl’s parents and to 
marry her immediately, without any of the boy’s family attending. This was a 
self-arranged marriage, but not a love marriage, since although he had seen and liked the 
girl before the wedding, the marriage was not the product of a prior acquaintance or 
courtship. The final case of self-arranged “marriage’’ involved the inter-caste elopement 
previously discussed where a prostitute of indeterminate caste abandoned her Cham ar de 
facto husband and young son to run away with another villager of Dhobi caste.
It should be noted tha t ,  of the nine self-arranged marriages enumerated in the 
study area, only three or four can be considered to be true “love” marriages in the sense 
of premarital romance and courtship. Thus, although “love” marriages do occur in the 
Indian context, they are extremely rare, and occur in less than one percent of cases. 
Villagers consider love marriages to be somewhat scandalous unions, as they often 
involve elopements, deep estrangements between families, and de facto rather than 
socially sanctioned marriages. The love marriages which do achieve social acceptance are 
those which take place within caste boundaries and in which both parties make a 
concerted effort to create the appearance of an arranged marriage. Often the young 
lovers do their best to keep their parents ignorant of the relationship, and rely on friends 
and intermediaries to suggest the match. Only when the parents are inclined to refuse 
the match will the boy or girl confess to the attraction (the girl always through an 
intermediary). This confession will not guarantee the marriage, especially for the girl 
whose wishes have little or no impact on her parents’ decision. However, if the boy is 
adam ant and refuses all other marriage offers, his parents may eventually accede to the 
match if the girl and dowry are also acceptable to them. All of this is kept relatively 
quiet within the family, and many fellow villagers may not be aware tha t  the marriage 
which went through all of the traditional forms of an arranged marriage, was actually a 
union based upon love.
As regards arranged marriages, it is obvious tha t ,  while the father and elder male
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relatives are responsible for the ultimate decision in a particular case, many other friends 
and relatives are involved in the marriage process. Because of the information network 
created by their exogamous marriages, women are primarily involved in locating 
potential partners, while men take the direct role in mediation between the two families. 
In the following sections I will discuss the chronology, ceremonies, and steps in 
arrangement of typical village marriages.
M A R R IA G E  A R R A N G E M E N T S  FO R A VILLAGE B R ID E
Santoshi is a typical village girl, born and raised in Rajepur in a family of Thakur 
caste. She attended the village school more or less regularly throughout her childhood, 
but after the completion of grade five at age 13, she began staying home with her 
mother, as there was no higher school in the village, and her parents did not want her to 
travel outside the village for schooling. Her completion of school largely coincided with 
her first menstruation, which provided further proof of her approaching m aturity , and 
thus another good reason why she should be kept at least partly secluded close to the 
home. Although somewhat immature at first menses, she proceeded to develop fairly 
rapidly in the year or two that  followed, so tha t  by the time she reached her fifteenth 
birthday, her parents could see substantial evidence of her womanly development. Thirty  
years ago, the primary event which would have prompted the search for a bridegroom 
was menstruation. Although this was still true of many village families, an increasing 
minority, especially in the higher castes now tended to wait for more obvious visual signs 
of m aturity , such as development of breasts, to begin their search for a bridegroom.
While Santoshi’s parents had talked somewhat idly about arranging her marriage 
previously, they now began to search in earnest, and resolved to marry her as soon as 
possible. They let it be known as widely as possible among friends and relatives th a t  
they were looking for a suitable bridegroom for their daughter. Thus, when Santoshi’s 
father visited friends, and business acquaintances, or sat in smoking circles, he would 
mention his search, and ask people to please inform him if they heard about any suitable
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boys. Similarly, mother put out word among her sisters, aunts, and other relatives, tha t  
they should inform her if they knew of any eligible boys. A married sister was then 
visiting the household, and she resolved to look for a boy upon her return to her 
husband’s village. After some time, information began coming in on available boys in 
several villages a t  varying distances from Rajepur. The family discussed the information 
on various boys (although generally not in front of the girl), and, if a boy seemed 
suitable according to the reports of friends and relatives, the father would go to visit the 
boy and his family in their village. The purpose of this visit was to see the boy and his 
family at first hand, to find out if they were also interested in the match, to ascertain 
their expectations as regards dowry and ceremonial expenses, and to check up on the 
information given by the mediator by inquiring of the boy’s fellow villagers about the 
boy and his family. Santoshi’s father visited several boys’ families, some of whom he did 
not like for one reason or another, some of whom demanded too much dowry, and some 
of whom had already made an agreement with another girl’s family by the time th a t  he 
had heard of and got around to visiting them.
TABLE 5.2
NUMBER OF PR O SPECTIV E SPOUSES SEEN BY FAMILY BEFORE M ARRIAGE
Number Seen Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
1 89 53.6
2 21 12.7
3 38 22.9
4 8 4.8
5 5 3.0
6+ 5 3.0
Total 166 100.0
Source: Village interview data.
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The number of boys or girls seen for marriage, and the amount of time spent 
arranging a match varied greatly among villagers. In approximately 52 percent of 
marriages, villagers arranged the marriage with the first boy or girl’s family tha t  they 
met, whereas approximately three percent of village families viewed six or more 
potential partners before actually settling on a match (see Table 5.2). Similarly, some 
village families were able to find a suitable match within two or three months of 
beginning a marriage search, while others spent two or three years before they were 
successful in arranging the marriage. In general, both the number of potential partners 
seen and the duration of the marriage search increased dramatically for families with 
college educated boys or girls. Educated boys were much in demand, and the am ount of 
dowry demanded by the families of university educated boys was much higher, thus 
raising the price of the marriage to beyond the financial means of many girls’ families. 
The parents of highly educated girls were loth to marry their daughters to a boy of lesser 
education, thus drastically limiting their field of selection of potential marriage partners. 
Thus, the parents of educated brides had to visit many families before they could find 
one which would agree to a marriage wdthin their means. Similarly, the parents of 
educated boys would often wait for a number of offers to come, and marry their son to 
the girl whose family offered the most dowry.
Another factor in the amount of time taken to settle a match related to individual 
styles of searching of the girl’s parents. In the case of a Srivastav girl, her father was a 
prosperous farmer who did not wish to spare much time to the marriage search. When 
news of a suitable boy came, he was invariably busy managing the farm, and would 
delay visiting the boy’s family until he could find the time. By then, most of the families 
who were asking a reasonable amount of dowry had already made arrangements, and the 
ones who were still available were those who were demanding exorbitant dowries. Thus, 
although the father began searching when the girl finished her B.A. at age 20, she is still 
unmarried three years later, and is the oldest spinster in the village, a fact which many 
villagers disapprove of and consider somew hat scandalous.
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In Santoshi’s case, the family was not so unlucky, and after a few months, 
Santoshi’s father got word of another family with whom he was able to make an 
arrangement. The dowry agreed upon was really more than he could afford, but he was 
doubtful of being able to arrange a good match with any less dowry, and calculated that ,  
if he arranged the marriage for the following May-June (the most common month for 
marriages in the village), he would be able to use the proceeds from the sale of his potato 
crop to at least partly cover the costs. After making the decision, Santoshi’s father 
returned to the boy’s house to put a tilak  (a mark made from turmeric paste) on the 
boy’s forehead, and give a few rupees in order to officially seal the engagement. After the 
tilak  ceremony, Santoshi’s father consulted with the village priest/astrologer (p u nd it) in 
order to set an appropriate date for the wedding. A letter was sent to the boy’s family 
proposing the wedding date, which was then checked and approved by the boy’s pundit. 
Thus, Santoshi’s wedding was arranged.
M A R R IA G E  C ER E M O N IE S IN  THE VILLAG E
Marriage is probably the most important life cycle ritual in the Indian setting, and 
every aspect of it, from the erection of the marriage pole and thatch  roof under which 
the ceremony is held, to the ceremonial bathing of the bride and groom before the 
wedding, is fraught with religious significance. The actual marriage ceremony usually 
takes place over three days, but the pre- and post-marriage rituals may be spread out 
over several years. There are many systematic accounts of marriage ceremonies in rural 
north India (see Luschinsky, 1962; Lewis, 1958: Reddy, 1956a; 1956b). In the interests ol 
brevity, I will describe only the major steps in the marriage process, and discuss how 
they pertain to marriage arrangements, marriage expenses, and age at effective 
cohabitation of the couple. It must be noted tha t  the following description applies only 
to Hindu ceremonies. Although Muslim ceremonies in rural U tta r  Pradesh are similar, 
having been heavily influenced by Hindu customs, there are im portant differences. For a 
detailed account of Muslim ceremonies in U ttar  Pradesh see Uddin (1972).
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The first major ceremony in the Hindu marriage cycle is the lagun ceremony which 
celebrates the engagement and impending marriage of the couple. This occurs one or two 
months before the actual wedding and is celebrated at the bridegroom’s house. At this 
time the bride’s father again marks tilak  on the groom’s forehead, presents are 
exchanged, and the majority of the cash payment of dowry is given. Among higher 
castes, a document known as Lagun Patri is often drafted giving information about the 
bride and groom, as well as the date and circumstances of the wedding. In many lower 
caste weddings there is no separate lagun ceremony, and, instead, a khet lagun  (field 
lagun ) is held on the actual wedding day, as the marriage party  reaches the outskirts of 
the village lands. At this time presents are sent, and a brief ceremony is held before the 
marriage party proceeds on to the bride's house in the village.
Except in the rare cases of dhola marriages (see below), the marriage ceremony is 
always held at the bride’s house. On the appointed day the barat or marriage party, 
consisting of the groom, his male relatives, and invited friends will make their way to 
the bride’s house. Efforts are made to invest the procession of the bridegroom with as 
much pomp and splendor as possible. The bridegroom wears a crown and his best clothes 
and usually rides in a palanquin, although a horse or elephant may also be used. He is 
followed by the members of the marriage party and by a hired band which plays popular 
songs as loudly as possible. The marriage party travels slowly, and makes frequent stops 
for impassioned dancing and revelry, arriving at the bride’s house around eight or nine 
in the evening. There the bridegroom is greeted at the door by the bride’s father and 
other relatives.
The darwaza ceremony, or ceremony at the doorway, involves various forms of 
puja  or worship in which the pundit  sprinkles Ganges river water over the bridegroom 
and bride’s father, and gives them each a ring made of kush  grass. Tilak  is again marked 
on the bridegroom by the bride’s father, and both mark tilak  on various household items 
set out in an altar  arrangement. The bride's father places a necklace of flowers around 
the bridegroom’s neck, and touches the feet of the groom five times; a red thread  is tied
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around the groom's wrist. Gifts are presented to the groom by the bride's father, which 
must include as a minimum the ceremonial five cooking utensils (burtun ) given in all 
weddings, but which may include substantial gifts of clothes, household items, and 
money. The bride does not participate in the darwaza  ceremony, but may peek out from 
inside the house, and throw rice at the bridegroom. After this ceremony, the bridegroom 
and barat will be shown to a place (usually a neighbor’s house, a partitioned off portion 
of the bride’s house, or a tent erected in the village fields) where a feast has been 
prepared for them, where they will eat, celebrate, and sleep for the night.
Among the townspeople, who practice an abbreviated form of wedding lasting two 
rather than three days, the actual marriage ceremony involving the seven rounds of the 
sacred fire takes place the same night as the arrival of the barat, around three or four in 
the morning. Among the villagers, however, the marriage ceremony is performed at first 
light the following morning. The bride and groom are seated under the ceremonial 
bamboo pole and thatch roof shelter where the wedding ceremony will take place. Many 
friends and relatives come forward to touch the feet of the bride and groom, and to offer 
gifts of a few rupees each. All contributions given in this manner are noted down in a 
register, and the families of the bride or groom will endeavor to present the same or 
slightly more money in the marriage of one of the giver’s family members. In this way, a 
reciprocal exchange takes place which provides some small assistance to families in 
meeting the wedding expenses.
For the actual marriage ceremony, all men not directly involved in the ceremonies 
are asked to leave the courtyard, and only the women are present as spectators. The 
pund it or priest ties the scarves of the bride and groom together, and they both make 
offerings in front of the sacred fire. Then comes the ceremony known as kanya-dan , or 
the gift of a virgin, where the bride’s father ceremonially places the bride’s hands in the 
bridegroom’s hands, thus signifying the gift of his daughter to the boy. The priest puts a 
small clay pot over the fire to smother it, and the bride and groom in turn pass their feet 
over the fire. Then comes the sat padi. or seven steps around the sacred fire. With their
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scarves still tied together, the couple circle the fire seven times, the first three with the 
bride leading, and the last four with the bridegroom leading.
The next ceremony involves the application of sindur  or vermilion powder by the 
bridegroom in the part of the bride’s hair. In north India, the daily application of sindur  
is an im portant indication of the married state. The edge of the bride’s sari is lifted by 
one of the bride’s female relatives, and the bridegroom sprinkles the red powder in the 
part  of her hair. As the bride has been heavily veiled throughout the entire ceremony, it 
is during the application of sindur  th a t  the bridegroom often gets his first glimpse of his 
new wife. After this the bride and bridegroom’s hands are joined, and some wheat is 
poured through first the bridegroom's and then the bride’s hands to symbolize their 
cooperation in household and agricultural activities. The priest then reads out the 
marriage vows to which the bride and groom agree. These mainly involve promises of 
respect and obedience on the part of the bride towards her husband, and promises of 
support and consultation in major m atters  on the part of the bridegroom towards his 
wife.
Subsequently, the bride and groom adjourn to the inside of the house where an 
open candle with two wicks has been lighted. It is the duty of the bridegroom to push 
the two candle wicks together to make one, thus symbolizing the joining of two people in 
marriage. This is the final ceremony in the marriage proper, and concludes the series of 
ceremonies held on the second day. The groom and his family return to their 
accommodations, relax, and prepare to be feasted again that night.
On the morning of the third day, the barat prepares to leave for the groom’s 
village. The bride’s relatives gather at her house to lament her departure for her 
husband’s house. This is a very sad occasion for the bride and her entire family, and is 
the scene for ritualized, but nevertheless genuine weeping as she packs up her dowry and 
personal belongings preparatory to departure. Usually, the bride goes to the groom s 
house for four days to be viewed by the groom’s relatives; this is called m ukh  dekana , or 
literally “showing of the face” . At the end of four days, she returns to her natal home
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until the performance of a separate gauna or consummation ceremony some months or 
years later. While at her in-laws' house, she is supposed to behave in a very shy and 
retiring manner. Her main duty is to sit silently in the central courtyard during the 
daytime, while friends and relatives of the groom’s family pay a few paise for the 
privilege of lifting up her veils and seeing her face. The dowry and presents sent by the 
bride's family are set out for public display, and there is much discussion as to their cost 
and quality, with criticism and ridicule being heaped on anything which is not up to 
standard.
The time lag between the marriage and gauna or consummation ceremonies is 
determined by a number of factors. In child marriages when the girl is physically 
immature, the bride's family will wait for the appearance of menses and other signs of 
physical m aturity  before agreeing to gauna. However, pre-puberty marriages are now 
rare in the study area, so this factor has much less influence than formerly. The advice of 
the village priest and astrologer is another influencing factor in deciding when 
consummation will take place. According to tradition, the gauna ceremony should take 
place in the first, third, fifth, or other odd numbered year following the wedding. This 
custom is almost universally adhered to, and in addition, the pundit  may select certain 
days as more auspicious, or even suggest a delay of two years in gauna if he finds some 
inauspicious portent which he feels may adversely affect the marriage. However, in 
conversations with villagers, it became clear that the single most important factor in 
determining the timing of gauna was the labor needs of the husband’s family. Thus, in 
several cases, gauna was held earlier than agreed upon because there was an illness or 
some other crisis in the husband’s family, and the girl’s household labor was required.
Performance of gauna is also related to the economic situation of the girl’s family. 
The two main functions of gauna are to delay the consummation of marriage until the 
girl is physically mature, and to provide yet another ceremonial occasion for gift giving 
and thus sta tus enhancement of the two families. In cases where the girl's family is very 
poor and is obviously unable to give any more gifts at the time of gauna. or when the
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girl's family is demanding brideprice, the function of gauna as yet another ceremony for 
the bride’s family to give expensive gifts to the groom’s family is not particularly 
relevant. In these instances the gauna  ceremony is dispensed with, and instead the 
marriage is consummated immediately after the wedding ceremony. In these cases, 
instead of going for the traditional four days for viewing, the bride goes and stays for 
some months in her husband’s village, returning to her natal village only when invited 
for a visit by her parents.
Other methods of minimizing marriage expenses are through child marriages (not 
currently practiced within the village, but still within living memory), the combined 
celebration of the weddings of two couples on the same day, or in the performance of an 
alternative and less preferred type of wedding ceremony known as a dhola wedding. The 
dhola type of ceremony is designed so tha t  the majority of the ceremonial expenses are 
paid by the groom’s family. This type of wedding ceremony is commonly employed in 
cases of brideprice, or when the girl’s family is too poor to pay the wedding expenses. In 
a dhola marriage, the groom or groom’s father goes to the bride’s village and fetches the 
bride, who is accompanied by her father and one or two male relatives. They are then 
brought to the groom's village where the actual marriage ceremonies are held. Thus, the 
groom’s family pays for all of the expenses associated with the performance of 
ceremonies and feasting of guests, and the bride’s family incurs very few expenses in the 
wedding.
In a dhola wedding, the same ceremonies are performed as in the more common 
type of wedding which takes place at the bride’s house, although these ceremonies may 
take place in somewhat abbreviated form. In these cases, the only dowry given is often 
the obligatory five cooking utensils (burtun ), while the groom’s family may pay a 
substantial brideprice. At the conclusion of the ceremonies, the bride may either return 
to her parents’ house, or if she is physically m ature, she will most probably remain at 
her husband’s house and begin married life immediately. This type of wedding is 
associated with the payment of brideprice, and is practiced almost exclusively by the
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TABLE 5.3
NUM BER AND PER C EN TA G E OF D H O L A  WEDDINGS 
BY YEAR OF MARRIAGE
Year
Number of 
Dhola Weddings
Total
Weddings
% of Cases of 
Dhola Weddings
1974-1983 4 71 5.6
1964-1973 1 23 4.3
1954-1963 4 48 8.3
1944-1953 5 24 20.8
Total 14 166 8.4
Source: Village interview data.
middle and lower caste families of the village. Informants stated tha t  this type of 
marriage used to be relatively more common, but the incidence of this practice has 
decreased greatly in the past 25 or 30 years. Table 5.3 lists the number and percentage 
of dhola weddings by the year of marriage. While it does appear that there has been a 
smaller proportion of dhola weddings in recent years, the sample size is far too small to 
make any definitive statement.
M ARITAL DISSOLUTION, REM ARRIAGE AND  
MULTIPLE M ARRIAGES
Our examination of marriage arrangements in the study villages concludes with a 
brief discussion on polygamy, widowhood, divorce, and remarriage. Table 5.4 shows the 
proportions of the ever-married population who have ever been widowed or divorced, 
and of those, the proportions who have subsequently remarried. A substantial proportion 
(16.4 percent) of the ever-married population has experienced the death of a spouse, this 
comparatively high figure being related to the general high level of mortality in the
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study villages (see Chapter 3). In contrast, the proportion of marital dissolutions caused 
by divorce or separation was very small, with less than two percent of marriages ending 
in divorce. The term divorce is used here in a societal rather than legalistic sense as 
official divorces gained in the courts are almost unheard of in the study villages. Persons 
enumerated as divorced were those considered by society to be divorced, who were not 
cohabiting, and who considered the break from their spouses to be permanent. The 
reasons for divorce most commonly given were barrenness, severe incompatibility or 
dislike between spouses, dislike of women in general, and physical or mental abnormality 
of the spouse. In addition, there were three cases of divorce by desertion of the wife, two 
where a woman left her husband to marry a man who offered to pay a higher brideprice 
(see Chapter 6), and one in which a woman left because her husband was serving a five 
year prison sentence.
The probability of a divorced or widowed person remarrying was much greater for 
males than for females. Remarriage was an official and socially approved event for a 
widowed or divorced man. However, the Hindu religion frowns on remarriage for women, 
as, in Hindu custom, the marriage bond lasts beyond the grave (this was the ideology 
upon which the custom of sati or immolation of women on the funeral pyres of their 
husbands was based). Thus, female remarriage is disapproved of, although it is allowed 
to the lower castes (Kapadia, 1955), as the wife ostensibly still retains religious and 
spiritual ties with her first husband.
Of the 23 men in the study villages who had remarried, two had been previously 
divorced, and 20 previously widowed, while one was a bigamist who took another wife 
because the first wife was barren. Of these 20 had contracted their second marriages to 
a previously unmarried girl, and three had entered into de facto marriages to previously 
divorced or widowed women. Of the six women who remarried, four involved levirate 
marriages in which, after the death of the older brother, the younger brother began 
cohabiting with the elder brother's widow. This eventually evolved into a stable and 
socially accepted de facto union. Of the non-levirate remarriages, one woman was
134
TABLE 5.4
MARITAL DISSOLUTION AND REM ARRIAGE IN THE STUDY VILLAGES
Males 
No. %
Females 
No. 7.
Total 
No. 7.
No. and Percentage of Ever- 
Married Pop. Ever Widowed 55 15.3 55 17.6 110 16.4
No. and Percentage of Ever
Widowed Pop. Ever Remarried 20 36.4 5 9.1 25 22.7
No. and Percentage of Ever- 
Married Pop. Ever Divorced 8 2.2 4 1.3 12 1.8
No. and Percentage of Ever
Divorced Pop. Ever Remarried 2 25.0 1 25.0 3 25.0
No. of Reported Cases 
of Polygyny
N o . of Reported Cases 
of Polyandry
2 1
l 1
1. one polygynous husband, as well as the polyandrous wife are now deceased. 
Source: calculated by the author from village census data.
previously widowed and one previously divorced, and both through the intervention of a 
mediator later came to live with previously divorced or widowed men. Social sanctions 
prohibiting the marriage of a never married man with a previously married woman are 
quite strong, and except for the levirate, which is a special case, no such cases occurred 
in the study villages. In fact, the families of many men of Kisan caste, faced with the 
prospect of permanent celibacy for their sons, still refused marriage offers with 
previously widowed or divorced women. In these situations, at least some families evolve 
alternative mechanisms to cope with the prospect of lifelong celibacy. For example, in 
the in-depth interviews, an interesting case came to light, involving de facto wife sharing 
by two Khori brothers. Because the younger brother was not able to marry due to 
problems of marriage arrangement, at some point he began cohabiting with his elder
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bro the r’s wife. The elder brother and his wife lived in the same household with the 
younger brother, and after some time, this arrangement evolved into a stable de facto 
polyandrous union, with both brothers sharing the one available wife. The wife had died 
in the year prior to my fieldwork in the village, and at the time of fieldwork, both 
brothers comforted each other by together mourning their mutual loss. Although this 
was the only reported case of a polyandrous union in the study villages, it is possible 
th a t  the fact of the wife’s death made it possible for the two brothers to speak of it more 
openly, and although probably infrequent, the existence of other (unreported) cases in 
the study villages cannot be ruled out.
The third case of polygamy enumerated in the study villages occurred as a rather 
desperate response to an extremely poor m an’s inability to arrange the marriages of his 
daughters. Amrudhin was a poor Muslim man, a widower, who thirty years ago made a 
bare living as an agricultural laborer, as well as trying to raise his two daughters and 
small son. Due to lack of time and finances, Amrudhin was having difficulty arranging 
the marriage of his eldest daughter, who was nearing the age of 23. The existence of an 
“aged spinster” of 22 in his house caused Amrudhin to become the butt  of village jokes 
and ridicule. One day a 50 year old crippled man, a Muslim, came to beg in the village. 
Apparently, overhearing something about A m rudhin’s problem, and catching a glimpse 
of the younger daughter, the man said something like '■‘I’ll take her off of your hands for 
you!” Amrudhin, sick of this problem, and anxious to avoid its future recurrence, replied 
tha t  it was all right with him, but the man would have to agree to take both of his 
daughters. In an abbreviated and informal ceremony, the two sisters, one aged 10 and 
one aged 22 were simultaneously married to the same 50 year old crippled beggar, thus 
ridding their father of the worry and social pressure of having mature aged unmarried 
daughters in his house. About ten years later, their husband died and they returned to 
their natal village. Although still an economic liability to their father’s family, at least 
they were no longer a social one, as however unsatisfactory the marriage had been, at 
least they had undergone marriage - the mandatory religious sacrament in North Indian 
society.
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C H A P T E R  6
M A R R IA G E  E X P E N S E S
The nature of marriage payments in a given society had been theoretically linked 
to a number of issues, most importantly: s ta tus  and relative economic contribution of 
women vis-a-vis men (Van Der Veen, 1972; Lindenbaum, 1981); nature of residence and 
inheritance systems (Spiro, 1975; Yalman, 1967); shortages of potential brides or 
bridegrooms (Caldwell et al. 1983); and tendencies toward egalitarianism or 
stratification in a given society (Goody, 1973). However, comprehensive and consistent 
explanations of cross-cultural variations in marriage payments have often been 
frustrated by the wide variations in values and practices associated with marriage. 
Marriage is not just a contract between two people, but in many societies forms the 
main avenue through which kinship bonds are created. Thus, marriage payments in a 
given society cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be evaluated within the wider 
context of kinship and social relations and their associated economic exchanges.
In general, the major questions concerning marital wealth flows of importance to 
researchers (c/. Goody, 1973: 3-14) relate to:
1. Amount of payments;
2. Content of payments;
3. Timing of payments;
4. Variability in payments;
5. Use to which payments are put; and
6. Conditions of returnability or refund
The question “Who are the givers and receivers of payments?” is also of theoretical 
importance. Do brides and payments move in the same direction (as is the case with 
dowry payments), or are brides and payments exchanged? Do payments flow between 
generations (as when a young man pays brideprice to a girl's parents), thus reinforcing
137
the structure of wealth and power differences between old and young; or are payments 
confined to exchanges within a single generation? These are essential questions which 
may be addressed in a study of marriage payments.
The theoretical literature on marriage payments has often been confused by a lack 
of precise definition of types of payments. In this thesis, I will adopt the terminology of 
Spiro (1975), Comaroff (1980), and others who distinguish four principal types of 
marriage payments. Dowry refers to property given by the bride’s kin to the bride 
(although often under the supervision of the husband) a t  the time of marriage. Dower 
refers to property given by the bridegroom’s kin to the bridegroom at the time of 
marriage. Brideprice or bridewealth refers to the property given by the groom a nd /o r  his 
family to the bride’s parents, while groomprice or groomwealth refers to property given 
by the bride an d /o r  her family to the groom’s parents (c/. Spiro, 1975: 89; Comaroff 
1980: 4). Although isolated instances of groomwealth have been reported (Nash, 1978), 
it is generally considered to be an extremely infrequent form of marriage payment, if it 
in fact exists at all (Goody, 1973; Comaroff, 1980). It is my intention to show tha t  the 
practice of groomprice is widespread both in the study area, and in North Indian society 
as a whole, and thus merits much greater theoretical consideration.
Marriage payments have a long and varied tradition in Indian society. The ancient 
Smriti texts recognize four approved forms of marriage, three of which involve 
mandatory economic exchanges.1 2345678 Although cases of dowry were reported among the 
royal families, it is probable tha t  the more frequent type of payment among the common
1. These are:
1. Brahma - the gift of a girl bedecked with ornaments;
2. Daiva - the gift of a girl (with or without ornaments) to an officiating priest during the 
performance of a religious ceremony;
3. Arsha - the receipt of a wife in exchange for a gift of cattle by the groom’s family; and
4. Prajaptya - similar to the Brahma form.
The disapproved (but nonetheless recognized) forms of marriage are:
5. Asura - purchase of a bride;
6. Gandharva - love marriage;
7. Rakshasa - marriage by capture;
8. Paisacha - marriage by rape of an unconscious or intoxicated woman (Avasthi, 1979: 
36-44).
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people in ancient times was brideprice (Altekar, 1959: 69-70). The practice of dowry as 
an affectionate gift given from the bride’s father to the bride upon her marriage has been 
mentioned in classical texts as early as the third Century B.C. (Thomas, 1964: 73), 
although brideprice was the more common form of marriage payment.
The dowry system is connected with the conception of marriage as a dana  or 
gift. A religious gift in kind is usually accompanied by a gift in cash or gold. So 
the gift of a bride also was accompanied by a formal and small gift in cash or 
ornaments ... The dowry system had become a positive evil of great magnitude 
in R ajpu tana  from about the 13th or 14th century A.D ... Elsewhere! the 
amount of the dowry was a nominal one. It was a voluntary gift of pure 
affection and presented no impediment in the settlement of the daughter’s 
marriage till the middle of the 19th century (Altekar, 1959: 71).
However, in the past hundred years, and especially since World W ar II, the entry 
of educated Indians into professional jobs has led to competition for educated 
bridegrooms, and an inflation in the amount of dowry demanded by these men. At the 
same time, men from lower educational and sta tus  groups felt compelled to raise their 
s ta tus by emulating the behavior of their social superiors, and the problem of dowry has 
been passed on to the middle and lower rungs of the social hierarchy.
But an examination of dowry alone neglects the extreme complexity and diversity 
of contemporary Indian marriage payments. For example, despite the recent expansion 
of dowry problems, payments of brideprice are still common in India among particular 
sub groups of the population - notably Harijans, Tribals, and Himalayan groups 
(Government of India, 1974: 69). Even among dowry weddings, prestations are not 
characterized by a single payment from the bride's parents to the bride. Rather the 
common practice is tha t  of a complex series of countervailing payments of varying 
content and size, and involving exchanges between the relatives of both bride and 
groom. For example, in his study of a Madhya Pradesh village, Mayer outlines the types 
of payments occurring in typical rural weddings (see Table 6.1). From this it is apparent 
tha t  several different types of payment are often simultaneously incorporated into the 
economic exchanges of a single wedding. Thus, in assessing the nature of payments one 
must observe the types of countervailing economic exchanges which occur, together with
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TABLE 6.1
M ARRIAGE PAYM ENTS R E PO R T E D  BY MAYER (1960) 
FOR A MADHYA PRADESH VILLAGE
Payments by Groom ’s Family Payments by Bride’s Family
Engagement
G room ’s family give ornaments to the 
bride.
Groom ’s family give annual gifts of 
clothes to the bride during the 
engagement period.
Wedding
Groom ’s family present clothes to bride 
and give cash payment to bride's family 
family to help defray expenses
Bride’s parents provide dowry to bride 
consisting of furniture, vessels, jewellery, 
and cash.
Bride’s close agnates give gifts of clothes to 
groom and his agnates.
Bride’s family feast groom's retinue and kin.
Source: Tam biah, 1973: 99.
the relative amounts of money and value of goods given and received; and also assess 
who has the ultimate and effective control over the goods after the wedding.
The latter point is quite important in tha t  the person who has effective control 
over the disposal of goods received in marriage prestations is often in a position to 
recoup his losses vis-a-vis the payments which he has made. In this regard it has been 
my observation th a t  the majority of marriage payments in the study village and in most 
of rural north India more closely resemble brideprice and groomprice, rather than dowry 
and dower, because, with the prevailing norm of extended family residence, the 
payments received in marriages are most often under the effective control of the older 
generation. Thus, although many people speak in terms of dowry to the bride, in fact the 
cash and goods paid by the girl's parents are most often controlled by the head of the
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husband’s extended family and the young wife has little say in the distribution or 
disposal of the items of her dowry. In my interviews, many young wives reported that 
the clothes and household items of their dowries were distributed among members of the 
extended family, and were not retained by them. Similarly, although ornaments given by 
the groom’s family to the bride formed a major component of wedding expenses, reports 
were common of the parents of the groom later reclaiming these ornaments in order to 
give them in the subsequent wedding of a daughter or other relative. Hooja states:
The mother-in-law enjoys full authority  to use the dowry; and immediately 
after the marriage it is she or the sister-in-law who gives clothes to the new 
bride to wear. She willy-nilly agrees to their wishes. In case of disputes she is 
considered aggressive and unreasonable. Sometimes the mother-in-law locks up 
some of the bride’s things to give them to her daughter of marriageable age. If 
the daughter-in-law tries to interfere in the discretionary choice of her 
mother-in-law, it leads to disagreement and disruption in the family and 
creates an unbridgeable gulf between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law ...
It is clear from the above analysis tha t  the relatives of the bridegroom do enjoy 
the property brought by the bride ... If money is given along with other 
articles of utility, it goes to the head of the family. The patriarchal system 
allows money to go to the father-in-law (Hooja, 1969: 9-10).
Thus, it must be remembered th a t  although the amounts of money spent by the 
bride’s and groom’s families may be quite similar, owing to patrilocal residence it is the 
groom’s family who most often gain effective control over and later benefit of the 
marriage gifts; they may in fact reclaim, sell or give away these goods virtually at will. 
Due to the powerlessness of the young bride in her husband’s family, there is very little 
tha t  she can do to retain her property, or prevent such redistributions.
M ARRIAGE EXPENSES IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC  
AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
An examination of the payments surrounding marriages can be of interest to 
demographers, both because of their oft-noted effects in inhibiting marriage negotiations 
and thus delaying the age at marriage, and also for the purpose of documenting the 
nature of intergenerational wealth flow's at a specific point in time, i.e. marriage, and 
therefore providing some insight into the application of Caldwell’s (1976) intergenera-
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tional wealth flows theory as applied to India. In the current study, I collected da ta  on 
the amount of total expenditures of the husbands' and wives’ families for the 166 
marriages selected in my 40 percent group. In addition, I collected further details of the 
exact nature of expenditures for most of these families, although this information was 
not consistent enough in form to allow me to code and analyze it quantitatively.
When information on total expenses was analyzed, I found a strong relationship 
between amount of expenditure and the economic sta tus, occupation, education, and 
caste of the individuals and families involved. These variables were all significant at the 
.01 percent level, with the exception of caste, which was significant a t  the .05 level. 
However, although all of the other variables retained their significance when the effects 
of additional variables were controlled for by means of partial correlation, caste became 
an insignificant factor when economic status was controlled for, indicating th a t  it had 
little effect on total expenditures independent of economic status. However, total 
expenditure is not the most im portant factor in an understanding of marriage expenses, 
and customs influencing the content, timing, returnability , and eventual controller of 
marriage payments were primarily discussed by villagers as customs varying between 
caste groups. Therefore, a discussion of variations by caste is useful, although it must be 
acknowledged that the primary forces creating such variations (at least in total 
expenditures) are economic.
As the da ta  used in this chapter were collected by retrospective questioning as well 
as by direct observation, some adjustment for changes in the value of the rupee over the 
three decades previous to the study was necessary to ensure comparability of the da ta  
over time. It should be noted tha t  all values given in this and subsequent tables are 
adjusted for the inflation of the rupee given in the consumer price indices published by 
the Reserve Bank of India in its annual reports (Reserve Bank of India, 1954-1983), with 
the value of the rupee in 1981-82 taken as the standard. Since the real purchasing power 
of the rupee in 1981-82 was only approximately one fifth of its 1954 value, this 
adjustment was necessary to ensure comparability of the aggregated da ta  over time.
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However, when individual case studies are discussed in the text, the actual values of cash 
and goods given are indicated, together with the year of reference. Another 
methodological concern relates to the comparison of current traits  such as economic or 
occupational s ta tus  with da ta  on marriage expenditures over the past 30 years. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, little economic or occupational mobility has occurred in the 
study area, and the temporal consistency of the results presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 is 
high. On this basis, I have included all marriages for the past 30 years in the 
computation of these tables - a procedure which was in any case necessary because of the 
small sample size, and which did not seem to produce any systematic bias in the results.
V a r ia tio n s  in M arriage  E xp en ses  by C aste
It can be seen from Table 6.2 tha t  there is a general relationship between the 
average economic sta tus  of the caste group and the amount which they spend on their 
weddings. In particular the higher caste and more economically powerful Brahmin, 
Srivastav, and Baniya families go to considerable trouble to present a conspicuous 
display of wealth in the marriages occurring in their families. However, the 
disproportionate amount of money spent by the boy's family in these cases does not 
represent any tendency towards brideprice among these castes, but rather is due to the 
fact tha t  the majority of marriages enumerated involved the marriages of boys from the 
powerful families of the study village with girls from comparatively less politically 
powerful families from neighboring villages. Also, as this group includes some of the 
most influential families of the village, there wras a greater tendency for these families to 
display their high social and economic status in terms of conspicuous spending. For 
example, in a 1972 marriage of a Srivastav boy, the girl’s family spent a to ta l of Rs. 
6,000. This included Rs. 700 cash given in the Lagun  ceremony; Rs. 800 worth of goods 
including clothing, cooking utensils and a watch for the bridegroom; and about Rs. 4,500 
on the wedding expenses, including the hiring of a priest, and the feeding, 
accommodation and a contribution towards the transport costs of the guests. Meanwhile 
the boy’s family spent Rs. 15,000 on gold and silver jewelry for the bride, and a further
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TABLE 6.2
AVERAGE W EDDING EXPENSES OF HUSBANDS’ AND 
W IVES’ FAMILIES BY CASTE
Avg. Expenses 
for Boys’ 
Caste Families1
Avg. Expenses 
for Girls’ Ex
Families1 Ratio
pense
Index
Economic 
3 Cases
No. of
HIGH STATUS CASTES 
Brahmin 46,900 38,400 122 15 3
Thakur 4,600 6,700 69 8 15
Srivastav 28,200 22,400 126 22 4
Baniya 16,700 13,500 124 6 3
INTERMEDIATE STATUS CASTES 
Kacchi (village) 2,400 1,900 126 1 27
Kacchi (hamlet) 2,400 1,800 133 0 23
Jotsi 6,300 5,600 113 -2 3
Kisan (hamlet) 5,800 4,000 241 7 18
Kahar 2,600 2,100 123 -8 18
Darzi 3,200 4,000 80 -5 2
Khori 1,800 1,200 150 -5 5
Teli 4,000 2,100 190 -8 3
Burgi 3,900 1,100 355 -7 6
SCHEDULED CASTES
Nai 4,200 1,300 323 -2 3
Dhobi 10,900 5,700 191 -7 13
Chamar 7,400 2,400 308 -6 5
Dhanuk 6,100 4,100 149 -4 5
Bhangi 5,500 5,100 108 -6 4
NON-HINDUS
Muslims 4,400 3.400 129 -6 6
1 .
2 .
In 1981-82 adjusted rupees.
Average Total Expense, Boy’s 
F amily
Expense Ratio =  ------------ ---------------- : ---- —
Average lo ta l expense, Girl s I amily
X 100.
3. This index represents an approximation of the economic status of the various caste 
groups, and is constructed primarily from information on ownership of land, 
animals, farm and house implements, and other material possessions. For discussion 
of the construction of this index, see Chapter 1 and Appendix A.
Rs. 2,000 on clothing for the bride and her near relatives. When the girl came to live in 
her husband’s extended family, she brought the Rs. 15.000 worth of jewelry, and 1,500
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of the Rs. 2,000 spent on clothes with her, as well as the goods given by her parents (the 
cash had been handed over previously), adding this to the total household pool of 
resources. While this family is rich enough tha t  the issue of the sale of the bride’s 
jewelry or personal effects to meet household expenses had not arisen, considerable 
redistribution of the items of her dowry did occur, as various items of clothing and 
jewelry were shared out among the other female members of the extended family, or put 
away to be given in future weddings. In this regard, the rights of the family head and his 
wife to sell or redistribute the items of the dowry are recognized by the entire family, 
including (somewhat reluctantly) the young wife. Thus, although the wedding involved 
considerable expenditure by the boy’s family, nearly this entire amount of money 
returned to the house with the girl, while the expenditure of the girl’s parents was 
permanently lost to them.
The Thakurs, although also a high status caste group, exhibit a completely 
different pattern  of wedding expenditure. Theirs is the only caste group which exhibits a 
consistently higher level of expenditure for bride’s families than for groom’s families, 
boys families’ expenditures averaging only 69 percent of girls’ families’ expenditures. 
(The higher level of expense for brides’ than grooms’ families indicated in Darzi 
weddings is not conclusive, since it is based upon only two cases.) For example, in the 
marriage of the daughter of one of the richest Thakurs in the village, the girl’s father 
gave Rs. 10,000 cash, a watch, bicycle, and other goods totalling Rs. 6,000 and spent Rs. 
8,000 on wedding expenses. In contrast, the boy’s family, although also quite affluent, 
spent only about Rs. 5,000, primarily on clothes and jewelry in addition to giving some 
old jewelry borrowed from one of the other young wives of the husband’s house. Thus, in 
extreme cases the cash gift given by the bride’s family at the Lagun  ceremony may 
sometimes equal or exceed the entire outlay of wedding expenses incurred by the groom ’s 
family.
The Thakurs are on average less affluent than their Brahmin or Srivastav 
neighbors. However, theirs is the second most numerous caste group in the village, and
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one which is socially and politically dominant. Theirs is a K s h a tn y a  or warrior caste, 
which places great emphasis on male machismo, patriarchy and extended family 
residence, and takes great pride in their alleged purity of descent from legendary warrior 
kings. Because of this, Thakur women are more strictly secluded and subject to greater 
restrictions on their movements than the women of almost any other caste group 
(although the other high caste women are also strictly secluded, these families are also 
somewhat more progressive owing to their greater urban contacts and higher educational 
atta inm ents). Because of the specific cultural characteristics of this caste group, Thakur 
women have more of an exaggeratedly low sta tus in relation to Thakur men than is the 
case in any other caste group. In this situation, more money must be paid to the high 
status male to shoulder the burden of a very low status wife who although working long 
hours has fewer opportunities to make a direct and highly visible social and economic 
contribution to the extended family.
Among the intermediate and lower s tatus caste groups, wedding forms and 
expenses vary greatly according to the relative social and economic sta tus  of the bride 
and groom, and the vagaries of the marriage market. Elements of brideprice and 
groomprice (called dowry by the villagers) are both pronounced in the weddings of 
villagers of these castes. However, the existence of brideprice is not always easy to 
identify in individual cases, because of the ambiguous nature of the two-way exchanges 
of cash and goods associated with Indian weddings, and also because of the reluctance of 
villagers to admit to the payment of brideprice, which is considered to be a lower class 
and shameful practice. As was illustrated in the example of high caste weddings, the 
mere fact of a greater expenditure by the groom's family does not necessarily denote a 
brideprice situation, since many of the goods given by the boy’s family will return with 
the bride to the boy’s house. W hat is needed to indicate brideprice is more specific 
information confirming either a cash payment from the boy’s to the girl’s family, or 
concrete evidence tha t  a substantial amount of the gifts in kind given by the groom’s 
parents actually remained with the bride’s parents, and did not return with the bride to 
the husband’s village upon consummation of the marriage.
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Bahn K haridna  or the buying of a bride is considered to be a shameful act in 
Hindu culture, the preferred form of marriage being a “dowry” type. When brideprice is 
paid it is given in a secret transaction between the bride's and groom's parents and the 
fact of its payment is hidden even from relatives and fellow villagers. In addition, a small 
amount of “dowry” is often displayed on the wedding day to give the appearance of a 
“respectable” dowry wedding. Thus, in interviews, villagers would readily list the total 
amounts of expenditures of both families in. the wedding. However when more probing 
questions revealed tha t  the au th o r’s true interest was in brideprice, responses inevitably 
became guarded, and the refusal to admit to the payment of brideprice (even when I had 
prior knowledge of its payment through the reports of informants) was common to all 
families interviewed except two with whom I had a close personal friendship. The 
payment of brideprice is often (though not exclusively) associated with dhola weddings 
(see Chapter 5) in which the wedding ceremony takes place at the groom’s rather than 
the bride’s house. So information on dhola weddings can also provide some indirect 
evidence as to the payment of brideprice in particular cases.
The grooms who end up paying brideprice are usually those who are considered 
less desirable in terms of the criteria of selection of a marriage partner (discussed in 
Chapter 5) i.e., those with less land, education or wealth, those with few living family 
members, those who are older, have physical or mental defects, or have been previously 
married. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5, problems of obstruction by fellow 
villagers, or insufficiently developed communication networks to let people outside the 
village know about the marital availability of men, can also cause delays in age at 
marriage for men. In such cases, if a m an’s marriage is delayed past the age of 25 or 30, 
the family may become desperate to get him married, and be willing to pay brideprice 
simply because the man has been overlooked in marriage offers, and consequently has 
passed what is considered to be the ideal age at marriage for males.
In brideprice, as in dowry weddings, the presence of a mediator between the two 
families is essential, but he is usually someone selected by the girl’s family as being
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closer to the girl’s family and having their interests first in his mind. The amount of 
brideprice is usually established through the conversations of both parties with the 
mediator, and is based upon both the m ediator’s assessment of how much money the 
boy’s side can afford to pay, and on his assessment of how badly they want the girl. The 
amounts of brideprice paid can vary dramatically from marriage to marriage, ranging 
from Rs. 200-300, to 5,000 or even 10,000 rupees if the groom is widowed, divorced or 
aged and desperate for a wife. The average price seems to be in the 1,000 to 2,000 rupees 
range. Although in the case of first marriages, the brideprice is usually paid by the boy’s 
family, a man who has lived independently for some time usually cannot rely upon much 
financial assistance from his family in his efforts to remarry. In such cases, a man must 
himself work hard to save up sufficient brideprice to enable his remarriage.
In some cases it is apparent tha t  the parents of the girl do not always have her 
best interests in mind, and are often more concerned with maximizing their profits in the 
marriage market than with their daughter’s future happiness. At times, such marriages 
can create misery for a young girl, but she, more often than her higher caste 
counterparts, does have the option of returning to her parents’ house, thus effecting a de 
facto divorce. Her return is more often welcomed than is the case for high caste wives, 
because the social stigma of divorce is somewhat less among the intermediate and lower 
castes, and also because her parents may hold ambitions for getting her remarried to 
another man unaware of her previous marriage, and thus claiming a second brideprice. 
Because of the market value of the woman, it seems tha t  she has greater scope for 
objecting to or fleeing from an intolerable situation. For example it was said in the 
villages that men with brideprice marriages were more reluctant to beat their wives than 
others, because these wives would be more likely to leave an intolerable husband. It can 
be argued that in brideprice marriages, the wrife has more say in the conjugal 
relationship, and is less vulnerable to m istreatment because of her greater access to the 
natal home where she will probably be welcomed and not ostracized. It also appears 
tha t ,  although still quite rare, the frequency of de facto divorce, and especially
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wife-initiated divorce is higher among the lower and intermediate caste groups who 
practice brideprice, than among higher caste families.
The monetary emphasis of some brideprice receiving families can be quite striking. 
For example, during my stay in the village, I learned of two cases in which a man had 
married a woman through brideprice, only to be abandoned several years later when the 
girl’s parents had found another man willing to pay an even higher brideprice in order to 
marry her. In one case involving a Dhobi family, the wife's parents called for her and, 
abandoning her three small children, she returned to her natal village in order to marry 
a rich divorcee who gave a large brideprice to her parents. The wom an’s husband called 
the issue before the village panchayat (council), who ruled in his favor. However, as the 
woman had already left the village, they were unable to force her to return to her 
husband, and the decision of the panchayat could not be implemented.
The most numerous caste group in the study area is the Kacchis, traditionally 
vegetable growers, and now involved in a wide range of agricultural and casual labor 
activities. Among the Kacchis, the payment of groomprice is common in the majority of 
weddings, particularly when the groom has secondary education, or comes from a family 
with substantial landholdings or considerable social influence in the villages. However, 
according to the estimates of informants, plus my own calculations as to the proportion 
of weddings in which the payment of brideprice was confirmed, such payments occur in 
approximately 15 percent of weddings in this caste group. Among the Jotsis, the 
payment of brideprice is quite rare; however, most of the other intermediate castes are 
quite similar to the Kacchis in tha t  groomprice exchanges are the most common form, 
but a cash brideprice is paid in approximately 15 to 20 percent of cases.
The difference between hamlet and village residence in relation to problems of 
communications and factionalism is illustrated in the figures on the hamlet dwelling 
Kisans found in Table 6.2. Among the Kisans, a peasant farming caste, we find an 
expense ratio of 241, the highest ratio found among non-scheduled castes. This is despite 
their extensive landholdings and relative affluence (with an economic index of 4-7). As
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discussed in Chapter 5, their relative social isolation, in combination with divisiveness 
and competition for brides, has led to an inflation in the amount of brideprice demanded 
by girls’ fathers. Often the girl is virtually given to the family who bids the highest for 
her services, creating feelings of competition and bitterness which have soured many 
aspects of hamlet social relations. Of the 18 Kisan weddings studied, eight were 
definitely of the groomprice type, seven were those in which a cash brideprice was paid, 
and three of the type in which the total expenses of the boy’s side were definitely 
greater, but the information given on the content and later distribution of wedding gifts 
was insufficient to definitely establish either brideprice or groomprice. However, 
according to informants, this greater tendency towards brideprice was not a peculiar 
tra it  of the Kisan caste, normally less inclined towards brideprice than the Kacchis, but 
was due to the conflicts present in tha t  particular hamlet.
Among the scheduled castes, we find a marked tendency toward greater expense by 
the boy’s families among the Chamars, Nais, and Dhobis. However, among the Dhanuks 
and Bhangis, considered to be at the absolute bottom of the social scale, wedding 
expenses are more balanced, and the tendency is toward more of a groomprice than a 
brideprice arrangement. For example, in a 1982 wedding of a Bhangi village girl, the 
girl’s father gave 1,000 rupees cash, some utensils and clothing, in addition to paying for 
the wedding costs. The boy’s family spent considerable money on ornaments, making for 
an average of 4,000 rupees spent by each family. The wedding was clearly a groomprice 
type, as most of these goods returned to the groom's house after the wedding. It is 
difficult to say why the Dhanuks and Bhangis would differ from the Nais, Chamars, and 
Dhobis, in adhering to a notion of groomprice; however, this could be linked to their 
awareness of their extremely low social position, and perhaps a greater desire to try to 
raise their social status by emulating higher caste practices (i.e., Sanskritization; see 
Srinivas, 1976; Dumont, 1970). Among the Chamars, Dhobis, and Nais available 
evidence plus reports from informants indicate tha t  brideprice is the prevailing marriage 
form in 35 to 45 percent of weddings. Again, the deciding factors in determining
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brideprice are primarily the educational status of the boy, and the landholdings of the 
family. As relatively few of these caste members are educated or own substantial land in 
the village, the proportion of brideprice weddings is higher than among the intermediate 
s ta tus castes.
TABLE 6.3
AVERAGE WEDDING EXPENSES OF HUSBANDS’ AND WIVES’ FAMILIES
BY ECONOMIC STATUS
Level of 
Economic 
Status1
Avg. Expenses 
for Boys’ 
Families2
Avg. Expenses 
for Girls’ 
Families2
Expense
Ratio3
No. of 
Cases
Level 1 3,700 1,900 195 24
Level 2 5,000 3,100 161 32
Level 3 4,800 3,500 137 27
Level 4 3,400 2,500 136 22
Level 5 6,300 4,100 153 16
Level 6 6,000 4,600 130 20
Level 7 12,200 10,500 116 25
1. The da ta  from my economic sta tus  index were divided into seven categories or 
relatively equal sizes, ranging from Level 1, the poorest people to Level 7, the 
richest people in the villages. For a discussion of the construction of this index, see 
Chapter 1 and Appendix A
2. In 1981-82 adjusted rupees.
Average Total Expenses, Boy’s Family
3. Expense Ratio — -----------—---- — ------------- „---- —  x 100
Average lo t a l  Expenses, Girl s r am ily
V a ria tio n s  in E xp en ses  by E con om ic S ta tu s and O ccu p ation
A comparison of average wedding expenses by economic status shows a definite 
relationship between the amount of expenditure of the husband’s and wife’s families and 
economic status (see Table 6.3). Due to the practice of village exogamy, it was not 
possible to obtain detailed information on the economic status of both families, as such a 
survey would have necessitated visits to the approximately 130 different villages of 
origin of the married women. Therefore. I have had to use the figures on the economic 
sta tus  of one family (usually the husband’s) as a proxy for full details on economic
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status. Although it is not as accurate as a composite measure, the use of this information 
should not create a systematic bias in the results as variations in wealth between 
families are largely random, and do not follow any consistent hypergamous pattern  (see 
Chapter 5). As expected, a general upward trend is noted in the expenses of both 
families with increases in wealth, with the richest and most influential families of the 
village showing a marked increase in amount of expenditure. The small fluctuations in 
the pattern  are probably due to the small size of the sample population.
Marked differences in expenditure by husband's occupation are also apparent, 
particularly in the large amount of brideprice (indicated by the high expense ratio) paid 
by sharecroppers and landless agricultural laborers (see Table 6.4). However, much of 
the absolute difference in expenditure can be a ttr ibu ted  to the sharp differentials in 
economic s ta tus  by occupation.
V a r ia tio n s  in M arriage  E x p en ses  by E d u ca tion
The rise in marriage expenses with greater education of the husband or wife is 
a ttr ibu tab le  in part to the fact th a t  most of the families which send their children for 
higher education are from the upper socio-economic s tra ta  (see Table 6.5). However, as I 
indicated in the discussion on caste, the level of total expenses of husbands' and wives" 
families does not address the issue of who obtains ultimate control over the goods given 
in marriages. Information from the in-depth interviews indicated th a t  among sons with 
higher education there was a much greater tendency to demand a large dowry or 
groomprice. At the same time, these families exhibited a much greater tendency to 
engage in a lavish display of wealth in order to reinforce the boy’s already high sta tus  in 
the community. In all of these cases, the goods did in fact return to the boy’s family 
upon consummation of the marriage. With regard to education of girls, Indian social 
custom demands tha t  in no case may the wife be more highly educated than her 
husband. Thus, since educated girls are marrying educated boys, the same principles 
apply, with the weddings being of an exclusively groomprice type, and the total expenses 
of both families being high for reasons of prestige and status.
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TABLE 6.4
AVERAGE WEDDING EXPENSES OF HUSBANDS’ AND WIVES’ FAMILIES
BY HUSBANDS’ OCCUPATION
H u s b a n d s ’ 
Occupation
Avg. Expenses 
B o y s ’ Families1
Avg. Expenses 
G i r l s ’ Families1
Expense
Ratio2
N o . of 
Cases
High-Status Non- 
Agricultural3 10,600 9,500 111 15
Landowning
Farmer 6,100 4,300 142 103
Sharecropper or
Agricultural
Labourer 4,100 2,900 164 22
Low status Non-
Agricultural3 5,700 3,500 163 12
1. In 1981-82 adjusted rupees.
Average T otal Expenses, B oy’s Fam ily
2. Expense Ratio =  -----------~---- — -------------. v, ^-----T-  x 100.
Average lo t a l  Expenses, Girl s fa m ily
3. High sta tus non-agricultural occupations include village officials, teachers, 
shopkeepers, army recruits, police officers, mill operators, etc., while low status 
non-agricultural occupations include barber, tailor, washerman, sweeper, laborers on 
road construction, and door-to-door vendors.
C hanges Over T im e
Before moving on to a discussion of conflicts in marriage expenditure it is 
necessary to comment briefly on the temporal consistency of the pattern  of marriage 
payments outlined above. The results from the current study indicate little or no change 
in total expenditure over time. Once an adjustment was made for inflation of the rupee, 
correlation coefficients indicated no significant relation between total expenditure and 
the date of marriage over the 30 years prior to the study. Much discussion has been 
devoted in recent years to the evils of the dowry system, giving the impression tha t  the 
cost of weddings even after controlling for inflation has increased dramatically. However, 
I have not seen any detailed quantita tive  studies which document an absolute increase in
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TABLE 6.5
AVERAGE WEDDING EXPENSES OF HUSBANDS’ AND WIVES’ FAMILIES 
BY EDUCATION OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
Years of Avg. Expenses Avg. Expenses Expense No. of
Schooling Boys’ Families1 Girls’ Families1 Ratio2 Cases
Education o f  Husband
0 4 ,5 0 0 3 ,3 0 0 136 68
1-5 4 ,6 0 0 2 ,6 0 0 177 34
6-8 4 ,3 0 0 2 ,8 0 0 154 25
9-10 8 ,1 0 0 5 ,9 0 0 137 23
11 + 14 ,000 12,400 113 16
Education o f  Wi fe
0 4 ,5 0 0 2 ,8 0 0 160 127
1-5 9 ,7 0 0 8 ,8 0 0 110 26
6-8 10,300 7 ,9 0 0 130 10
9 - 123 17,400 16 ,800 104 3
1. In 1981-82 adjusted rupees.
Average T ota l Expense, B oy’s Fam ily
2. Expense Ratio =  -----------“ ---- — ---------- . ,, _-------— x 100.
Average lo t a l  Expense, Girl s fa m ily
3. There were no married women in the villages with greater than a twelfth grade 
education.
the amount of wedding expenditure over the past 30-40 years, once both inflation and 
economic status are controlled for. Certainly the emergence of the Indian feminist 
movement has led to a greater public awareness of dowry problems. Another 
explanation for the greater concern over dowry in recent years may relate to the 
emergence of a substantial educated middle class in India. Indian history shows us that 
the custom of dowry began among royalty and the wealthy educated classes, and spread 
to the peasantry. The amount of dowries paid by the wealthy has always far exceeded 
what has been paid by the peasantry. While the real value of wedding expenditure for 
families of each socio-economic s tra tum  may not have changed over the past 30 years, it 
is probable tha t  a greater proportion of the population than before belong to the 
educated middle and upper classes, and are thus subject to higher rates of dowry 
expenditure.
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In-depth interviews indicated tha t  while villagers sometimes spoke of dowry 
inflation, it was mainly in the context of the weddings of university-educated young men 
aspiring to professional jobs. Among this group, the amount of groomprice demanded is 
much higher than among less educated young men. One village family in searching for a 
match for their B.A. educated daughter reported th a t  many educated boys’ families were 
demanding payments of 40.000 to 50,000 rupees cash, plus the usual consumer goods and 
lavish wedding feast. Although the girl’s family was willing to give Rs. 20,000 cash, they 
could not afford 50,000, and the girl’s marriage had been delayed for three years through 
the parents’ inability to find a suitable bridegroom who would accept a smaller payment. 
Thus, the results from the current study indicate tha t  there has been little or no real 
change in the size of marriage payments among the study villages, and tha t  what change 
has occurred has been due to a structural change in the village population, rather than 
to a real change in the system of marriage payments, as 30 years ago there was no 
comparable group of university-educated village youth.
As regards style of negotiation in relation to marriage payments, the main change 
noted across all socio-economic s tra ta  was in the more openly monetary nature of 
current marriage negotiations. Villagers stated tha t  whereas before, the discussion of 
dowry was veiled in politeness and indirect negotiation, and was more a reflection of the 
am ount of money tha t  the girl’s family wanted to give, now the custom among an 
increasing number of families is for the parents of the groom to baldly state  to all comers 
the amount of cash money required to purchase a marriage to their son. This practice, 
originally s tarted  with the educated classes, was at the time of my fieldwork spreading 
to the higher caste peasantry, as families began to feel if their more educated neighbors 
were demanding set amounts of money, why should they not do the same?
CONFLICTS OVER M ARRIAGE PA YM ENTS
Although conflicts or problems involving marriage payments were evident to some 
degree throughout the study population, it was among the higher educated group that
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these conflicts assumed their severer forms. We have already discussed the problems of 
payment of brideprice in relation to village factionalism, divorce and desertion, and 
permanent celibacy for males. Conflicts over marriage expenses were also fairly common 
among the less educated groups which traditionally transacted groomprice weddings. In 
the village, if a groom or his family is unhappy about the amount of money or quality of 
gifts given by the bride’s family they can protest in several ways. They can refuse to go 
through with some aspect of the wedding ceremonies until more goods are produced. Or, 
if the disagreement over marriage payments occurs after the wedding, they can nag the 
young wife to get her parents to send more gifts, and, if these are not forthcoming, they 
can beat and m istreat her so tha t  the wife’s parents, fearing for her happiness or 
sometimes for her life, will feel compelled to send more gifts. Occasionally, the 
husband’s family may simply neglect to call her back after one of her visits to her 
paren ts’ house. However, this tactic is more commonly employed in cases where the wife 
is unable to produce a son, than in conflicts over marriage expenses, as the m istreatm ent 
of young wives has been found to be a more effective method for the collection of 
payments.
For example, during one Thakur wedding which I attended, in the middle of the 
wedding ceremonies, the bridegroom suddenly refused to perform an essential ceremonial 
function (pushing the two candle wicks together to make one wick), and said tha t  he 
would first have to receive a gold ring before he would proceed any further with the 
wedding. All of the bride’s relatives were very upset. They told the boy th a t  if he had 
asked for the ring previously, they could have bought it, but now, on the spur of the 
moment they were unable to get it. The girl’s relatives began offering him small 
amounts of cash (five or ten rupees each tha t  they happened to have in their pockets) in 
an effort to appease him. The groom was becoming angry. He refused the money, and 
attem pted  to get up and walk out of the wedding. The bride's female relatives were 
physically restraining him, waving the extra money collected in his face and asking him 
to be reasonable. They continued thus for about 15 minutes in this impasse. Meanwhile,
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the bride, heavily veiled and beautifully bejewelled, was sitting next to her husband on 
the reed mats, and witnessing the whole interaction. Finally, after some further 
persuasion, the bridegroom pushed the two candle wicks together. However, he was still 
angry and grumbling and refusing to take the 23 rupees being offered. It was obvious 
tha t  although the wedding ceremonies were now complete, the bride’s family had not 
heard the last of this issue, and tha t  the groom still intended to collect his gold ring 
after the wedding, most probably by threatening to ill-treat the young bride if it were 
not forthcoming.
In northern India in recent years, there has been much public discussion of the 
custom of “bride-burning” , in which a young wife is tortured in efforts to collect more 
money, and sometimes murdered in cases where additional money is not forthcoming. 
This custom is much more prevalent among the upper and more educated s tra ta  of 
society than among the peasantry (Kishwar and Vanita, 1984: 32; M azumdar, 1976: 52). 
Among the poorer peasant families, women are valued more as contributors of essential 
household labor than in families rich enough to have servants. More im portantly , the 
absolute amount of the dowry is much greater among the educated middle and upper 
classes, and is more often sufficient tem ptation to precipitate a murder.
I believe th a t  this brutal practice is exacerbated by two common Indian customs. 
One is the extreme social stigma attached to divorce. The second is th a t  despite a well 
established legal concept of str idhana  or women’s property, which should remain under 
the control of the woman, and should be returnable to the woman upon divorce, or to 
her family upon her death without issue (Tambiah, 1973), the de facto custom, universal 
in Northern India, is of the non-returnability of the dowry, even if divorce or death is 
due to the cruelty of the husband and is not the wife’s fault.
This trend is illustrated by Verghese in an example of a woman who had just
obtained a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.
Return the dowry? W hat are you saying behenji [sister;? The day I entered 
their home, my mother-in-law took away all my jewellery from my body and
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said it is to be in the bank for safety. My fifty-one beautiful saris and my all 
clothes -- They are still with them. One key “she" had and one key uher> had. I 
have lived in my these four saris which I am washing for past three years 
(Verghese, 1980: 107).
In the case of control over women’s property, the reality of contemporary social practice 
is in direct contradiction to the social and legal concepts of the society held by both 
ancient legal texts and contemporary law.
Although certain elements of mistreatm ent of young wives (i.e. denial of food and 
clothing, verbal and physical abuse) over dowry were present in many marriages in the 
study area, this abuse only reached its extreme form - tha t  of the murder of the wife - in 
the case of the most educated man in the village, the village Ayurvedic doctor. After 
receiving his degree in Ayurvedic medicine, Manoj, a Kacchi by caste, contracted to 
marry an educated city girl, the daughter of a doctor. The wedding took place in 1980, 
and Manoj received a substantial dowry from the girl’s family. However, Manoj had 
requested a motorcycle to enable him to go back and forth to work, in the event tha t  he 
could get a job in a hospital. Although the girl’s father promised to give the motorcycle, 
after the wedding it was not forthcoming. Also, Manoj had thought that the girl’s father 
would be able to help him get a good job in medicine, a hope which did not materialize. 
Since he was unable to find a job, he was still living in the village with his widowed 
mother, and his wife, raised in an affluent city family, found difficulty learning and 
adjusting to the hard labor required of village women in such work as the processing of 
crops, and the tending of animals. Although this was a factor in marital 
incompatibility, the main issue was the absence of the motorcycle, the possession of 
which would have made Manoj feel like a big man around the village.
Soon after the wedding, Manoj began nagging his wife to get her parents to send 
it. He used to beat her almost daily, and the neighbors would hear her screams. He and 
his mother would torture her by denying her food and water. Although she wrote 
terrified letters to her father, he was unable to provide the motorcycle. One morning, 
after about one year of marriage, she was found dead, hanged in the courtyard of her
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husband’s house. Manoj and his mother claimed tha t  she had committed suicide. 
However, the considered opinion of the entire village was that Manoj and his mother had 
murdered her.
Since the event happened within the courtyard walls, and there were no witnesses 
to the murder, nothing was done about it. The biggest problem in the prosecution of 
“bride-burning ’1 cases is tha t  the murder happens within the house, without outside 
witnesses. As murder - as opposed to suicide or an accident - usually cannot be proven 
without a witness to the crime, the husband's family most often gets off scot-free, and, 
after a few months, the husband is able to remarry, again receiving an exorbitant dowry. 
After about a year, Manoj married again. This time, he married a village girl who 
quickly adjusted to village life, as he had by this time given up his a ttem pts  to get a 
professional job. As her family had paid a large groomprice for a marriage to such an 
“educated” man, Manoj and his mother were not unpleased. Now Manoj walks around 
the village, a satisfied man, although he still does not have his motorcycle.
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C H A P T E R  7
S U M M A R Y  A N D  CO N C LU SIO N S
The purpose of this study was to obtain a detailed understanding of marriage 
practices and their social and demographic implications in a rural north Indian area. In 
evaluating the broader implications of this information, one must go beyond descriptions 
of social and demographic behavior, and evaluate the functions and meanings of these 
behaviors in Indian society, and the broader implications of changes in these customs for 
cultural, social, and demographic change. In this regard, it is apparent tha t  marriage 
cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be evaluated within the wider context of the 
prevailing norms and values of the society. I will venture such an evaluation here, 
beginning with a summary of the main points outlined in the preceding chapters.
SUM M ARY AND DISCUSSION
In Chapter 2 we looked at the nature of daily life and activity cycles and village 
social relations. Interactions both within a single family and between families are based 
upon strong systems of stratification of individuals by age, sex and caste. Although 
persons occupying the top of the social stratification system with regard to these three 
factors enjoy considerable freedom and privilege within the society, others occupying the 
lower rungs of the social ladder are considerably restricted in their actions and 
expressions. These restrictions are so forceful and ubiquitous tha t  they not only restrict 
a person's outward behaviors, but, especially for women, profoundly affect their 
personality development, suppressing in them much individual initiative, desire for 
self-decision-making, or awareness of possible alternatives. As regards child-rearing, even 
among young boys, the concepts of respect and unquestioning obedience to elders creates 
young men largely untrained in independence of thought or action. Decisions about
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education, employment, and marriage are made by the elder generation with the idea of 
maximum benefit to the extended family group, but with little regard for the individual 
personalities and potentialities of various family members. The roles of people in various 
relational situations (i.e. mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, young son, older uncle, etc.) 
are concretely and narrowly defined, so tha t  little personal stress or confusion as to 
proper behavior is encountered in everyday social situations. Conversely, any person who 
does deviate from his/her assigned role is severely chastized, and interpersonal relations 
are so structurally controlled th a t  little leeway is allowed for personal expression or 
communication except among persons of relatively equal social status.
Relations between members of different castes are still largely based upon 
unofficial systems of power and patronage, related to hereditary caste membership, as 
well as to the strength (both numerical and political) of various lineages. Except when 
used as a tool in personal confrontations between rivals, the formal legal systems of the 
country intrude little into everyday village interactions. When they do, the outcome is 
primarily dependent upon the relative power and sta tus of the two disputants, rather 
than upon more objective concepts of the justice or legality of the situation.
The concentration of material wealth in the hands of the high s ta tus  caste 
members was examined in a more quantitative fashion in Chapter 3. The high sta tus 
castes have a higher economic status, and an average size of landholding which is more 
than twice the average for the intermediate or lower caste groups. Land shortages were 
chronic in the study area, and 44 percent of village households owned less than one acre 
of land. As regards occupation, while 93 percent of the high caste males employed in 
non-agricultural occupations were able to obtain high status jobs, only 5.9 percent of the 
scheduled caste men employed outside of agriculture were able to obtain such jobs. 
Instead, these scheduled caste men were overwhelmingly still employed in low paid and 
traditional service occupations such as barber, cobbler, sweeper, washerman, etc. The 
traditional ja jm a n i  system of payments for these services has largely, though not 
completely, broken down, leading to a worsening of the economic condition of many of
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these families, as many higher caste families still feel that they have a God-given right to 
services, regardless of whether payments have been regularly made.
The prevailing norms of purdah  and female seclusion greatly limit the ability of 
women to participate in employment and educational activities. Over 90 percent of 
women were employed solely as “housewives” , the other 10 percent being primarily 
involved in occasional agricultural work (usually only available on the rare occasions 
when sufficient male workers could not be found), or in behind-the-scenes work for male 
family members involved in tailoring, washing clothes, and shopkeeping. These female 
helpers had little or no contact with customers, and no control over the money earned 
from their labor, as all outside roles of taking orders or delivering the finished goods 
were performed by men.
Strong caste and sex differentials were also apparent in the da ta  on educational 
a tta inm ent of villagers. The educational a tta inm ents  of high caste males, shown by 
percentage of children currently attending school and by average educational a tta inm ent 
of adult villagers, were nearly twice those of scheduled caste males. For females, these 
differentials were even more pronounced. While primary school a ttendance among high 
caste females was nearly equal to tha t  of high caste men, these women were not able to 
a ttend the secondary school in the neighboring village, as the purdah  ideology precluded 
their movement outside of the village without adult male chaperonage. However, these 
women were luckier than their less advantaged sisters, as the da ta  collected in the study 
indicate tha t  no scheduled caste female had ever attended school in the history of the 
study area.
Indirect estimates of fertility and mortality based on information on children ever 
born and surviving in the study area, yielded a total fertility rate of seven for the study 
population. Although infant mortality is still quite high, it had declined substantially in 
the 25 years prior to the study, from an estimated rate of 210 in 1965-69 to a rate of 
approximately 160 in 1979. This decline in mortality in combination with the still high 
fertility and infrequent use of family planning methods (with only four percent of couples
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15-49 protected by family planning in 1983) has led to an increase in the rate of 
population growth, estimated at 2.25 percent per annum in Farrukhabad district for the 
1971-1981 decade.
Patterns and variations in age at marriage were examined in Chapter 4. The 
substantial increases in mean age at marriage during this century for all-India contrast 
with the smaller increases for U ttar  Pradesh, and the even smaller increases for 
Farrukhabad district, these differences being* related to general developmental indicators. 
For the study population, although male age at marriage has fluctuated considerably, 
the net effect has been tha t  of a possible slight increase in age at marriage for males, 
which when combined with a decrease in the waiting time between marriage and 
consummation, has led to little change in age at effective marriage for males. While age 
at marriage has increased steadily for females, this increase has been offset by a sharp 
decline in the waiting period between marriage and gauna , leading to no appreciable 
change in age at effective marriage for females. This sharp decline in the time lag 
between marriage and gauna , from an average of 2.0 years in 1930-39 to 0.8 years in 
1980-83, seems to indicate that part of the rise in age at marriage in the district and 
s ta te  documented in the census has been due to a change in the age of ceremonial (not 
effective) marriage.
Differentials in age at marriage by education, caste, and occupation of husband 
were observed, as well as substantial variations based on such factors as the death, 
sickness, or absence of various relatives capable of seeing to the marriage arrangements, 
the shifting labor needs of the natal or marital family, the advice of the village 
astrologer, or changes in a family's Financial situation.
Chapter 5 describes the nature of marriage arrangements in the study area. 
Marriages are overwhelmingly parentally arranged, with a large number of friends and 
relatives assisting in the search for a potential partner, but with the parents of the bride 
or groom usually being the primary decision-makers as to whether a specific marriage 
offer will be accepted or rejected. Relatives or family friends were usually the
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matchmakers in village marriages, with women primarily involved in the location of 
prospective partners and their husbands assuming the active role of mediating in the 
discussions between the two families. Although some attention was given to previewing 
and evaluating potential grooms in order to determine their suitability for marriage, the 
vast majority of families did not view the bride before marriage, instead relying on the 
advice of the matchmaker, and in fact, the closeness of relationship and trust between 
the m atchmaker and the seeking family was probably the most im portant factor in 
determining whether a given marriage offer would be accepted.
Potential brides and grooms are evaluated on the basis of characteristics 
considered to be desirable in a marriage partner. These criteria of selection differ 
considerably for bride and groom, but in the case of both, they are primarily based upon 
considerations im portant to the extended family group, rather than upon individual 
characteristics which would lead to the formation of a strong conjugal relationship. The 
field of marriage selection is circumscribed by strict rules of caste and kinship, which 
restricts the universe of potential partners to only a small fraction of the population, 
thus creating a highly hierarchical and regulated system of marital alliances.
Arranged marriage is considered to have a number of important benefits to the 
society in reinforcing parental control, enhancing the solidarity of the kinship group, 
strengthening the power of the elder generation, and in maintaining the systems of social 
stratification, by caste and class. Love marriage is strongly disapproved of as the person 
so selected may not belong to the correct caste or class. However, even when the person 
selected does belong to the correct social group, love marriage is further disapproved of 
because it removes the decision-making power from the elder generation, and more 
importantly, because it creates strong emotional bonds between husband and wife: bonds 
which are both feared and disapproved of as possibly interfering with or superceding the 
normally param ount loyalty of the son to his parents and patrilineal kin group. Many 
institutionalized practices in Indian society, such as the lack of privacy of young couples, 
and the strict formality of interaction required in front of others on the grounds of
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modesty and shame, serve to limit the formation of a strong conjugal bond. Thus, a 
young wife is required to veil her face with her sari when her husband enters the house, 
and may not speak to him directly when any elder family members are present. Men and 
women usually sleep in separate rooms, so even at night there is little opportunity  for 
conversation and acquaintance between spouses.
Exogamy and early marriage can also be seen as practices which lower the status 
of young brides, as the young wife is isolated from the support of her natal family, and 
when little more than a girl goes to live in her husband’s extended family. The fact that 
villagers were aware of and appreciated these issues was illustrated in responses from 
in-depth interviews. Many villagers s tated tha t  they were reluctant to accept a bride 
from a neighboring village or from the mother-in-law’s natal village, as they did not 
want the bride’s natal family to know if she was having any adjustment problems in the 
husband’s family, and as they feared tha t  she might be more familiar and less likely to 
obey than  girls from distant villages.
In chapter 6 we found th a t  although the majority of marriage payments in the 
study area are commonly termed dahej  or dowry, in fact the effective control over the 
cash and goods received in dowry was overwhelmingly in the hands of the head of the 
husband’s extended family group: thus the payment was effectively a ugroompricer 
rather than a dowry payment. Although the amount of total expenditure of both the 
bride’s and groom’s families increased dramatically with increases in economic status, 
education (especially higher education), and employment in high sta tus occupations, we 
found tha t  an evaluation of the total amount of money spent by each family was not an 
accurate indicator of the economics of the situation. In nearly all cases of groomprice, 
although the groom’s family spent considerable money on clothes and ornaments for the 
bride and her family, nearly all of these goods returned with the bride to the husband’s 
house upon the consummation of the marriage. Although these goods nominally 
belonged to the young bride, they were in fact controlled by the head of the husband’s 
extended family and his wife, who had the power to redistribute the items of the dowry
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among various family members, put away some items for use in future weddings, or 
even, in cases of hardship, sell some of the items of the dowry in order to raise money to 
meet household expenses.
This situation is in direct contravention to the traditional legal concepts of the 
society and contemporary law, both of which recognize the rights of the woman to the 
ownership of the items of her dowry. The reasons for the existence of this custom may be 
related to the extremely low sta tus of young'brides, as well as to the prevailing norms of 
concentration of wealth and power among certain groups. In an analysis of women’s 
property rights in northwest India, Sharma described the strict limitation of women’s 
access to property, especially regarding wealth-producing property (i.e. land) as a 
strategy designed to limit the fragmentation of landholdings which can occur when many 
children are produced. Upholding the integrity of estates is im portant to the 
maintenance of a class society as it ensures tha t  at least some members of the 
property-owning group maintain their socio-economic position from generation to 
generation (Sharma, 1980: 202). Thus, the limitation of inheritance of wealth-producing 
property to a particular group is another method of maintaining the system of class 
hierarchy prevalent in the society, as it acts to prevent excessive division of estates, and 
thus the degradation of substantial holdings over t im e.1 Similarly, the limitation of 
ownership of women’s property gifted as dowry is yet another method by which wealth 
and power is concentrated among the older generation, thus maintaining the dominance 
of the family patriarch over the younger family members by reducing the access of the 
young to economic resources.
In addition to the traditional groomprice payments discussed above, there was also 
a considerable incidence of brideprice weddings, especially among the poorer and lower
1. Although the fragmentation of land, and consequent impoverishment of many farm families 
is currently an issue of grave importance in rural India, this probably poses a much greater threat 
to the maintenance of the class system now than in the past. The much higher mortality on the 
Indian subcontinent prior to World War II (Dyson, 1986) made it unlikely that a sufficient num­
ber of sons would survive to adulthood to give rise to extensive partition of estates.
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caste families. In brideprice weddings the majority of cash and goods was given from the 
groom a n d /o r  his family to the parents of the bride. In these marriages, we found that 
the traditional practices which served to weaken the bonds and support systems between 
the young bride and her natal family were less operable, both because of the economic 
value of the woman to her natal family - in terms of her possible contribution of labor, 
and in terms of the possibility of her remarrying and again bringing a substantial 
brideprice - and because of the economic value of the woman to her husband in terms of 
the brideprice which he has had to pay.
DEM OG RAPHIC IM PLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
In assessing the demographic implications of the study, it is necessary to discuss 
the possible fertility impacts of the sharp decline in the waiting period between marriage 
and gauna  found in the study area, which is documented in Chapter 4 and summarized 
in the preceding section. As illustrated in Table 4.5 the average time lag between 
ceremonial and effective marriage in the study area has declined sharply, from an 
average of 2.0 years in 1930-39 to 0.8 years in 1980-83. This ongoing decline was 
occurring in all s t ra ta  of society, regardless of caste, education, occupation or economic 
status. On the basis of information gleaned during travels in other parts of the state , as 
well as from the reports of village brides whose natal villages lay in other parts of 
Farrukhabad or neighboring districts, I obtained a strong indication tha t  this decrease in 
the time lag between marriage and gauna  was not confined to the study area alone, but 
was also occurring in other parts of the state. Thus, I thought it not unreasonable to 
make an exploratory comparison between this cultural trend and census da ta  available 
on age a t  ceremonial marriage for the district and state.
Table 4.1 shows the reported ages at ceremonial marriage from the different 
censuses since 1891 (the census does not collect information on age at effective 
marriage). Since the village data  only extends back until the 1930s, I am unable to make 
a comparison for the earlier years. Owing to the spate of marriages which occurred prior
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to the implementation of the Sarda Act in 1930, raising the legal minimum ages at 
marriage to 14 for girls and 18 for boys, the mean ages at marriage from the 1931 census 
are abnormally low, and deviate from the general pattern  of a steady increase in the 
mean age a t  marriage since the turn of the century. Because of this, and because the 
da ta  which I have stretching back to 1931 are very sparse, 1 have chosen to compare the 
change in age at marriage from 1941 to 1981 documented in the census to the results 
derived from the study. Census results from Farrukhabad district illustrate an increase 
in the mean age at marriage for females, from 14.0 in 1941 to 16.1 in 1981, yielding a net 
increase of 2.1 years. Assuming that the average decline of 1.1 years in the time lag 
between marriage and gauna  derived from the current study is illustrative of patterns in 
the district as a whole, we can see tha t  at least one half of the observed 2.1 year rise in 
the age at marriage for Farrukhabad district between 1941 and 1981 has been due to a 
decrease in the time lag between ceremonial and effective marriage, and only one half 
due to an actual rise in the age at effective marriage. The comparison becomes less 
convincing when the da ta  are compared to trends in age at marriage at the s tate  level, 
because of changes in scale and because of the inclusion of the culturally quite different 
Himalayan regions. Although it is impossible to generalize further, the current finding 
does inject a disturbing note into studies of marriage and fertility in U ttar  Pradesh 
based on census da ta  alone.
In any case, the mean age at marriage in U ttar  Pradesh has only recently 
increased to the point where substantial fertility effects are probable. In Chapter 1, I 
discussed a possible rise in age at marriage in the light of evidence suggesting that 
because of adolescent sterility and the increased risk of secondary sterility due to 
complications associated with early pregnancy, an increase in age at effective marriage 
up until perhaps 16 years of age would have little impact on fertility, and tha t  it was 
only when age at marriage increased past the age of 16 or so tha t  substantial fertility
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effects were probable.“ Further increases in the female age at marriage would probably 
have significant fertility impacts, and thus it might be useful to discuss the probable 
future course of age at marriage in the s ta te  and district.
Although it is impossible to generalize from this study to the more developed, 
urbanized or Himalayan districts of U ttar  Pradesh, we can say th a t  the trend for 
Farrukhabad and other districts of the central plains seems to be towards a continued 
slow rise in female age at marriage, m uch 'o f  which will initially be accounted for by 
further decreases in the time lag between marriage and gauna , but which will probably 
eventually begin to change the age at effective marriage as well. Given the low status of 
women and the advantages of the current marriage system for maintaining patterns of 
authority  and dominance within the household, I do not see much potential for rapid 
change, and feel th a t  while the cultural patterns described in the thesis are being 
challenged to some degree by Government programs, media presentations, and other 
modernizing influences, the influences toward stasis are also strong enough to ensure 
th a t  change will not be rapid.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Since Independence, the Indian government has implemented many positive 
policies with the intention of introducing equity into the marriage system. Laws have 
been passed raising the legal minimum age at marriage to 18 for girls and 21 for boys, 
prohibiting the taking of dowry, and legalizing divorce and inter-caste marriage (see 
Mehta, 1981, Vlassoff, 1982). In addition, many other laws have been passed giving basic 
rights to women - rights to vote, to own property in their own name,and to inherit a 
share of the property and land of their fathers. However, in practice, other than voting, 
few if any North Indian women avail themselves of these rights.
2. It must be noted, however, that the age of 16 is an arbitrary one which has been put forward 
based upon data from clinical studies of Indian populations, and that the possible fertility impacts 
of given female ages at marriage would tend to vary substantially with factors such as general 
health and nutritional status.
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In a society with strong customs of early marriage for women, parents fear tha t  if 
they delay the marriages of their daughters, they might have trouble getting them 
married. Similarly, parents feel tha t  if they do not provide a substantial dowry, they will 
be unable to a t t rac t  a suitable bridegroom - a reasonable fear given the current a ttitudes 
of families of eligible boys in wanting to maximize their “profits” in the marriage 
market. Parents  of boys reason tha t  if they can get an equally suitable bride with a 
substantial dowry, why should they marry one who brings nothing? The caste barrier is 
one major impediment to love marriages, as the odds of falling in love by chance with 
someone of the same caste and subcaste are small. And, as discussed in chapter 6, the 
custom of non-returnability of the dowry is still ubiquitous in northern India, even in 
cases where divorce is obtained on the grounds of the neglect or cruelty of the husband.
Despite legislation providing for the ownership and inheritance of land by women, 
the widespread custom in northern India is of the daughter not claiming her rightful 
share of the father’s property, as such a claim would be viewed by the family as selfish 
and as usurping part of her brothers’ inheritance. In north India, the regard and 
assistance of her brother is a necessary insurance and support system to a woman 
throughout her life as, after her parents die, he is her primary connection with her natal 
village, and is in a unique position to offer her refuge in case of marital or financial 
troubles, divorce or widowhood. Many north Indian customs such as the holiday of 
rakhi , in which the sister ties a colored thread around the bro ther’s wrist, symbolizing 
her reliance upon him for support and protection, provide graphic illustration of this 
ongoing bond between sister and brother. In a society with so few institutionalized 
support systems for women, where the women is traditionally separated from her natal 
family and village and where solidarity between women in the marital family is inhibited 
because of concepts of insider-outsider, as well as prevailing patterns of authority  and 
dominance, the potential assistance and support of the brother is extremely im portant, 
and women are loth to jeopardize this vital support system by exercising their legal 
rights to inherit a share of the father's land.
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Although any examination of land records in north India will show a few women 
owning land, this seldom reflects actual control over the land and its profits. More often 
the ownership of land by women is simply a deception used by the large landowners to 
evade the recent legislation which puts a ceiling on the amount of land which a person 
can own. Thus, if a man owns more than the legal maximum amount of land, he may 
transfer ownership of some of his land to his wife’s or sister’s name. In virtually all cases, 
the man retains effective control over the use of the land, as well as retaining all of the 
profits.
The Indian government continues to make efforts to improve the general status of 
women. Recent Five-Year-Plans have allocated substantial funds to programs to provide
9
education0 and related vocational training to women, to improve maternal and child 
health, as well as allocating some funds for programs to provide daycare facilities for 
working mothers, and hostels where unmarried working girls can live in the cities 
(Government of India, 1985). However, much of the Indian bureaucracy is inefficient, 
and as few people are willing to work in the more backward rural areas, a 
disproportionate amount of this aid goes to the cities, or to already comparatively 
advantaged rural areas. In any case, the money available for these programs is small in 
comparison to the size of the population, and only a minority of women reap their 
benefits.
With regard to the policy implications of the current work, it is clear tha t  if the 
laws currently in existence regarding marriage and property rights for women were 
obeyed, both the marriage system and the status of women in the society would be 
immeasurably improved. Many of the social ills discussed in this thesis, such as 
ill-treatment of young brides over dowry, child marriage, and marriage to unsuitable 
partners would be greatly reduced or eliminated by the implementation of the laws
3. However, the types of education offered are often inappropriate for the needs of rural Indian 
women, and education of girls seems to have less positive influence in terms of increasing general 
knowledge than similar levels of education for boys (Vlassoff, 1980: 434).
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already in existence. The enforcement of such laws regulating personal and familial 
relationships is difficult in a democratic society, as it is impossible to “put a policeman 
in every bedroom” . W hat can be done is to intensify efforts to instil more egalitarian 
values in the people, and convince them of the desirability of a compliance with these 
policies through education and mass media programs. Policies such as providing school 
textbooks illustrating principles of equality and showing women and scheduled caste 
persons in high sta tus or powerful positions, or creating popular radio dramas having 
women engineers as well as housewives, can contribute to changing people’s ideas about 
desirable roles and occupations for women and members of scheduled castes. A more 
radical move would be to introduce stories about love or inter-caste marriage in a similar 
manner.
But change will doubtless come slowly, as people occupying positions of authority 
and privilege in the society will be loth to relinquish their special advantages in the 
name of such abstract concepts as “equality” . Ultimately the adoption of the practices 
implied in current Indian legislation would lead to far-reaching changes to the fabric of 
Indian society. The exercise of options such as inter-caste marriage would lead to the 
eventual breakdown of the caste system. Other policies such as the abolition of dowry 
and child marriage would lead to increased female sta tus and autonomy, while spousal 
self-selection would contribute to a decline in patriarchal authority. These are laudable 
changes but ones which will not be easy, and which actually tend to go against many of 
the most revered concepts of Hindu philosophy, those of karma  and dharma  which state  
tha t  a person is born into a scheduled caste because of past wrongdoing, and tha t  the 
highest goal in life should be not to try to rise above tha t  position, but to fulfill the fated 
position to perfection. Similarly, any struggle by women to wrest equality from the 
system goes against the fundamental concepts of feminine virtue, and the desirable traits  
of the “ideal Indian woman” as illustrated by Sita. in the Ramayana - always faithful, 
uncomplaining and cheerful, ready to serve her husband’s whims, whether reasonable or 
not, and enduring abuse, rejection, and m istrust, and returning only perfect love and
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obedience. An excerpt from a letter of one woman reader to M anush i.  an Indian feminist 
magazine, may serve to illustrate the silver threads with which Indian women today are 
bound, and the emerging determination of at least a few to break free of these 
stereotypes.
The ideals, ethics and morality heaped on women since time immemorial are 
suffocating and killing. The adjectives used to praise us have become 
oppressive. Calling us loving, they have locked us in the closed room of culture, 
calling us gentle, they have reflected us in a mirror of helplessness, calling us 
kind, they have tied us in cowardice, they have handcuffed us with modesty 
and chained our feet with loyalty, so tha t  far from running, we have not been 
able even to walk ... Today we are not Sitas but Saritas, flowing, free, able to 
cross rocks, we are Manushis, singers of liberation, vehicles of liberation, 
Manushis (Kishwar and Vanita, 1984: 298-299).
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G L OSSARY OF SELECTED H IN D I W O R D S
barat Marriage party consisting of the groom ’s family and friends upon their 
travel to the bride’s house for the wedding.
bidi Home-made cigarette
burtun Cooking pots, cooking utensils
chapatis
chula
Flat unleavened bread, usually made from wheat 
Fireplace or hearth used for cooking
dahej Dowry
dana A gift
darwaza Doorway
dharm a A general term denoting one’s duty in life, especially in regard to religious 
duties or ideas of righteousness
dhola Literally, a drum - also the name of an alternative type of marriage 
ceremony performed in north India, where the marriage takes place at the 
groom’s rather than the bride’s house.
gauna The ceremony of the bride’s going to her husband’s house after a 
post-marriage interval. This usually marks the beginning of cohabitation 
of the couple.
ghee Clarified butter
gotra A smaller division of caste than a subcaste: usually regarded as referring
to a lineage 
jajm ani system
An anthropological term used to refer to the interrelation of services
kanya-dan
between families of different castes within a village in which labor or 
services (such as washing clothes or cutting hair) are exchanged for other 
labor, for periodic paments in kind (usually grain), or for cash.
Literally “gift of a virgin” - refers to a portion of the marriage ceremony 
where the bride’s father ceremonially places the bride's hands in those of 
the bridegroom, signifying the gift of his daughter to the bridegroom.
karma A general term meaning one’s fate or destiny
lagun The engagement or premarital ceremony in the Hindu marriage system
mukh dekana Literally “showing of the face"’ - a custom which takes place at the
paise
panchayat
pradhan
bridegroom’s house a few days after the wedding in which neighborhood 
women pay a few paise for the privilege of lifting up the new bride's veils 
and seeing her face
Indian coin worth 1/100 of a rupee.
Elected village council or arbitration committee
Village headman
184
puja
pundit
purdah
rakhi
sari
sati
sharm
sindur
stridhana
tilak
Religious worship
A religious priest or official, usually a Brahman, who may or may not also 
be an astrologer
Literally, “curtain"’ - refers to the veiling and seclusion of women from the 
eyes of outsiders
A Hindu festival celebrated in north India in which a sacred thread is tied 
by the sister around the wrist of the brother as a mark of affection and 
which binds the brother to protect her in times of crisis
Traditional Indian dress consisting of five (or sometimes seven) meters of 
cloth wrapped around the lower body, and bosom, and thrown over the 
left shoulder
1) The custom of immolation of women on the funeral pyres of their 
husbands, 2) A woman who burns herself willingly on the funeral pyre of 
her husband out of devotion
Shame, shyness, bashfulness.
A red powder which is placed in the parting of a wom an’s hair after 
marriage
Originally a Sanskrit word referring to dowry, women’s wealth, or 
women’s property (in terms of personal possessions such as clothing and 
ornaments)
An ornamental or religious mark placed in the center of the forehead
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CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC INDEX
The following point scores were assigned to various items owned 
by households:
Land: 2^ points per acre of irrigated farmland owned.
1% points per acre of non-irrigated land owned.
1 point per acre of land leased by household.
House: 1 point per mud room
2 points per brick room.
Animals: bullock:
cow:
buffalo: 
goat: 
chicken:
Agricultural tools :
iron plough: 2
wooden plough: 1
tractor: 80
tubewell engine: 20 
bullock cart: 12
chaff cutter: 5
fodder machine: 3
5 points 
2 points 
4 points 
1 point 
^ point
points
point
points
points
points
points
points
Non-agricultural tools:
sewing machine: 10 points
■flour mill: 70 points
other tools of trade: as evaluated
Household Possessions:
bicycle: 
radio : 
clock: 
watch: 
torch: 
lantern:
hand flour mill: 
cot:
10 points 
3 points 
2 points 
1 point
1 point
2 points 
5 points 
1 point
The number of items of each type owned by the household was 
multiplied by the point value assigned to each item, and then 
summed. This number was then divided by the number of household 
members, with adults counting for one point each, and children 
under 16 counting for % point each.
